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Abstract
This thesis analyses three versions o f the Absolute in romanticism as it moves towards
modernism. First, the system in Hegel's writing and the Promethean Age in Shelley's
Prometheus Unbound demonstrate the dissolving positive Absolute. Prometheus
Unbound, in conjunction with Athenaeum Fragemente, is also an example of the literary
Absolute. Second, the overthrown Titans in Keats's Hyperion exemplify a negative
absolute fraught with Freudian melancholy and Benjaminian allegory due to the loss of
the ideal. Finally, the dynamic Absolute unfolds in Keats's The Fall o f Hyperion, which
attempts to accept the loss o f the Absolute through Moneta’s productive melancholy, as
defined by Kristeva, and the dreamer-poet’s recognition o f his humanity. The Fall o f
Hyperion also presents an art that creates a bridge between an art couched in negativity
and an art that must soothe the world. In contrast with the lingering phantasm o f the
Absolute in modernism, o f which the incomprehensible ruins in Eliot's The Waste Land
are an example, the Absolute persists in The Fall o f Hyperion. This thesis, therefore,
' V
defines romanticism as the movement which, despite changing definitions of the
Absolute, still clings to the ideal, while also opening up the discussion of modernism's
difference from romanticism.

Keywords: Romanticism, Absolute, Hegel, Percy Bysshe Shelley, Prometheus Unbound,
Keats, Hyperion, Fall o f Hyperion, Athenaeum Fragmente, Literary Absolute, Nancy,
Lacoue-Labarthe, Benjamin, Freud, Kristeva, Modernism, T. S. Eliot, The Waste Land,
Allegory, Melancholy
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Introduction
v

In the introduction to The Indivisible Remainder, Slavoj Zizek argues against Martin
Heidegger’s reading o f F. W. J. Schelling as a thinker o f finitude who fails to go far
enough in the direction o f thinking finitude. Instead, Zizek maintains that the concept o f
the Absolute must be at the core o f any thinking about Schelling:
Our reading is radically opposed to such a reduction o f Schelling to an
“intermediate” phenomenon whereby, in order to obtain the analytics o f finitude,
one has only to cast off the form o f the Absolute: we are as far as possible from
dismissing Schelling's narrative o f the A bsolute. . . In dealing with Schelling's N
Weltalter, one should always bear in mind the precise discursive context o f his
endeavour: his ultimate aim was to realize the so-called 'oldest systematic
programme o f German Idealism' from his youth, and to deliver the system o f
'rational mythology' which would present the highest insights into the nature of
the Absolute in a popular-mythological form. (8-9)
In effect, one could say that the Absolute is also fundamental to studying other

Romantics.'1' -

''
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My thesis thus falls under the purview o f Zizek’s introduction, as it examines the
changing Absolutes in Romanticism, while also arguing that holdingonto the ideal is part
o f what makes a Romantic part o f his or her age. I will pursue three different''versions of
the ideal: the positive, yet always already dissolving Absolute in G. W. F. Hegel’s
depiction o f the Absolute as totality and unity and in Percy Bysshe Shelley’s depiction of
the ideal as the Promethean Age in Promethus Unbound; the negative, melancholic
Absolute in John Keats’s Hyperion; and what I will define as the dynamic Absolute in
Keats’s Fall o f Hyperion: First, allow me to survey the different uses o f the word
“Absolute” while also outlining the development o f my argument. A general definition of
the Absolute is a willingness to follow something to its absolute limit and to risk
everything in that following.

2
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The Positive Absolute
Kant and Hegel .
In Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique o f Pure Reason), Immanuel Kant outlines the use
o f the word “Absolute” in his era and also defines his use o f the word:
Das Wort absolut wird jetzt öfters gebraucht, um blos anzuzeigen, dass etwas von
einer Sache an sich selbst betrachtet und also innerlich gelte. In dieser Bedeutung
würde absolutmöglich das bedeuten, was an sich selbst {interne) möglich ist,
welches in der That das Wenigste ist, was man von einem Gegenstände sagen
kann. Dagegen wird es auch bisweilen gebraucht, um anzuzeigen, dass Etwas in
aller Beziehung (uneingeschränkt) gültig ist, (z. B. die absolute Herrschaft,) und
absolutmöglich würde in dieser Bedeutung dasjenige bedeuten, was in aller
Absicht, in aller Beziehung möglich ist, welches wiederum das Meiste ist, was ich
über die Möglichkeit eines Dinges sagen k a n n . . .
^
In dieser erweiterten Bedeutung werde ich mich denn des Worts: absolut,
bedienen, und es dem blos cömparativ oder in besonderer Rücksicht Gültigen
entgegensetzen; den dieses Letztere ist auf Bedingungen restringirt, jenes aber
gilt ohne Restriction. (283-284)1
Absolute knowledge, then, would be knowledge that knows itself even as it knows what
it knows, which would be far from the empirical data we normally observe and which
would form the infinity o f knowledge. Absolute knowledge; for Hegel and other idealists,
'x

is the absolute knowing o f an absolute spirit. Kant, however, does not readily accept the
possibility o f achieving absolute knowledge, despite

^

gewisse[r] Erkenntnisse, [die] sogar das Feld aller möglichen Erfahrungen
verlassen, und durch Begriffe, denen überall kein entsprechender Gegenstand in

1
The word absolute is at present frequently used to denote that something can be predicated o f a
thing considered in itself and intrinsically. In this sense absolutely possible would signify that which is
possible in itself {interne)— which is, in fact, the least that one can predicate o f an object. On the other
hand, it is sometimes employed to indicate that a thing is valid in all respects— for example, absolute
sovereignty. Absolutely possible would in this sense signify that which is possible in all relations and in
every respect; and this is the most that can be predicated o f the possibility o f a thing . . .
In this enlarged signification then shall I employ the word absolute, in opposition to that which is
valid only in some particular respect; for the latter is restricted by conditions, the former is valid without ;
any restriction whatever. (204) From Immanuel Kant, Critique o f Pure Reason, Trans. J.M.D. Meiklejohn
(New York: Colonial Press, 1900). All further translations o f Kritik der reinen VernunftWiW be from this
edition.
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der Erfahrung gegeben werden kann, den Umfang unserer Urtheile in über alle
Grenzen derselben zu erweitern den Anschein haben.
Und gerade in diesen letzteren Erkenntnissen, welche über die Sinnenwelt
hinausgehen, wo Erfahrung gar keinen Leitfaden noch Berichtigung geben kann,
liegen die Nachforschungen unserer Vernunft, die wir, der Wichtigkeit nach, für
"/weit /■■-.
”- ■
" ■■
/■/.
vorzüglicher und ihre Endabsicht für viel erhabener halten, als Alles, was der,
Verstand im Felde der Erscheinungen lernen kann, wobei wir, sogar auf die
Gefahr zu irren, eher Alles wagen, als dass wir so angelegentliche
Untersuchungen aus irgend einem Grunde der Bedenklichkeit, oder aus
Geringschätzung und Gleichgültigkeit aufgeben sollten. Diese unvermeidlichen
Aufgaben der reinen Vernunft selbst sind Gott, Freiheit und Unsterblichkeit. (40)2
I would add the Absolute to this list o f “Aufgaben [problems or challenges],” as Kant
terms them (40;5). The persistence in following the Absolute pushes Kant’s insistence
that we cannot know what we cannot observe to the wayside and it also leads to the
conventional notion o f absolute idealism or absolute knowledge as something to be
striven towards in eternity.
Hegel’s version o f the Absolute, a variant o f the positive Absolute which I will
further define in Chapter One, is a systematized whole that is constantly progressing
towards achieving absolute knowledge. Hegel insists on the system with his progression
o f art from the classical to symbolic to romantic. The ideal art is the unity o f Spirit and
form, but romantic art’s trouble in fulfilling this criterion questions the possibility o f the
Absolute and thus Hegel argues for the end o f art and turns instead to philosophy. This
turn, however, presents Hegel’s fervour for, and attempt to conceal issues with, the
Absolute. Hegel’s letters to K. J. H. Windischmann disclose his personal belief in the
2
the consideration that certain o f our cognitions rise completely above the sphere o f all possible
experience, and by means o f conceptions, to which there exists in the whole extent o f experience no
corresponding object, seem to extend the range o f our judgments beyond its bounds. And just in this
transcendental or supersensible sphere, where experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance, lie the
investigations o f Reason, which, on account o f their importance, we consider far preferable to, and as
having a far more elevated aim than, all that the understanding can achieve within the sphere o f sensuous
phenomena. So high a value do we set upon these investigations, that even at the risk o f error, we persist in
following them outj and permit neither doubt nor disregard nor indifference to restrain us from the pursuit.
These unavoidable problems o f mere pure reason are God, Freedom (o f will) and Immortality. (4-5)

4
negative and his simultaneous argument that reason will pull us out o f the negative.
Hegel’s enthusiasm, thus, suggests an eventual dissolution of the ideal.

Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound and the Literary Absolute
Percy Bysshe Shelley’s Absolute in Prometheus Unbound is the Promethean Age. This
Absolute, despite its attempts to suppress the negative by stressing harmonization as well
as the talents that Prometheus has endowed on humankind, also begins to dissolve:
primarily because Prometheus is an allegory, distanced from the age named for him and
which he should represent. He is unable to recall his curse, which leads to his diminished
sense o f self, authority, and a diminished authority o f words. Despite this, Shelley
presents the new age through the allegory o f Prometheus äs Christ the saviour and
through imagery and language which depict progress and potentiality. The unravelling o f
the Absolute, however, is inescapable, as the problem o f defining the genre o f the play as
lyrical drama or political allegory reveals. As a political allegory, the play attempts to
reach for something higher - the golden age - but fails to do so, and as such falls back
into the fragmented Promethean Age. Indeed Shelley acknowledges the ideal as already
dissolving in his preface to the play where he suggests that his play is hypothesis.
The self-critical nature o f Prometheus Unbound thus reveals the play as an
instance o f “Transcendentalpoesie [transcendental poetry],” which the authors of
Athenaeum Fragmente define in Fragment 238:
Es giebt eine Poesie, deren Eins und Alles das Verhältniß des Idealen und des
Realen ist, und die also nach der Analogie der philosophischen Kunstsprache
Transcendentalpoesie heißen m üßte.. .So wie man aber wenig Werth auf eine
Transcendentalphilosophie legen würde, die nicht kritisch wäre, nicht auch das
Producirende mit dem Produkt darstellte, und im System der transcendentalen :
Gedanken zugleich eine Charakteristik des transcendentalen Denkens enthielte: so
sollte wohl auch jene Poesie die in modernen Dichtem nicht seltnen
transcendentalen Materialien und Vorübungen zu einer poetischen Theorie des

5
(
Dichtungsvermögens... mit der künstlerischen Reflexion und schönen
Selbstbespiegelung, und [sich selbst] in jeder ihrer Darstellungen mit darstellen,
und überall zugleich Poesie und Poesie der Poesie seyn. {Athenaeum, 2: 64-65)3
Simply put: the theory o f the poem is a poem. The Jena romantics preferred the fragment
as the form for transcendental poetry, as it is full o f potentiality even in an incomplete
state. The authors o f Athenaeum Fragmente define these aspects o f the fragment in
Fragment 116: “Die romantische Poesie ist eine progressive Universalpoesie... Die
romantische Dichtart ist noch im Werden; ja das ist ihr eigentliches Wesen, daß sie ewig
nur werden, nie vollendet seyn kann” (2: 28-30);4>and in Fragment 383: “Es giebt eine
Art von Witz, den man wegen seiner Gediegenheit, Ausführlichkeit und Symmetrie den
architektonischen nennen möchte . . . Er muß ordentlich systematisch seyn, und doch
auch wieder nicht; bey aller Vollständigkeit muß dennoch etwas zu fehlen scheinen, wie
abgerissen” (2: 117).5

■ :■■■'

While the authors o f Athenaeum did not use the term “Absolute,” Jean-Luc Nancy
and Philipe Lacoue-Labarthe develop their theory o f the literary Absolute based, in large
part, on the Athenaeum Fragmente. Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe argue that
le romantisme implique quelque chose d’inédit, - la production de quelque chose
d’i n é d i t . ils finiront quand même par appeler - bon an, mal an - littérature. . .
3 “There is a kind o f poetry whose essence lies in the relation between ideal and real, and which
therefore, by analogy to philosophical jargon, should be called transcendental poetry. . . just as we
wouldn’t think much o f an uncritical transcendental philosophy that doesn’t represent the producer along
with the product and contain at the same time within the system'of transcendental thoughts a description o f
their thinking: so too this sort o f poetry should unite the transcendental raw materials and preliminaries o f a
theory o f poetic creativity . . . with artistic reflection and self-mirroring . . . this poetry should describe
itself, and always be simultaneously poetry and the poetry o f poetry” (Fragment 238, 50-51). From
Friedrich Schlegel , Athenaeum Fragments, Philosophical Fragments, Trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis:
U o f Minnesota Press, 1991) 18-93. All further translations o f Athenaeum Fragmente will be from this : ;
edition.
■
4 “Romantic poetry is a progressive, universal poetry : : . The romantic kind o f poetry is still in the
state o f becoming; that, in fact, is its real essence: that it should forever be becoming and never perfected”
(Fragment 116, 31-32).
5 “There is a kind o f wit which, because o f its solidity, thoroughness, and symmetry, one is 1 . ;
tempted to call architectonic w it . . . It has to be properly systematic, and then again it doesn’t; with all its
completeness, something should still seem to be missing, as if tom away” (Fragment 383,78).
<\
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Et qu’ils auront en tout cas explicitement visé sous les espèces d’un genre
nouveau. . . Au-dèla des partages et de toute dé-finition, ce genre s’est donc
programmé dans le romantisme comme le genre de la littérature : la généricité, si
l’on ose dire, et la générativité de la littérature, se saisissant et se produisant ellesmêmes en une Œuvre inédite, infiniment inédite. U absolu, par consequent, de la
littérature. Mais aussi son ab-solu, sa mise à l’écart dans la parfaite clôture sur soi
(sur sa propre organicité). (21 )6
.
With their posterior view, though they do argue that we are still part o f romanticism, the
critics develop a theory o f romanticism and the literary Absolute:
L’absolu de la littérature, ce n’est pas tant la poésie (laquelle invente elle aussi
son concept moderne dans le fragment 116 de 1’Athenaeum) que la poïesie ; selon un recours étymologie que les Romantiques ne manquent pas de faire. La
poïesie, c’est-à-dire la production. La pensée du « g e n re litté ra ire » concerne
donc moins la production de la chose littéraire que la production, absolument
parlant. La poésie romantique entend pénétrer l’essence de la poïesie, la chose
littéraire y produit la vérité de la production en soi, et donc, on le vérifiera sans :
cesse ici, de la production de soi, de l’autopoïesie. Et s’il est vr ai . . . que
T autoproduction forme l’instance ultime de la clôture de l’absolu spéculatif, il
faut reconnaître dans la pensée romantique non seulement l’absolu de la
littérature, mais la littérature en tant que l’absolu. Le romantisme, c’est
l’inauguration de Y absolu littéraire. (21)7
Thus, the literary Absolute is a mitigated version o f the philosophical Absolute of
absolute idealism, but it moves the Absolute from the realm o f philosophy to literature.
This move is similar to Hegel’s attempts to unify absolute Spirit and form in romantic art.

6 romanticism implies something entirely new, the production o f something entirely n e w . . . they
decided to call it - all things considered - literature ... [and] will approach it explicitly as a new genre. . .
beyond divisions and all de-finition, this genre is thus programmed in romanticism as the genre o f
literature : the genericity, so to speak, and the generativity o f literature, grasping and producing themselves
in an entirely new, infinitely new Work. The absolute, therefore, o f literature. But its absolute, its isolation
in its perfect closure upon itself (upon its own organicity). (11) From Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-.
Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory o f Literature in German Romanticism, Trans. Philip
Barnard and Cheryl Lester (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988). All further translations o f L 'absolu littéraire will
be from this edition.
7 The absolute o f literature is not so much poetry (whose modem concept is also invented in
Athenaeum fragment 116) as it is poeisy, according to an etymological appeal that the romantics do not fail
to make. Poeisy or, in other words, production. The thought o f the “literary genre” is thus less concerned
with the production o f the literary thing that with production, absolutely speaking. Romantic poetry sets out
to penetrate the essence o f poeisy, in which the literary thing produces the truth o f production in itself, and
thus, as will be evident in all that follows, the truth o f the production o f itself, o f autopoeisy. And if it is
true . . . that auto-production constitutes the ultimate instance and closure o f the speculative absolute, then
romantic thought involves not only the absolute o f literature, but literature as the absolute. Romanticism is
the inauguration o f the literary absolute. (11-12)

7
Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe provide a concise definition o f “l’absolu littéraire:”
Le romantisme n'est ni « d e la littéra tu re » (ils en inventent le concept) ni même,
simplement, une « th é o rie de la littéra tu re » (ancienne et moderne), mais la
théorie elle-même comme littérature ou, cela re-vient au même, la littérature se
produisant en produisant sa propre théorie. L’absolu littéraire, c’est aussi, et peutêtre avant tout, cëtte absolue opération littéraire. (22)8
::
The literary Absolute, thus, is its own system, containing literature, its theory, and the
“opération littéraire [literary operation]” (22; 12).
.

:■<:
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Romanticism and the literary Absolute are not approachable by any models of

revolution or emergence, but only through the philosophical path, through the crisis o f ;
the subject and “un rapport inédit - et imprévisible - ...entre esthétique et philosophie”
which Kant articulates in the third Critique (43).9 As Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe tell it,
the transcendental Aesthetic presents “dans le « s e n s i b l e » lui-même, c’est-à-dire
l’intuitif, le partage entre deux formes {apriori)” (43).1012This means that there is no
longer an “intuitus orignarius,” no longer ah “archè” or “télos” and “[ce qui] avait
toujours été présent pour assurer le philosophique lui-même [disparaît]” (43).11 This leads
to “[une] forme vide [an empty form]” (43;30) in place o f the subject,\“le « j e » . . . qui
« acco m pagne mes representations». Et cela, on le sait encore, parce que la forme du
temps, qui est la « fo rm e du sens in te rn e » , ne permet aucune présentation substantielle.
Le « c o g i t o » kantien, la chose est bien connue, est un cogito vide” (43).

This empty1

subject adopts the distilled form (“la forme pure”) o f “une function d’unité ou de synthèse
8 “Romanticism is neither mere “literature” (they invent the concept) nor simply a “theory o f
literature” (ancient and modem). Rather, it is theory itself as literature, or in other words, literature
producing itself as it produces its own theory. The literary absolute is also, and perhaps, above all, this
absolute literary operation (12).
9 “an entirely new and unforeseeable relation between aesthetics and philosophy” (29)
10 “the division between two forms (a priori) within the ‘sensible’ or intuitive s e lf’ (30).
11 “what had heretofore ensured the philosophical itself disappears” (30)
12 “[an] T . . . that ‘accompanies my representations.’ This is so because the form o f time, which
is the ‘form ofth e internal sense,’ permits no substantial presentation. As is well known, the Kantian
‘cogito’ is empty” (30).

8
[a,function o f unity or synthesis]” (43;30). This synthesis is similar to Hegel’s définition
o f art as that which unifies the Spirit and form. Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, however,
insist that this unity must be created as a Bild, as a representation or picture, without
eventually turning to philosophy alone. Thus, for the critics, “une voie [peut] se frayer [a
path [is] forged]” by romanticism (46;33), by literature between speculative idealism and
“la « p o é s ie de la p o é s ie » [the ‘poetry o f poetry’]” (46;33): it is “le projet de
reconquérir la possibilité d’une spéculation effective —c’est-à-dire la possibilité de
Tauto-reconnaissance de l’Idée comme la forme propre du sujet” (47).

Thus, in place o f

the intuitus orignarius and the empty subject, romanticism develops a literary Absolute, a
production which allows us to seek the Absolute or the Ideal. In regards to Shelley’s
Prometheus Unbound, then, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe’s literary Absolute embodies
the values we must embody to reach the Promethean Age.
The literary Absolute follows from Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe’s interpretation
o f the statement in “Ältestes Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus” (“Earliest
Program for a System o f German Idealism”) that “die Philosophie desyGeistes ist eine
ästhetische Philosophie] [the philosophy o f the Spirit is an aesthetic philosophy]”
(83;73): “la « philosophie de l’E s p rit» , cela désigne évidemment la philosophie. . . du
Sujet lui-même, dans son idéalité ou, ce qui revient au meme, son absoluité” (49).1314 Since
î

the Spirit is alive and organic, the form it adopts must also be organic while alsobeing
aesthetic: “la philosophie doit s’accomplir en œuvre d’art: l’art est Y organon speculative
par excellence/ ... la force formatrice est la force esthétique. Par là s’explique d’ailleurs

13 “the project o f reconquering the possibility o f effective speculation, the possibility in other :
words, o f the auto-recognition o f the Ideal, as the subject’s own form” (33). : .
14 ‘“the philosophy o f the Spirit’ clearly designates the philosophy. . . o f the Subject itself, in its
ideality, or, in other words, in its absoluteness” (34).

9
que la visée de l’Idée soit une acte (ce quit suppose à la fois la force, voire la volonté, et
le sujet) et que la visée de l’idée de beauté, l’acte esthétique, puisse être dit l ’acte
suprême de la raison” (50).15 As such, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe reintroduce
philosophy into the realm o f aesthetics, while preserving art as art.
The best form for the literary Absolute is the fragment, in accordance with
Athenaeum Fragmente. Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe define the fragment as a genre, as
“[le] premier moment de la question de la littérature [the moment the question of
literature]” is first raised (25;14). The fragment has three traits: “le relatif inachèvement.
. . de chacune de ses pièces; - la variété et le mélange des objets dont peut traiter un
même ensemble de pièces; - [et] l’unité de l’ensemble, en revanche, comme constituée
en quelque sorte hors de l’œuvre, dans le sujet qui s’y donne à voir ou dans le jugemènt
qui y donne ses maximes” (58).1617O f particular importance is the incompletion o f the
fragment. Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe present this idea o f a poetry which is progressing
towards a completed state, but is forever incomplete, as such: “L’inachèvement, on l’a
vu, s’achève, et c’est lë fragment comme tel” (80).
désormais l’infinie vérité de l’œuvre” (69).

Further, “work inprogress énonce

The forever becoming aspect o f the

fragment means that it is organic, like the Spirit. Indeed, the Bodleian manuscript of
Prometheus Unbound, which reárranges the scenes o f the play, displays Shelley’s
intentions for an organic work o f art in progress, whose parts can be shuffled to form new

15 “philosophy must fulfill itself in a work o f art; art is the speculative organon par excellence . . .
formative power is aesthetic power. This explains why the aim o f the Idea should be an act (which implies
both power or will and the subject) and how the aim o f the idea o f beauty, the aesthetic act can be called the
‘the highest act o f Reason”' (35).
V
...... :
16 “the relative incom pletion. . . o f each o f its pieces; the variety and mixture o f objects that a
single ensemble o f pieces can treat; [and] the unity o f the ensemble, by contrast, constituted in a certain
way outside the work, in the subject that is seen in it, or in the judgment that proffers its maxims in it” (40).
17 “Incompletion completes itself and is the fragment as such” (5 7 ).; »
^
:
1 : 18 “work in progress henceforth becomes the infinite truth o f the work” (48).
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meanings.1920The literary Absolute must also harness irony, “en tant qu’elle s’adresse au
poète lui-même, montre au poète comme sa vérité - du point de vue de l’infini - sa
propre limitation, c’est-à-dire sa finitude” (205).

This definition o f irony correlates with

the definition o f transcendental poetry in Athenaeum Fragment 238: both insist upon a
certain self-reflection and criticism that is also apparent in Shelley’s preface to !
Prometheus Unbound. The literary Absolute, thus, preserves a positive Absolute through
terms like “progress,” “incompletion,” and “irony,” and the genre o f the fragment, which
acknowledges that the ideal will always be a potentiality that will be forever out o f reach.
The literary Absolute is the way in which to work towards absolute knowledge, as
the work o f art forever tries to embody, or posit itself as, the Absolute. Jan Plug focuses
on this attempt to materialize the Absolute in his essay “Romanticism and the Invention
o f Literature.” Plug critiques Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe’s work to provide a variant of
the literary Absolute, the materiality o f which interrupts the goal o f the literary Absolute.
As such, Plug begins paradoxically to deconstruct yet preserve the literary Absolute by
examining Kant’s aesthetics, Schelling’s Die Philosophie derKunst (The Philosophy o f
Art), and A. W. Schlegel’s theory o f artistic style in relation to the body. Kant’s
distinction between aesthetic and rational ideas yields the beginning of this interruption:
aesthetic ideas are intuitions without an adequate concept; rational ideas involve a
concept, but are not intuitions (Critique o f Judgment 187; Kritik der Urteilskraft 283284). Since aesthetic ideas do not have an adequate concept and because they cannot be *

19 The manuscript, which is housed in the Bodleian library, is divided into three notebooks.
Shelley hassplit the scenes o f Prometheus Unbound, often to juxtapose lyrical and dramatic scenes. The re
organized version o f the play points to a different meaning than the published version. Shelley may have
worked on this manuscript both before and after the publication o f Prometheus Unbound. For a more
detailed description ofth e three notebooks, see Rajan’s The Supplement o f Reading, page 319, footnote 27.
20 “insofar as it addresses the poet himself, reveals to the poet that his truth - from the point o f
view o f the infinite - is his own limitation, or in other words, his fmitude” (78).
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encompassed by language, “aesthetic ideas frustrate any attempt to articulate them in a
figurative system. Not only do they resist determination and adequation in a given
concept, even as such they constitute a thinking o f excess, thought as excess. An excess
o f thought, too much thought to be circumscribed or be made intelligible by language”
(Plug 20). Thus, poetry and rhetoric begin a process whereby the concept cannot be
expressed in language. Poetry also bridges the gap between the sensible and the
supersensible by
freeing the mind from determination. . . and thus permitting a judgment o f nature
that no longer refers to the laws o f experience or understanding. : . [Poetry,
therefore,] opens the possibility for the phenomenal to stand as a schema for the
nonphenomenal. Irreducible to any concept, poetry is the source o f the excess of
thought over language and thus emerges as a language in excess o f language.
(Plug 22)
As more than language, “poetry and rhetoric are therefore also something other than a
strict materiality” (Plug 22). Indeed, Kant’s discussion about poetry suggests “poetry as
the material life o f spirit” (Plug 32). Thus, Plug argues,
'

' ......... ................................................

'N

'

By turning to poetry. . . at a key juncture in the aesthetic, Kant elaborates a
theory o f language which, while it would hot live up to the name for either
Idealism or its reading in contemporary theory, nonetheless anticipates the literary
absolute. Kant’s literary absolute is never that because it never achieves the status
o f a self-theorizing poetry, which alone has the right to the title. But in a perhaps
even more profound sense, it could never be considered a literary absolute not
because o f a failure so much as because the notion o f poetry that allows that
absolute to emerge also refuses to reduce it to the “mere letter” [(Kant, Critique o f
Judgment 160; Kritik der Urteilskraft 253)],; to a materiality the absolute would
leave behind on its dialectical trajectory. (23)
As such, Plug hits his stride in questioning the viability o f an Absolute that is tied
to materiality with Schelling’s Die Philosophie derKunst. As Plug argues, for Schelling,
Art is the phenomenalization o f (aesthetic) ideas. In fact, it might be that what
defines art as a r t . . . is its very functioning as symbol, precisely the symbol o f
phenomenalization. The symbolization that that art presents is necessarily double:
it is the phenomenalization o f aesthetic ideas and, by reflecting on itself, this very
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phenomenalization, by symbolizing it in turn, provides the self-closure o f art as
ideal(ism). (Plug 24)
The symbolic is the unity o f the universal and the particular and the embodiment o f this
unity is art. Thus, Schelling separates philosophy from art: philosophy is allied with the
idea and represents the Absolute in the universal; art is defined in terms of
particularization. Art, as Plug interprets it,
[expresses] the absolute unity o f the universal and the particular, [and] while it
represents the absolute itself, it does so always within the particular. . .
Consequently, the absolute, in art, will always be symbolized, but the symbol,
even as the particularization o f the indifference o f the universal, will always be a
certain absolute, the representation o f absolute indifference, but a particular one.
A particular absolute, at once absolute and particular. (24-25).
The symbol, then, is defined in terms o f difference and materiality: it is conceived by
Schelling as “the materiality o f the idea” (Plug 25), such that “die Idee .. .ist Materie
[idea is matter]” (Schelling 481 ;99). Language becomes

’

the reality o f the ideal, its symbol, but a symbol that embodies the ideal without
rendering it merely bodily. . . Language therefore allows Schelling to save the
absolute from becoming a mere particularization that lacks ideality. . . To the
extent that it conceives o f verbal art as real ideality, The Philosophy o f Art
provides the linguistic symbol for the ideal, unifying ideality aind materiality and
reducing what might have been difference to the unity o f the same. (Plug 26)
The early Schelling’s literary Absolute,21 though he does not term it thus, rests on the
notion o f language as “ein Reales, ohne daß er aufhörte ideal zu seyn [something re a l.
without ceasing to be ideal]” (635;204). But, language cannot be part o f the ideal as it
cannot be subsumed into the ideal, which because o f its ideality demands “the resolution
o f being into thought, [thereby demanding] the negation o f the materiality of language:”
language would leave behind a reminder (Plug 26). Thus, “Schelling’s literary Absolute
is founded on the exclusion o f . . . materiality. Yet contrary to the thrust o f Schelling’s
21

•

Schelling, subsequent to his transcendental Idealist phase, would not have endorsed a Literary
Absolute, for instance in his Freedom essay. 1

13
own argument, this very exclusion at the same time renders linguistic materiality the
source o f the interruption o f the literary as absolute” (Plug 26).
Further to this issue with materiality, A. W. Schlegel tries to answer the question,
“How is it possible for our own individuality not to limit the,universality o f art?” (Plug
30). In Schlegel’s words, “Wie ist es also möglich, in der Kunst nicht manierirt zu seyn,
ja nur zu merken, daß wir eine Manier an uns haben?” (Schlegel, Kritische Ausgabe der
Vorlesungen 261).

To answer this, Schlegel underscores that our similarities, “that

which we share” as humans, must be represented in art (Plug 30). This happens through
an artist’s style, as opposed to his or her manner:
Dieses heißt Manier, wenn es ein gefärbtes oder trübes Medium ist, welches auf
alle dargestellten Gegenstände einen falschen Schein wirft; Styl, wenn es den
Rechten von Beyden, der Kunst und der Natur nicht zu nahe tritt, welches nicht
anders möglich ist, als durch die dem Werke selbst gleichsam eingeprägte
Erklärung, es sey nicht Natur, und wolle sich nicht dafür ausgeben. (Schlegel,
Kritische Ausgabe der Vorlesungen 262)2223
v
Further, as Plug elaborates,
N.

Manner in a r t : . : is inferior. . . precisely because it never escapes the body, more
precisely the habits o f the hands. The body has no hand in style, however, the
stylus being an instrument which, while it leaves its particular marks, can always
be put down in favour o f another. Style will always be a kind o f inscription in
wax or the imprinted declaration on the work o f art - that it precisely art and not
nature. Style will always be the writing o f difference and freedom, not because
writing remains undetermined but because its determination is always subsumed
to an act o f free will. Freedom; the freedom o f art (from nature), is predicated
upon a declared independence from the body. As though the stylus, “on the other
hand,” as the English translation rather felicitously has it, were being held by
something other than a hand [(Kritische Ausgabe der Vorlesungen 264; “Theory
o f Art” 224)]. (31)
22 “How is it possible not to be mannered in art, indeed, even to notice that we have a manner o f
our own?” (“Theory o f Art” 221). From A. W. Schlegel, “Theory o f Art,” Theory as Practice: A Critical
Anthology o f Early German Romantic Writings, Ed. and trans. Jochen Schulte-Sasse, et al. (Minneapolis: U
o f Minnesota P, 1997) 194-225.
“It is called manner if it is a colored or opaque medium that throws a false light on all
represented objects; it is called style if it does not impinge on the rights o f either art or nature, which is only
possible through a declaration that is, as it were, imprinted on the work itself, namely, that it is not nature
and has no desire to pass itself o ff as such” (A. W. Schlegel, Theory o f Art 222).
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As such, this freedom implies dismemberment:
The ultimate work o f art, and perhaps even the ultimate artist, might well b e . . .
the dismembered body whose very lack o f hands and difference from nature make
it the work o f style. It figures the possibility o f writing without hands . . . , o f
choosing one’s style and stylus freely precisely because on has no hand in it,
choosing freely and freedom, because style is here the informing o f the work of
art not by an instrument, no matter how freely chosen, but by free wi l l . . . Style as
absolute act. The positing o f free will, free o f the body. (Plug 32)
However, earlier in Kritische Ausgabeder Vorlesungen (Theory o f Art), Schlegel posited
that art comes from the act o f communication before speech, the desire to communicate
as it is expressed through the bodily enactment or expression o f ourselves (249;210).
This, like Shelley’s attempt to embody the Promethean Age in Prometheus, Schlegel deidealizes the work o f art “in the figure o f the body[, enacting] the disfiguration o f the
figure o f the coincidence o f form and matter, idea and body, thinking and be i ng. . . The
resistance to totality takes places, then, as the simultaneous completion and interruption,
embodiment and disfiguration, o f the absolute” (Plug 32-33).
Thus Plug concludes,
The literary absolute I have tried to elaborate would therefore not be the
fulfillment o f the absolute in its embodiment o f the idea, so much as it would
equally mark the absolute as absolute, as that which cannot be embodied in any
conventional sense. In the literary absolute, the absolute remains absolute. The
disfiguring o f the absolute coincidence o f thought and being by materiality, the
dismembering o f the embodied idea, resists the materialization o f the idea or what
Benjamin might call the “sobering o f the absolute.” (Plug 33)
The literary Absolute, therefore, achieves a sort o f success in its failure: in its inability to
embody the Absolute, the literary Absolute acknowledges that the Absolute is out of
reach, that it cannot do what it aims to do, and as such, preserves the Absolute as
Absolute. As such, the literary Absolute also preserves the transcendence o f the Absolute
since the literary Absolute also resists the “sobering o f the Absolute” that would have
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been inevitable had the literary Absolute materialised the Idea. That is, if the literary

;

Absolute had been successful, as Rodolphe Gasche argues via Benjamin, it would have
forced the Absolute to accept the profane, or the finite, material, and individual work,
into itself and this would have resulted in a finite, sober Absolute that has lost its
f

__

transcendence. I will discuss Gasche’s article “The Sober Absolute” in more depth later
in this Introduction.
Hegel’s romantic art and Prometheus Unbound aim to be successful versions o f
the literary Absolute inasmuch as they attempt to reach the Absolute through an artistic
medium that is always becoming. As such, they are also attempts as the positive

;

Absolute. However, both the play and romantic art as conceived by Hegel must somehow
materialize the idea and as such they cannot successfully be the literary Absolute as
Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe define it; Instead, they seem to be examples o f the literary
Absolute as Plug defines it: as something which preserves the Absolute in its very
inability to embody the Absolute. Plug’s version o f the literary Absolute, however,
cannot become a successful positive Absolute because it backs away from, or attempts to :
preserve, the Absolute with anxiety regarding the Absolute’s dissolution. This retreat is
Plug’s literary Absolute’s attempt to prevent itself from falling into the depression
involved with a dissolving ideal. But this anxious withdrawal is only a stop gap measure
as the literary Absolute as Plug conceives it tries to stop short o f the inevitable path to the
negative Absolute.

; :

r
#

The Negative Absolute: KrelTs Three Ends o f the Absolute and Keats’s
Hyperion
Before proceeding to the sober and the dynamic Absolute, I will discuss the negative
Absolute and its accompanying depression and negativity. David Farrell Krell’s
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postulating o f the negative in “Three Ends o f the Absolute” reveals negative Absolutes at
work in Schelling, Friedrich Hölderlin, and Novalis, in the forms o f absolute inhibition,
absolute separation, and absolute density. O f particular relevance to my thesis are
absolute separation and absolute density. Krell’s postulating o f different forms o f the
Absolute supports the contention that the Absolute is the following o f something to its
absolute limit, whether that be in a positive direction with absolute idealism or in a
negative direction with absolute nihilism. Further, unlike the other theorists and critics in
my thesis who outline variations on the theme o f the Absolute, Krell’s examples all
display negativity and resistance, perhaps even an unusable negativity, and yet Krell
applies the term Absolute to these cases.

!

To briefly summarise absolute inhibition: Krell begins with Schelling’s
recognition o f opposites in the natural world: “Freedom, being, and spirit are ‘infinite
activity,’ that is they are characterized by the absolutely active and unconditioned deed;
nature, becoming, and matter, by contrast, are characterized by conditioned, compelled,
necessitous activity” (Krell 137). Schelling, thus, must reconcile botlTinfinite activity and
absolute inhibition in nature, which he attempts to do by positing a theory o f “absolute
Organisation [absolute organization],” “one that would dispense with duality and sexual
opposition while also accounting for their eventual emergence,” which is in effect, a
theory o f the common origin o f all deviations and gradations to come {Erster Eintwurf
eines Systems der Naturphilosophie 64; First Outline o f a System o f the Philosophy o f
Nature 49 & Krell 140-141). However, this theory o f “absolute Organisation [absolute
organization]” yields a proto-image with an undeveloped consciousness or desire for
freedom (Krell 140). As such, “the absolute inhibited absolute will slip henceforth into an
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ever more remote past, a past that never was present and that never will entertain a future
- and that is a little bit like death, and very much like an end of the absolute” (Krell 141).
This end o f the Absolute, or the dissolution o f the ideal, and its effects are the materials
that John Keats handles in Hyperion, through the allegories o f the overthrown and
ineffectual Titans who slip into a forgotten past.
Krell’s explanation o f Hölderlin’s absolute separation begins with Hölderlin’s
insistence that separation (Trennung) is necessary for the development o f consciousness
and identity (Krell 141). As Hölderlin argues, “die Identität [ist] keine Vereinigung des
Objects und Subjects, die schlechthin stattfände also ist die Identität nicht = dem
absoluten Seyn” (“Seyn, Urtheil, Modalität,” Sämtliche Werke 2:50).2425Further, Hölderlin
defines the intellectual intuition that supports tragic poetry as as “eine Einigkeit mit
allem, was lebt [the unity with everything that lives,]” a unity that comes “aus der
Unmöglichkeit einer absoluten Trennung und Vereinzelung” (Sämtliche Werke 2:104).

25

The act o f separation is located in the spirit’s “vorhandene Einigkeit [excess of unity]”
and,

■ ■

^

■

die Trennung [findet] ihrer Theile [statt], die den auch nur darum sich trennen,:
weil sie sich zu einig fühlen j wenn sie im Ganzen dem Mittelpuncte näher sind,
oder weil sie sich nicht einig genug fühlen der Vollständigkeit nach... Streben
nach M aterialiät,. . . Streben des Theilbaren Unendliche, Aorgischen, in welchem
alles organischere enthalten seyn m uß...in diesem Streben des theilbaren
Unendlichen nach Trennung welches sich im Zustande der höchsten Einigkeit
alles organischen den in dieser enthaltenen Theilen mittheilt, in dieser
nothwendigen Willkür des Zevs liegt eigentlich der ideale Anfang der wirklichen
Trennung. (Sämtliche Werke 2:106)26

24 “Thus identity is not some sort o f unification o f object and subject that takes place in a
straightforward manner, and thus identity does not = absolute being” (trans. by Krell 141)
■
25 “from the impossibility o f an absolute separation and individuation” (trans. B y Krell 142)
26 “the parts separating only because they feel excessively unified [zu einig] whenever they are*
closer to the midpoint o f the whole, or because they do not feel unified enough, with a view to
com pleteness. . . [This] striving o f the divisible for the more infinite, more aorgic, in which everything that
is organic is must be contained . . . [is] a striving that communicates itself in the condition o f the supreme
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This striving for the more infinite is, therefore, caught up “in search o f the materiality of
and elementality o f nature” (Krell 143). Perhaps then, the inability o f romantic art and the
literary Absolute to properly materialise the Absolute, to properly unify Spirit and form,
is inevitable because o f absolute separation. Krell continues with his analysis of
Hölderlin’s presentation o f the Absolute in the drafts o f Hyperion, in the scene where the
stranger communicates the doctrine o f Plato’s Socrates in Symposium. The stranger
explains:
Also da, als die schöne Welt fur uns anfieng, da wir zum Bewusstsein kamen, da
wurden wir endlich. Nun fühlen wir tief die Beschränkung unseres Wesens, und
die gehemmte Kraft sträubt sich ungeduldig gegen ihre Fesseln, und doch ist
etwas in uns das diese Fesseln gerne behält - denn würden Göttliche in uns von
keinem Widerstande beschränkt, so wüßten wir von nicht außer uns, und so auch
von uns selbst nichts, und von sich nichts zu wissen, sich nicht zu fülen, und
vernichtet seyn, ist für uns Eines. {Sämtliche Werke 1:513)
As Krell analyses this passage:
the absolute - here called “infinite essence” and “free and full force” [Sämtliche
Werke 1:513]-fa c e s a singular alternative: either it becomes conscious and thus
finite [when it is embodied in a human], that is, bound for eventual annihilation,
or it remains in absolute separation, catatonic isolation, and absolute autism
[when it remains as unembodied essence], which is the equivalent o f immediate
annihilation. In effect, there is no alternative for conscious life - no alternative to
living out the temporal unfolding o f one’s life . . . Consciousness and finitude are
reciprocally related .: . “Absolute separation,” the solus ipse o f an absolute spirit,
is impossible - unless spirit is either unconscious or dead. (Krell 145-146)
Applying this to the Titans in Keats’s Hyperion, they must, therefore, be annihilated or
overthrown because they are the divine “freie volle Kraft [free and full force]” that faces27

unity o f everything organic to the parts contained in it, in this necessary. . . ideal beginning o f the actual
separation.” (Trans, by Krell 142-143)
27
At the moment, therefore, when the world o f beauty became conscious, we became finite. Now
profoundly we feel the confinement o f our essence, and inhibited force strains impatiently against its
fetters. Yet there is something in us that gladly preserves the fetters - for if the divine in us were bound to
no resistance, we would know nothing outside ourselves and therefore nothing about ourselves either. And
to know nothing o f oneself, to not to feel that we are in being, and to be annihilated - these are one and the
same. (Trans, by Krell 145)
. :
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absolute separation from the organic world (Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke 1:513; frans.
Krell 145). Indeed, in the poem the Titans are separated from the rest o f the world as they
mourn their loss in a cave o f stone. Hölderlin also comes to something like the end or
inevitable dissolution o f the Absolute when he argues for the impossibility of an absolute
monarchy, since it is “objektlos [without object]” and would “alles greift einander und
leidet [cancel itself out everywhere,]” thereby “[kann] irgend eine der selbstständigen
Kräfte des Ganzen die Herrschende seyn, aber sie kann auch nur als temporär und
gradweise herrschend befrachtet werden” {Sämtliche Werke 2:722-723).28 This sounds
very much like the revolution o f power in Keats’s Hyperion: though the Titans are
replaced by the Olympians, the latter are also gods who will be replaced in turn, perhaps
1for the very same reasons that Hölderlin argues absolute monarchy cannot last. Thus,
“Hölderlin sees that every dream o f solitary rule, every phantasm o f the Absolute, thus
every monism, is bound to dissolve . . . Absolute separation. . . is itself the end o f the
absolute” (Krell 146-147).
Krell discusses Novalis’s absolute density from many angles, but for the purposes
o f this introduction, I will be concentrating on his analysis o f the voluntary renunciation
o f the Absolute and o f Novalis’s image o f a dead god made o f an absolutely dense metal.
Novalis provides a good reason to not pursue the Absolute: “ein absfoluter] Trieb nach
Vollendung und Vollständigkeit] ist Kranckheit, sobald er sich zerstörend, und abgeneigt
gegen das Unvollendete, Unvollständige] zeigt” {Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe
2:623).29 He further presents the negative side o f the Absolute:

28 “only [ruling] temporarily and only to a certain degree” (Trans, by Krell 146)
29 “an absolute drive for perfection and completeness is morbid, as soon as it shows itself to be
destructive and adverse to what is imperfect, and incomplete” (116). From Novalis, Notes fo r a Romantic
Encyclopedia: Das Allgemeine Brouillon, Ed. and trans. David Wood (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007).
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Durch das freywillige Entsagen des Absoluten entsteht die unendliche freye
Thätigkeit in uns - das Einzig mögliche Absolute, was uns gegeben werden kann
und was wir durch unsre Unvermögenheit ein Absolutes zu erreichen und zu
erkennen, finden. Dies uns gegebne Absolute läßt sich nur negativ erkennen,
indem wir handeln und finden, daß durch kein Handeln das erreicht wird, was wir
suchen. {Werke 2:180-181)3031
As such, Hegel and Shelley cannot find the positive Absolute; the literary Absolute can
never embody the ideal; and gods, who may in fact be human constructs, cannot
continually embody “Vollendung und Vollst[ändigkeit] [perfection and completeness]”
{Werke, Tagebücher und Briefe 2:623; Notes fo r a Romantic Enclycopedia 116). If we
persist with this drive for the Absolute, then we will be overwhelmed by depression and
melancholia, as Hyperion is, because we cannot let go o f the dissolving ideal to recognize
its loss. Thus, Novalis’s description o f the illness caused by the absolutizing drive
provides the recognition, as Krell poses it, “that transience and vulnerability are bound up
with spirit” (153). Novalis continues with his acceptance o f transience and a negative ^
Absolute when he indicates 1) that “die tote Materie ist Phlogiston [all dead matter is
phlogiston,]” and 2) “Phlogiston = Geist [Phlogiston = spirit]” {Werke 2:819; Notes fo r a
\

.

Romantic Encyclopedia 174). As Krell argues, these two propositions result in “the
[reader’s] conclusion that 3) the spirit is dead matter” (153). Regardless, Novalis follows
up with the following statements:
Gott ist von unendlich gediegenem Metall - das körperlichste und schwerste aller
Wesen.
Die Oxyd[ation] kommt vom Teufel. ; ;
Leben ist eine Krankheit des Geistes - ein leidenschaftliches Thun.
11
; Luftvemichtung ist Herstellung des Reichs Gottes. (Novalis, Werke 2:820)
30 B y means o f a voluntary renunciation o f the absolute, an infinitely free activity originates in us
- the sole possible absolute that can be granted us and that we can find only by means if our incapacity to
achieve and recognize an absolute. This absolute, the one granted to us, can be known only negatively, by
our acting, and by our discovering that no action ever achieves what we were searching for. (Trans, by
Krell 150)
.....................
31 God is o f infinitely compact metal - the most corporeal and the heaviest o f all beings.
Oxidation comes from the devil.
u
'
:.
^
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The idea o f a dead god, a dead or dissolving Absolute, that is so dense it implies a certain
“stasis” (Krell 153) is similar to when Keats likens the Titans to metal and stone,
specifically the Stonehenge: “Lock’d up like veins o f metal, crampt and screw’d; /
Without a motion, save o f their big hearts heaving in pain/ . . . like a dismal cirque/ Of
Druid stones, upon a forlorn moor” (.Hyperion, II, 25-35).
The Titans’ overthrow or death is the event which launches them into their
depression. They are allegories o f depression and melancholia over the loss o f the
Absolute. As allegories, they reach for a higher meaning, as Jakobson and Angus Fletcher
define traditional allegory, but the Titans are unable to do so and thus, fall into depression
at their ineffective nature. It is symbol which is closer to the world view o f the unified
positive Absolute and allegory which is nearer to the world view o f the disfigured (and
disfiguring) negative Absolute, as Samuel Taylor Coleridge and J. W. Goethe outline in
their definitions symbol and allegory. Keats uses a more contemporary form o f allegory,
as he perhaps anticipates Paul de Man, Walter Benjamin, and Sigmund Freud, to present
allegory as the figurative way we experience melancholia. That is, the Titans’ ceaseless
ruminations about their impotence and overthrow lead to their melancholia, which for
Benjamin, occurs when contemplation turns to the fantasy o f absolute knowledge and not
truth. Contemplation then turns into melancholy and misses the essence o f things, turning
these things into ruin and allegory. This melancholia, as Freud argues, represents an
inability to accept the meaning o f a loss, which for the Titans means that they do not
accept their loss o f power as they consider how to overthrow the Olympians.

Life is a sickness o f spirit, an activity bom to undergo passio.
Annihilation o f air establishes the Kingdom o f God. (Trans, by Krell 153)
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This melancholia is part o f the negative Absolute, which I will define in
conjunction with Soren Kierkegaard’s definition o f “infinite absolute negativity.” Implicit
in this negativity is depression and a lack o f productivity. The non-productivity inherent
in Hyperion and the unexpected ending o f the poem present the poem as a failure of
narrative. On the other hand, the poem can be seen as part o f an aesthetic that values «
negativity and non-productivity. Likewise, Keats wavers between representing the Titans
as failures and as embodying an aesthetic that values negativity and non-productivity.
This wavering, like the wavering between Hyperion's clinging to the positive and
demystifying it, constitutes the structure o f the negative Absolute. Keats, however, is not
fully comfortable with a new art that values negativity and so he attempts to return to the
positive with Apollo and the pastoral. This hysterical attempt at returning to the ideal; ;
however, cannot succeed despite Apollo’s original difference from the Titans - that he is
able to progress and act in time - because Apollo is another god who will be overthrown.
Keats thus realizes that he is deluding himself with another god and a genre that is new to
Hyperion. This attempt at the positive is interrupted by the melancholia o f the first two
cantos o f the poem and as such, Keats leaves the poem in ruin,'thereby returning to an
aesthetic o f the negative.

' ;

The Sober Absolute
While Krell’s absolute inhibition, absolute separation, and absolute density still describe
versions o f the Absolute that bear an “enthusiastic” and emotional response to the
commitment o f an Absolute, Rodolphe Gasche introduces a critical, reflective relation to
the Absolute. Gasche posits an Absolute that has lost its transcendence, as the difference
between the profane and the Absolute disappears, which leads to the disappearance o f the
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distinction between profane and symbolic forms and the eventual drawing o f the profane
into the Absolute. Gasché develops his sober Absolute by analysing Walter Benjamin’s
dissertation, The Concept o f Art Criticism in German Romanticism, which inspects the
major concepts o f Jena Romanticism, in particular the work o f Friedrich Schlegel. The
philosophy o f the Jena Romantics, as presented by Benjamin, “comprises a theory o f the
Absolute as a medium o f reflection [of the work o f art], [also known as the literary
Absolute,] and a theory o f Absolute or immediate intuiting o f this Absolute” (Gasché 5556). Gasché provides background and a summary o f Benjamin’s dissertation to ground
his argument and then proceeds more intensively to define the sober Absolute:
[T]he Romantic theory according to which the centres o f reflection [the individual
works] can be elevated to the medium o f reflection itself through reflexive
intensification condemns the medium o f reflection, or the Absolute, to being only
the enhanced reflection o f whatever is reflectively being raised to that higher level
. . . holding that the totality o f all works is a work [as Schlegel claims] - however
invisible or purely intelligible it may be - is to determine the Absolute as a mere
potentiation o f the singular works that it embraces. Such an understanding o f the
Absolute (or o f consciousness) entails a loss o f the force o f transcendence and the
relativization o f difference. (66) :
i
¡
^
.
That is, Benjamin believes that the assertions by Schlegel and the rest'of the authors o f ^
the Athenaeum Fragemente that individual works point to the Work which will achieve
the literary Absolute, result in the Absolute no longer being a transcendent force above
all o f the individual works, but rather being available finitely and individually to and in
each work. Gasché then moves into another o f Benjamin’s issues with the theory of
reflection, specifically the intensification o f this reflection and the resulting interruption
o f the Absolute by the profane:
Against the backdrop o f this Benjaminian critique, another aspect o f his
suspicions about the concept o f reflection comes into view. A reflection that
knows only intensification, and not the possibility o f diminishing, presupposes

>
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and asserts a continuity between the profane and the Absolute that can make the
Absolute tangible only as something profane. (66)
The intensification o f reflection is the elevation o f “the centres o f reflection” or the works
o f art to the “medium o f reflection, or the Absolute” (66). However, to assume that the
Absolute can absorb into itself the poetry o f poetry and all the individual works, or the
profane, is to assume that there is a likeness between the profane and the Absolute. Thus,
to force the ideal to include the profane does not elevate the profane to the level o f the
Absolute, but instead this action lowers the Absolute to the level of the profane, down to
the level o f materiality.
This continuity between the profane and the Absolute also occurs because the
Romantics did not clearly define the distinction between the symbolic and the profane
forms. Benjamin interprets Schlegel’s definition o f the symbolic form as that which
survives in the Absolute after the downfall o f the profane. Benjamin clarifies that
symbolic form is exhibition, or presentational form (Darstellungsform), purified
o f and distinguished from the profane forms o f exhibitiondhrough its reference to
the idea of art or the Absolute. Yet the “purification” or “survival” of symbolic or
absolute form after the downfall o f everything profane is a furiction o f a reflection
. that elevates itself to the Absolute [much like the profane art work which becomes
elevated to the Absolute as reflection] . . . [As such], it is clear that fo r
[Benjamin], the [symbolic] form is only the reflectively enhanced profane form ..
. As a consequence, the Absolute - the critical concept par excellence - is not
; only not demarcated from the profane with the necessary rigor, but everything
profane is drawn into the region o f the Absolute, polluting what, in principle, is to
be kept pure o f all alien ingredients. (Gasche 67-68, emphasis mine) 1
!
Thus, once it seems that everything profane has fallen, something has to take its place,
and the symbolic form becomes “the reflectively enhanced profane form.” As such, the
profane or sober persists while the symbolic or transcendent withers away or is brought
down to the level o f the profane.

.
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The term “sober” comes from the Romantics’ turn from poetry to prose as the
favoured form, “or highest possible manifestation o f the idea of art,” o f the literary
Absolute (Gasche 69). Prose has the proper meaning o f “a writing style distinguished
from poetry by its greater irregularity, variety o f rhythni, and its greater proximity to
ordinary speech . . . But in addition to its proper meaning, prose has a figural, improper
meaning, namely prosaic, plain, ordinary, sober. This lack o f differentiation, this
ambiguity o f meaning, predestines prose to become the comprehensible manifestation of
the Absolute” (Gasche 69). As such,

•

[t]he Absolute becomes desacralized, dedivinized by reflection - in an intellectual
and conceptual process o f an intuiting no longer intuitive (anschaulich), but
soberly rational, down-to-earth. . . But not only is reflection sober, the Absolute
to which it becomes potentatiated - the medium o f reflection and the continuum
o f forms - turns prosaic as well. It is an Absolute only relatively different from
the profane forms, one that has been divested o f its separating and discriminating
force. The sober Absolute is an Absolute that has forfeited its transcendence [and
has become secular]. (Gasche 70)
If the Absolute has lost its transcendence and has become the sober Absolute, the
question remains: why does Gasche use the word “Absolute”? Gasche answers this once
again through Schlegel and then through Benjamin. The answer comes down to the fact
that critique maintains a small slice o f transcendence in the profane because in
“absolutizing the created work, rendering it eternal, criticism presents the Absolute as
fact. Yet in spite o f the fact that criticism is indistinguishable from the work, Schlegel,
paradoxically yet inevitably, ‘valued criticism more highly than the art work’ because the
critical activity o f absolutizing the work is higher than the creation o f art” (71-72). Both
Gasche and Benjamin harness the image o f the blinding, sober light o f the “prosaic
Absolute that criticism exhibits in all works” (72). For Benjamin, it is criticism that
allows the individual works to become the Work, because criticism is the Idea. Gasche
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interprets this to mean that the light “is so dazzling that it becomes deceptive. In its
brilliancy, all differences fade absolutely. Its spell, the fascination it exerts, is that o f the
fact - the Absolute become secular”.(72). Benjamin asserts that the brilliancy o f criticism
is the Idea: if criticism defines the literary Absolute as literary Absolute, then the Idea
still persists in individual works, and so does the Absolute as Idea, albeit in its profane,
more approachable form.
Thus Gasche persists in using the term “Absolute” because o f critique’s relation
to the Absolute: “Benjamin agrees with the Romantics that all critique must take place in
view o f the Absolute, but [he argues that it must take place] in view o f an Absolute that is
absolutely transcendent, radically distinguished from everything profane or finite.
Between it and the latter, no continuity is thinkable. Yet critique is;a relating to [a nonsober] Absolute. It is the movement o f transcendence in the realm o f the profane or
finite” (73). The Romantics’ elevation o f critique still results in a sober Absolute because
they perceived “critique as the primarily positive dissolution” o f the difference between
the profane and the Absolute (72); in opposition, “Benjamin’s concept o f critique is
characterized by an essential agnosticism,” an agnosticism that distances critique and the
Absolute, thereby re-injecting transcendence back into the sober. Absolute (73). For
Benjamin, this is possible because he returns to Kant’s insistence that we cannot know
the Absolute, because he moves from the atheism o f the sober Absolute to the

.

agnosticism o f something somewhat more transcendent, and because he acknowledges
that we cannot capture the Absolute in any form. This opposes Hegel’s attempts to outline and reach the ideal and Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe’s attempts to encapsulate the
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Absolute in literary form. Benjamin is also distanced from Shelley’s attempts to depict a
hypothetical achieving o f the Absolute: there is no such potential for Benjamin.
While Benjamin’s critique originally leads him to desacralise the Absolute,
paradoxically it is also this critique which allows him to move beyond the sober
Absolute. This movement, however, is limited. That is, Benjamin’s insistence upon the
separation between critique and the Absolute, between the profane and the
transcendental, may re-inject some transcendence back into the sober Absolute, but the
relation between critique and the Absolute is still unable to harness “the certitude of truly
transcending the given” (73). Benjamin’s agnosticism, however, turns the loss o f ,
transcendence inherent in Romanticism’s philosophy, into “the sign” that the tiny slice of
transcendence in critique requires a “redemptive justification” (73). Because, for

,;

Benjamin, the Absolute can never confer complete transcendence on criticism, or it
would return to the mixing o f profane and Absolute, this redemption can never take
place: “critique [is] suspended in relation to an Absolute whose power would finally
fulfill its critical intention” (73). It is this suspension or separation wl\ich preserves the
Absolute once again and allows it become “an absolutely ‘non-sober’ Absolute capable
o f a post-factum endowment o f the transcending movement o f critique, o f conferring
actual transcendence upon critique” (73-74). However, no fulfillment o f “the
transcending movement o f critique” is guaranteed and in order to maintain the distance
between critique and the Absolute, “critique must remain critical to the utmost unrelentingly and uncompromisingly negative,” in the sense that it does not believe it can
reach the Absolute (74). Hence, Gasche believes “Benjamin’s dissertation on the
Romantic concept o f positive critique [which believes that it can know or reach the
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Absolute] is a most fulfilling example [of negative criticism]” (74). Benjamin, thus,
proposes an Absolute which has moved through the positive, an implied depression at
losing the ideal, the sober, and now into something more dynamic which allows for the
constant tension between the transcendent and the profane.

The Dynamic Absolute and Keats’s The Fall of Hyperion
The sober Absolute, therefore, seems to be a reaction to the negative Absolute, with the
former’sToss o f transcendence. What I define as the dynamic Absolute by analysing
Keats’s The Fall o f Hyperion, then, is a return to an Absolute that has some
transcendence, albeit transcendence that is in tension with the profane. Keats's The Fall o f
Hyperion allows for transcendence and humanity to exist in tension through the humanity
and humility o f the dreamer-poet, thereby injecting temporality into a narrative about the
supposedly eternal Titans. This tension exists because humanity is exposed to
transcendence as what exceeds it or transcends it in a conventional sense, and it is
exposed to what it does not know about itself as well. To a certain extent^ the dynamic
Absolute also moves towards an awareness about the transcendental: v)e may have not
V

known what the loss o f the Absolute meant while stuck in the depression surrounding its
loss, but now we are beginning to find meaning. Despite this movement beyond the
sober, there is still an element o f sobriety in Keats’s The Fall o f Hyperion, especially
through his archiving o f the Titans in Moneta’s memory, which turns the Titans into
cultural objects, and in his dreamer who cannot manage to be a poet by Moneta’s
definition and yet who does not have an overwhelming emotional response that could
turn him into a maniac or fanatic cither.

.
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In The Fall o f Hyperion, the pre-dominant emotion is despair, which is more
dynamic than static depression. This dynamism is evident when the dreamer-poet
“[gasps] with despair / O f change” after watching Saturn and Thea for two months and it
is evident also in Moneta’s sorrow as she preserves the Titans in her memory (I, 398399). Moreover, the dreamer-poet seems able to move beyond despair as he recognizes
his own temporality by wishing to die and as he reminds himself o f his humanity and
place in the world, while Moneta’s melancholy too can be read in the more productive .
and patient way that Julia Kristeva, as distinct from Freud, reads melancholy in Soleil
noir. Moneta’s productivity continues with her acknowledgement and questioning of
j

history and historicity, thereby allowing the Titans’ pain to become a source of
knowledge that can be safely accessed through Moneta’s memory.
This sense o f movement away from depression, into despair, and even beyond
continues with Keats’s struggle with and acceptance o f meta-art. Keats uses the framedevice as a form o f sobriety, yet he is troubled by this meta-aesthetic containment, as
evidenced by his recurring struggle with sorrow and despair in the poepi, particularly
because he is defining a new art which neither soothes nor vexes the wounds o f the
world. Instead, Keats creates a bridge across this dichotomy, embodied by the dreamerpoet who takes on the attributes o f the Titans but returns back to his humanity. The Fall
o f Hyperion’s place as meta-art directly opposes Hegel’s distaste for self-reflexive art
which goes to such an extreme that he declares the end o f art, especially because
romantic art cannot effectively express itself in a material form. Despite this, Hegel does
suggest art’s success in its lack o f success since it constantly tries to materialize the
Absolute by attempting to unify objectivity and subjectivity.
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Keats’s acceptance o f art moving out o f the negative and into the positive
emulates the dynamic Absolute, which depicts a certain awareness regarding the meaning
o f the loss o f the Absolute. This awareness leads to moving away from unproductive
melancholia and is exemplified in the paradoxical instances of Moneta’s illness, the
unspoiled textiles in the sanctuary, and the dreamer-poet’s acquisition of god-like
qualities and his accompanying return to humanity: these forms are Keats’s attempt to
bring temporality and the eternal into dialogue. Keats injects temporality into the eternal
more successfully in The Fall o f Hyperion than, in Hyperion because the latter tries to
make eternal gods temporal, which results in depression, while the former creates a
mortal Absolute, a húman immortality, through the dreamer-poet who experiences the
eagle sight o f the god but who also confronts the ruins o f this experience.
O f particular note is that the Absolute still persists in The Fall o f Hyperion in
contrast to the lingering phantasm o f the Absolute in T. S. Eliot's The Wasteland. This
dissolution is highlighted by the incomprehensible ruins in the latter as modernism
attempts to rid itself o f and dissolve the Absolute. What my thesis does, therefore, is to
define romanticism as the movement which, despite changing definitions o f the Absolute,
still holds onto a certain idealism, while also opening up the discussion o f modernism's
difference from romanticism.
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Chapter One: The Positive Absolute in Hegel and Shelley’s
Prometheus Unbound
Introduction
G. W. F. Hegel defines the Absolute as the end goal o f an ordered whole which is forever
becoming and progressing towards this ideal. The philosopher subsumes this insistence
on progression in his dialectic, the parts o f which Fichte labels the thesis, anti-thesis, and
synthesis. The progression o f art from the classical to symbolic to romantic also follows
this triad with the definition o f the ideal art as the unity o f Spirit and form. But, romantic
art’s difficulty in fulfilling the criteria o f the ideal presents problems with the viability of
the Absolute, forcing Hegel to declare the end o f art and turn towards philosophy. This
turn, however, displays Hegel’s attempts to cover up problems with achieving the ideal.
Hegel may also have personally believed in the persistence o f the negative, especially in
relation to madness and depression, as Daniel Berthold-Bond argues with the Zusätze, or
additions, to Hegel’s lectures in his book Hegel ’s Theory o f Madness', his letters to K. J.
H. Windischmann, however, reveal his argument that reason will always prevail. Hegel’s
fervour suggests an eventual dissolution o f the ideal: he presses too hard for the viability
o f an Absolute in the face o f its issues and the inevitable mutability o f everything.,
Percy Bysshe Shelley defines his Absolute in Prometheus Unbound as a Golden
Age brought about by a revolution against tyranny and hate. This hypothetical ideal
presents humankind as having god-like qualities, living in harmony, and creating with the
gifts o f Prometheus. This Absolute, despite its attempts to suppress the negative, also
begins to unravel: humankind transforms into a tyrant over nature, as evidenced by its
sexual violence towards the Heavens and the Abyss (IV, 418-419 & 423) and
Prometheus’s and Demogorgon’s violence against Jupiter is at odds with the proposed
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peace o f the new age. Prometheus, therefore, is an allegory, distanced from the age >
named for him and for which he should stand as a symbol. His status as allegory deepens
with his inability to recall his curse, which leads to the loss o f his sense o f self, his
authority, and the authority o f words. Shelley, however, continues to present the
Promethean Age with the prospective allegory o f Prometheus as Christ the saviour and
with imagery and language which portray progress and potentiality. But the dissolution of
the ideal is inevitable: Shelley attempts to reach for an always already lost Golden Age
and the tensions inherent in labelling the play a lyrical drama or a political allegory reveal
this nostalgic structure. The poet, however, is aware o f the state o f the Absolute as
something that is always already dissolved: in the Preface, he suggests that his play is a
hypothesis; the necessity o f Demogorgon’s existence displays constant dissolution and
revolution; and humankind’s immutability prevents it from reaching the ideal. The play,
therefore, contains its own criticism, presenting itself as an instance o f the literary
Absolute. Yet, the literary Absolute also has difficulty becoming an instance o f a
successful positive Absolute as it attempts to preserve a dissolving idea,l.
Despite suggestions o f the dissolution o f the ideal, the hope for the Absolute

'

persists in both Hegel’s work and in Prometheus Unbound. For the former, this hope is’
evident in his fervour and for the latter, it is evident in the play as hypothesis, in the
morals and values Shelley deems necessary for the success o f the Golden Age.

Hegel’s Absolute

.

:

■

Hegel posits a definition o f the Absolute as the goal o f a systematized whole. He argues
for totality in the preface to Phänomenologie des Geistes (Phenomenology o f Spirit),
when he claims, “Das Wahre ist das Ganze. Das Ganze aber ist nur das durch seine

-
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Entwicklung sich vollendende Wesen” (25).32 Hegel’s faith in the whole leads him to
systematize the world around him and even argue that the system is inherent in the world
around us, there for the philosopher to uncover. Hegel also subsumes the Absolute into :
the system: “Daß das Wahre nur als System wirklich, oder daß die Substanz wesentlich
Subjekt ist, ist in der Vorstellung ausgedrückt, welche das Absolute als Geist ausspricht, - der
erhabenste Begriff’ (29).33 The Absolute is the ultimate goal o f the Spirit and the process
o f the whole, which “die Wissenschaft desselben wesentlich System [ist], weil das Wahre
als konkret nur als sich in sich entfaltend und in Einheit zusammennehmend und -haltend,
d. i. als Totalität ist” {Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften 1: 60);34 the
result is “daß [das Absolute] erst am Ende das ist, was es in Wahrheit ist” {Phänomenologie
25).3536Whether this end will ever come is unclear, but the path to the ideal is an infinite
becoming with a progressive history - one that “sich vermittelt] [sell-mediates]”
{Phänomenologie 326; 122) its stages into the whole in an act o f “Aufheben [raising up
[or sublation]]” {Phänomenologie 326;122) - because “das Wahre w . den Trieb hat, sich
zu entwickeln” (Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie

A1Q).
\

Thus, when Hegel defines the stages o f art, he uses this same idea o f progress and
development to systematize art into the dialectic. Hegel defines the dialectic as the form
'
32 “The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself
through its development” (53). From G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology o f Spirit, The Hegel Reader , Ed.
Stephen Houlgate, Trans. A. V. Miller (Malden: Blackwell, 1998) 50-124. All further translations o f
Phänomenologie des Geistes will be from this edition.
33 “That the True is actual only as system, or that Substance is essentially subject, is expressed in
the representation o f the Absolute as Spirit - the most sublime” {Phenomenology 55).
34 “takes and holds itself together in unity, i.e. as totality” (14: 137). From G. W. F. Hegel,
Encyclopaedia Logic: Introduction, The Hegel Reader, Ed. Stephen Houlgate, Trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A.
Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Malden: Blackwell, 1998) 133-138. All further translations o f Enzyklopädie der
philosophischen Wissenschaften will be from this edition.
35 “that only in the end is [the Absolute] what it truly is” {Phenomenology 53).
/
36 “the True . . . has an urge to develop” {History o f Philosophy: Introduction 509). From G. W. F.
Hegel, History o f Philosophy: Introduction, The Hegel Reader, Ed. Stephen Houlgate, Trans. T. F. Geraets,
W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Malden: Blackwell, 1998) 133-138. All further translations o f
Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie will be from this edition.
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o f the logical, which has three sides: “a) die abstrakte oder verständige, ß) die
dialektische oder negativ-vernünftige, y) die spekulative oder positiv-vernünftige” i
(Enzyklopädie 1:169).37 Using Fichte’s terms, the side o f understanding is the thesis, the
negatively rational side is the antithesis, and the positively rational side is the synthesis.
In A Hegel Dictionary, Michael Inwood emphasizes the dialectic as deeply rooted in the
return which is the movement where the synthesis turns away from the antithesis, returns
to the thesis, and sublates and restores both the antithesis and thesis on a higher plane
(“Triads” 297). Hegel uses the word “Aufhebung” or “sublation” in all three o f its
meanings. The German word is a noun derived from the verb “aufheben:” “a u f’ as the
prefix meaning “up,” and “heben” as the verb meaning to salvage or hoist, to lift, and
also meaning to improve. Thus, “aufheben” means 1) to cancel, as the synthesis cancels
the antithesis; 2) to preserve or keep something safe, as the synthesis preserves the thesis
and antithesis within itself; and 3) to raise up, as the synthesis raises both the thesis and
antithesis towards the Absolute. The element o f the return in the dialectic explains why
romantic art departs from classical art so drastically and returns, in a sublated manner, to
symbolic art.

•

Art and its Stages
First, though, Hegel defines the criteria o f art: art is the sensuous “Einheit, zu welcher
Idee und Gestalt ineinander gearbeitet erscheinen,” and through which the Spirit
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“a) the side o f abstraction or the understanding, b) the dialectical or negatively rational side,

[and] c) the speculative or positively rational one” (168). From G. W. F. Hegel; Encyclopaedia Logic; The
Hegel Reader, Ed. Stephen Houlgate, Trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Malden:
Blackwell, 1998) 141-174. All further translations o f Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften
will be from this edition.
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progresses towards the Absolute ( Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik 1: 104).

Indeed, the *

goal o f art is “die sinnliche Darstellung des Absoluten” {Ästhetik 1: 101).

Hegel further

subsumes art into his system when he declares that through the development o f the Idea
“erhält die Kunstschönheit eine Totalität besonderer Stufen und Formen" {Ästhetik-1:
108),40 meaning that the progression o f art from the symbolic, through the classical; and
to the romantic should allow the Spirit to progress towards the Absolute. In the symbolic
stage, the Idea is indeterminate,; it does not know itself, and becomes contorted as the
artist tries to express it in an inadequate form. However, in the classical stage the Idea
and form achieve unity, but because classical art relies on the human form, the Idea is too
material and therefore cannot be Absolute. Romantic art must now synthesize these two
prior stages: first, romantic art must turn away and cancel the classical unity o f form and
Idea since romantic art adheres to a more abstract Idea than that which can be contained.
In abandoning the classical, romantic art returns to elements o f symbolic art:
Dadurch kommt die Gleichgültigkeit, Unangemessenheit und Trennung von Idee
und Gestalt - wie im Symbolischen - von neuem hervor, doch mit dem
wesentlichen Unterschiede, daß im Romantischen die Idee, deren
Mangelhaftigkeit im Symbol die Mängel des Gestaltens herbeifuhrte, nun als
Geist und Gemüt in sich vollendet zu erscheinen hat und aus dem Grunde dieser
höheren Vollendung sich der entsprechenden Vereinigung mit dem Äußeren
entzieht, indem sie ihre wahre Realität und Erscheinung nur in sich selber suchen
und vollbringen kann. (Ästhetik 1: 115)38394041 *
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“unity in which the Idea and the shape appear fused into one” (1: ,72). From G. W. F. Hegel,

Aesthetics, Trans. T. M. Knox, 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975). All further translations o f Vorlesungen
über die Ästhetik will be from this edition.
39“sensuous presentation o f the Absolute” {Aesthetics 1: 70). 5 ;
40 “artistic beauty acquires a totality ofparticular stages and forms''’ (Aesthetics 1: 75).
41 “Thereby the separation o f the Idea and shape, their indifference and inadequacy to each other,
come to the fore again, as in symbolic art, but with this essential difference, that in romantic art, the Idea,
the deficiency o f which in the symbol brought with it deficiency in shape, now has to appear perfected in
itself as spirit and heart. Because o f this higher perfection, it is not susceptible o f an adequate union with
the external, since its true reality and manifestation it can seek and achieve only within itself’ {Aesthetics 1:
81).
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Romantic art, therefore, turns to inwardness, perfecting the Idea, and both returns
to and preserves the disharmony o f form and Idea as it was in symbolic art, even if
romantic art possesses this disharmony “in eine hohere dritte [in a higher way]” (Asthetik
1:112; 1:79). At the same time, romantic art also preserves the Idea’s self-awareness,
which is present in classical art. Hegel subverts his own system, however, by defining
romantic art, the synthesis o f the symbolic and classical arts, as that which breaks the
definition o f the best type o f art. He then attempts to resolve this subversion with a deus
ex machina: he declares that romantic art’s turn into itself yields the end o f art. Romantic
art’s abstract nature results in art progressing towards the higher faculty of philosophy,
which will still, then progress towards the Absolute. I will discuss this deus ex machina at
greater length in Chapter Three. This attempt to cover up concerns about achieving the
ideal through art aids Hegel in systematizing the end o f art and allows him to carve out a
space for defective art in its place; despite Hegel’s best attempts at covering up his own
betrayal, however, the subversion is not resolved. Romantic art does not adhere to the
definition o f the best type o f art, as that which unifies form and Idea ii^ its progression
towards the Absolute, and yet it is still the most progressive stage o f art.

!;

Questioning the Viability of Hegel’s Absolute
The incongruity between the Absolute form o f art and romantic art as the synthesis o f
symbolic art and classical art begins the process with which we can question the viability
o f a positive Absolute which suppresses the negative. Romantic art’s inability to achieve
the Absolute suggests that we can never actually achieve the ideal.
Further, Hegel’s betrayal o f his own system suggests that his belief in the ideal is
not that solid. Perhaps, Hegel publicly believes in an Absolute which sublates the
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negative, but personally he seems to believe in the presence o f the negative: Hegel writes
in a letter, to K. J. H. Windischmann about the “trübe Seite und Weise der geistigen Natur
oder des natürlichen Geistes,” his expression for depression {Briefe, Briefe 158, pg
314).42 Hegel, still however, believes in progress and a way out o f the negative, as he
continues to advise Windischmann: “die Wissenschaft, die Sie in dieses Labyrinth des
Gemüts geführt, ist allein fähig, Sie herauszuleiten und zu heilen” {Briefe, Briefe 158, pg
314-315).43 Thus, for Hegel reason will lead anything out o f the negative and into the
positive.
,

.r :

This, then, is the positive Absolute, for both Hegel and Shelley in Prometheus

Unbound: it is the ideal which attempts to suppress the negative, whether as something
which sublates the negative into the system for Hegel, or as the ideal world which stamps
out tyranny and hate with revolution in Prometheus Unbound. But Hegel’s fervour acts as
an acknowledgement o f the positive Absolute’s eventual dissolution. His attempts to
preserve the sanctity o f the ideal display a certain monomania. Simply put: Hegel tries
too hard.

\

This is especially true o f a man who has the intelligence to recognise that an ideal
has to dissolve. Nothing is permanent and eternal, despite romantic attempts to create
such permanence through the symbol as both eternal and immutable, as de Man argues in
“Rhetoric o f Temporality.” However, as I will argue with reference to Shelley’s
Prometheus Unbound and at greater length in Chapter Two o f this thesis, the very nature
o f the symbol dictates its inevitable turn into allegory. This is all the more poignant in

42 “the dreary aspect and manner o f the spiritual nature or o f the natural spirit.” Translation mine.
43 “It is science which has led you into this labyrinth o f the soul, and science alone is capable o f
leading you out again and healing you” (560-561). From G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel, the Letters, Trans. Clark
Butler and Christine Seiler, Ed. Clark Butler (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1984).

38
terms o f Benjamin’s theory o f allegory which brings temporality and death to the
foreground, indicating the dissolution o f the ideal.

Shelley’s Absolute: the Promethean Age
An Age of Harmony, Creation, and Symbol
In his lyrical drama, Prometheus Unbound, Shelley posits the Absolute as an ideal world,
void o f tyranny and full o f the beauty o f language and science. The Spirit o f the Hour
describes what it has seen o f the reborn human world, following the overthrow o f Jupiter:
“Thrones were kingless, and men walked / One with the other even as spirits do, / None
fawned, none trampled” (III, iv, 131-133)' So idyllic is this utopia that humankind no
longer requires hierarchy and can instead rise to live “as spirits,” in harmony, and with
the Promethean-dealt power o f poetry and science:
From the temples high
O f Man’s ear and eye,
; ;
Roofed over Sculpture and Poesy; ;
From the murmurings
O f the unsealed springs
Where Science bedews his Daedal wings. (IV, 111-116)

^

:

;

c

The temples o f “Man’s ear and eye,” in light o f man’s new found capacity for walking
“one with the other even as spirits do,” weaves a symbol depicting a renewed god-like
status for humankind. That is, when Prometheus first helped Jupiter ascend to his throne,
the Titan demanded, “Let man be free” (II, iv, 45). Instead, Jupiter dealt man “strife,
wounds, and ghastly death unseen before” (II, iv, 51), and to alleviate man’s suffering,
Prometheus gave love, fire, speech, science, music, and art to humankind (II, iv, 59-86),
but for these “alleviations . . . / . . . [Prometheus] hangs / Withering in destined pain” (II,
iv, 98-100). However, during this first uprising o f man’s spirit,
The harmonious [human] mind

/
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Poured itself forth in all-prophetic song,
And music lifted up the listening spirit
' •
Until it walked, exempt from mortal care,
Godlike, o’er the clear billows o f sw eet sound” (II, iv, 75-79)
Thus, if mankind was “god-like” in their first limited uprising, it must be even more
powerful in their now unfettered state. To further this, the Spirit o f the Hour depicts

women . . . frank, beautiful and kind
'
As the free Heaven which rains fresh light and dew
On the wide earth, past: gentle, radiant forms,

■
- •

. . . being now, made Earth like Heaven.” (Ill, iv, 153-163)
The similes posit the women as symbols for goddesses o f heaven, thereby joining the
mutable and the eternal. Both symbols posit the symbol as a linguistic entry into the
Promethean Age.

-

;

Unravelling the Golden Harmony: Mankind as Tyrant
However, humankind’s new god-like status poses problems which undercut the harmony
o f the symbol and the Absolute. While mankind now lives in harmony, its rule over
nature is disconcerting:

^

v
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V

Man, oh, not men! a chain oflinked thought,
O f love and might to be divided not,
Compelling the elements with adamantine stress - •'
As the sun rules, even with a tyrant’s gaze,
The unquiet Republic o f the maze
O f Planets, struggling fierce towards Heaven’s free wilderness.
His Will, with all mean passions, bad delights,
And selfish cares, its trembling satellites,
A spirit ill to guide, but might to obey,
Is a tempest-winged ship, whose helm
Love rules, through waves which dare not overwhelm,
Forcing Life’s wildest shores to own its sovereign sway.
All things confess his strength. - Through the cold mass
O f marble and o f colour his dreams pass;
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The Lightning is his slave; Heaven’s utmost deep
Gives up her stars, and like a flock o f sheep
They pass before his eye, are numbered and roll on!
The Tempest is his steed, - he strides the air;
And the abyss shouts from her depth laid bare,
“Heaven, hast thou secrets? Man unveils me, I have none.” (IV, 395-423)
Disturbingly, man has taken on the strength o f nature and bent it to his will: in particular,
projecting himself as the sun, he has taken on the “tyrant’s gaze.” Shelley has also subtly
aligned man with Jupiter by referring to the “adamantine stress” with which man compels
the elements to do his will: Jupiter had secured Prometheus to the Caucasus with
“adamantine chains” (II, iv, 107). Further, the way “Heaven’s utmost deep / gives up her
stars” and “Man unveils [the abyss]” implies sexual violence: mankind has forced ■
Heaven to give up her light and has removed the mystery o f the abyss as if both were
virgins who have given up their secrets. Though love may rule the helm o f the “tempest
winged ship” that is mankind’s will, the sexual violence reveals that man is in control.
Thus, while the relationship between humans has improved, humankind’s relationship
with nature does little to distinguish itself from the tyranny o f Jupiter,\whose “strong hate
[transformed the earth] into a lifeless mire” (IV, 349). The strength o f the symbol
weakens as the supposed ideal age begins to reveal problems,

i

-

Indeed, Shelley can only write symbolically about nature and its positive aspect,
but resorts to allegory to discuss things such as love, spirit, hope, and wisdom. Compare
the specificity o f Shelley’s depiction of the Ocean’s rebirth to his inability to particularize
love:
OCEAN.
Henceforth the fields o f Heaven-reflecting sea
Which are my realm, will heave, unstain’d blood
Beneath the uplifting winds - like plains o f com
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Swayed by the summer air; my streams will flow
Round many-peopled continents and round
Fortunate isles; and from their glassy throne
:
Blue Proteus and his humid nymphs shall mark
The shadow o f fair ships ...
T V '.
Tracking their path no more by blood and groans,
And desolation, and the mingled voice >
O f slavery and command; but by the light
O f wave-reflected flowers, and floating odors,
And music soft, and mild, free, gentle voices,
That sweetest music, such as spirits love. (III,ii, 18-34)
The Ocean depicts three main aspects o f itself: what it was like during the rule o f Jupiter;
what it does or what it brings with it now that it has been cleansed after the tyrant’s fall;
and most importantly, what it is after the overthrow o f Jupiter through images o f how it is
s

composed. The Ocean was stained with blood and desolation as it carried slaves, but now
it brings “uplifting winds,” literally and figuratively: literally because it heralds the
bounty o f summer, as figured by the simile “like plains of com / Swayed by the summer
air;” and figuratively because it makes the continents and islands “fortunate” by way of
its surrounding the land masses. The reborn Ocean now reflects “flowers,” and carries
“odors, / And music soft, and mild, free, gentle voices.” That the waves reflect the
flowers suggests that their image and the accompanying odors and voices are part o f the
Ocean and its new harmony, which Shelley implies with the spirit-loved sweet music.
Shelley’s depiction o f the Ocean is symbolical in the sense that Georg Lukács and
Coleridge argue: for Lukács the symbol depicts “die konkrete Möglichkeit [concrete
potentiality]” (Gegenwartsbedeutung des kritischen Realismus 474;24) and Coleridge ,
aligns the symbol with a way o f experiencing the truth with an immediate and direct
sense (29). As such, Shelley can describe the Ocean with such particulars because the
symbol allows him to describe the true nature o f the Ocean. This opposes Shelley’s
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definitions o f love through its relation to other things, such as when the chorus sings that :
“Ruin now Love’s shadow be” (I, 780). Lukács argues that allegory depicts “die abstrakte
Möglichkeit [abstract potentiality]” (474;23), which when combined with Coleridge’s
argument that allegory is analytic and results in the disjunction o f faculties and meaning
(29), explains why Shelley can only delineate love abstractly and at a distance in relation
to other things. Shelley tries to define love once again by describing its power or what it
does: “Love, Thought, and Breath, / The powers that quell Death” (IV, 150-151). Finally,
Shelley attempts to delineate love when the Moon describes its effect on her, once again
describing only what love does and not what it is:
Gazing on thee [the Earth] I feel, I know,
Green stalks burst forth, and bright flowers grow
And living shapes upon my bosom move;
Music is in the sea and air,
Winged clouds soar here and there,
Dark with the rain new buds are dreaming of:
‘Tis Love, all Love! (IV, 361-369)
While these last two instances come close to the specificity o f thq descriptions o f the
Ocean, especially with the mention o f the music in the sea, they do not clearly describe
what love is in the manner that Shelly does with the components o f the now harmonious
Ocean. Considering that love is one o f the things that underpins the new world, Shelley’s
inability to define it precisely and his use o f allegorical abstractions to outline it through
contiguity calls into question the viability o f this Absolute..

Prometheus as Allegory
Shelley’s attempt to posit Prometheus as a symbol, and his ultimate failure to do so,
evident in the way Prometheus more or less disappears after the first act, also presents
problems with the ideal. To the immortal beings, Prometheus represents freedom: the
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Furies admit that he is the “champion o f Heaven’s slaves” (1,443) and the Spirits reminds
him that he is “the prophecy / Which begins and ends in thee” (I, 690-691). Shelley also
endeavours to present Prometheus, who is surrounded by the allegorical figures o f Jove,
the Furies, and the various Spirits, as a symbol for the origin and power o f the spoken
word, as the god who represents the Promethean Age:

:

He gave man speech, and speech created thought,
Which is the measure o f the Universe;
And Science struck the thrones o f Earth and Heaven,;
Which shook but fell not; and the harmonious mind
Poured itself in all-prophetic song (II, iv, 72-76)
The Titan, however, cannot stand in for the Golden Age because o f his violence towards
Jupiter in the form o f his curse: f
I curse thee! let a sufferer’s curse
Clasp thee, his torturer, like remorse,
Till thine Infinity shall be
A robe o f envenomed agony. (1,286-289)

,

:

■

This verbal form of violence opposes the new world in which “hate, disdain or fear, /
Self-love or self-contempt on human brows/ [Are] no more inscribed” (III, iv, 133-135),
and converges, instead, with the tyranny o f Jupiter. As Timothy Webb argues,
To curse is to give verbal expression to hate; it is to employ the negative powers
, o f language to achieve a tangible and injurious effect. It is to deny the creative
powers o f language (that “perpetual Orphic song” [IV, 415]) and to pervert them
to destructive ends . . . Near the end o f the play we discover that Jupiter is not
only cursed and cursing but that he is the incarnation of the curse (“Sceptred
Curse, / Who all our green and azure universe / Threatendst to muffle round with
black destruction” [IV, 338-340]). The instinctive and unthinking reaction of
Prometheus had been to curse Jupiter; by doing so, he immediately identified
himself with the tyrant and temporarily lost his own independence. Shelley
suggests this unhealthy identification :•. . through the ironic device o f calling up
the Phantasm o f Jupiter to repeat the curse which was directed at himself. (698)
Prometheus’s curse, therefore, is all the more significant as it spoils his image and selfidentification as a god who represents the origin of the spoken word. Further, the Titan’s
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curse and consequent binding, which acts as the final straw to spur on the revolution and
Golden Age, are paradoxically at the centre o f the new world order.
To further complicate Prometheus’s symbolic right to represent the Golden Age,
he cannot recall his curse. This amnesia suggests a loss o f self-identity and it is also
accompanied by a loss o f authority and recognition by the Mountains, Springs, Air, and
Whirlwinds. These elements o f nature “dare not” repeat Prometheus’s curse and respond
to his cries o f “Know ye not me, / The Titan?” with silence (1,130 & 117-118). This
amnesia and accompanying loss o f authority cannot even be resolved when the Phantasm
o f Jupiter repeats the curse back to the bound Titan, since he asks his mother: “Were
these my words, O Parent?” (I, 302). This resulting loss o f authority further presents
Prometheus at a distance from the Promethean age named for him, suggesting, as his
inability to act directly and only through Demogorgon also does, that Prometheus may be
losing his status as a god. Perhaps Prometheus Unbound is written in the shadow of
Keats’s Hyperion, as if Shelley acknowledges and implies this tendency towards
outmoded gods and their associated negativity.

\

Prometheus’s inability to recall the curse repeated by the Phantasm o f Jupiter also
calls into question the authority o f the word or language. The repeated curse does not
stimulate Prometheus’s memory and thus is separated from his own identity, betraying
the power language once held over his own sense o f being. Prometheus’s “naive belief in
the power o f the word” to help him re-identify himself parallels his belief in “a mistaken
concept o f language. .. giving rise to thought and science” (Jacobs 26). Prometheus’s
mistake arose because he thought he had explained to mankind the possibility o f “clear
knowledge” (I, 542), but instead, as the Furies explain:

. - v;.:
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Dost thou boast the clear knowledge thou waken’dst for man?
Then was kindled within him a thirst which outran
Those perishing waters; a thirst o f fierce fever,
Hope, love, doubt, desire - which consume him forever. (I, 542-545)
This “mistaken concept o f language” is similar to Christ’s and the French Revolution’s
belief in the word: despite Jesus Christ’s cry for a serene faith, “His words outlived him,
like swift poison / Withering up truth, peace and pity” (I, 548-549); and regardless o f the
French Revolution’s call for “‘Truth, liberty and love!’ / Suddenly fierce confusion fell
from Heaven / Among them - there was strife, deceit, fear; / Tyrants rushed in, and did
divide the spoil” (I, 652-654).
This diminishment o f the authority o f language to manifest, as in the case o f the
French Revolution, or to represent, as in the case o f Prometheus’s inability to stand in for
the Golden Age, therefore displays a de Manian allegory, or a distance from the origin.
This example o f de Manian allegory puts into relief the distance between the utterance
and meaning, and by extension the sign and signified. Indeed, as Raj an argues,
Prometheus and Demogorgon are allegorical characters “with the concomitant emphasis
on character as actant rather than personality, signifier rather than signified” (Supplement
o f Reading 316). To further emphasize Prometheus’s form, Hercules addresses
Prometheus:

:

-

v;

Most glorious among Spirits, thus doth strength
To wisdom, courage, and long suffering love,
And thee, who art the form they animate,
Minister like a slave. (Ill, iii, 1-4)

:

’

;

Thus, the way strength ministers to a slave, is the way strength uses the abstractions of
“wisdom, courage, and long suffering love” to animate the form, Prometheus. Shelley
may be referring to “wisdom, courage, and long suffering love” as values which make
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Prometheus; however, the fact that the form must be animated also suggests that the Titan
is an allegory to be constructed, rather than a symbol which develops from the
immediacy and organicity o f the mind, as Goethe and Coleridge argue.
Demogorgon’s conversation with Asia also questions the authority o f language.
Specifically, his/her answers to Asia’s questions about “who made terror, madness, crime
remorse, I ... I And Hell, or the sharp fear o f Hell?” (II, iv, 19-28) obscure meaning: “He
reigns” is an empty signifier because the antecedent to the pronoun is missing (II, iv, 28
& 31). We cannot really know what Demogorgon’s sentence means: we and Asia assume
it is Jupiter, but without a referent, the phrase cannot really point to anything. This
absence o f a referent recalls the distant origin o f allegory and so, in effect, Demogorgon
deconstructs the allegorical process, particularly by exaggerating the relation o f the
distant origin to the signifier, since, in the case o f “He reigns,” the origin is not distant,
but lacking. When Asia presses Demogorogn to specify what he/she means, he/she still
answers obscurely and finally tells her:
... If the abysm
Could vomit forth its secrets—but a voice
Is wanting, the deep truth is imageless;
For what would it avail to bid thee gaze
On the revolving world? What to bid speak
Fate, Time, Occasion, Chance and Change? To these
All things are subject but eternal Love. (II, iv, 114-120)

\

Thus, what is at stake with Demogorgon’s refusal to answer is the access to the truth and
to the origin. As Jacobs argues,

J

Demogorgon’s ‘deep truth’ is that of the abysm. It has no ground, no voice, no
possibility o f being represented. One can gaze on the revolving world ruled by
‘Fate, Time, Occasion, Chance and Change.’ Indeed poetry’s ‘figured curtain,’ as
we have seen Shelley call it elsewhere [A Defense o f Poetry 505], a realm o f
images is just this world - and the only realm, in one form or another, to which
we may have access. (46)

c
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In addition, Demogorgon’s reply, “I spoke but as ye speak” (II, iv, 112), “stresses the
relativistic and limited nature o f linguistic communication: to ‘speak as ye speak’ is to
say not what is utterly true, but what makes sense within ‘your’ limited terms of
reference” (Ward 203).
Despite Demogorgon’s deconstruction o f the allegorical process and
Prometheus’s distance from the Golden Age, Shelley still posits his brand o f allegory as
projective and prospective, as evidenced by the poet’s multiple links between Prometheus
and Christ. This allegory begins full o f pain and torture, like the dessicating allegory o f
Benjamin, but ends in the redemptive project(ion) o f the Promethean Age. Shelley first
aligns Prometheus’s torture and sacrifice with that o f Jesus Christ when Panthea
describes what she sees while the Furies torment Prometheus: “A woeful sight - a youth /
With patient looks nailed to a crucifix” (I, 584-585). This continues with Prometheus’s
plea to the Furies, and by extension Jove: “Remit the anguish o f that lighted stare - /
'x

Close the wan lips - let that thorn-wounded brow / Stream not with blood” (I, 597-599).
The Fury also repeats Christ’s words on the cross (Luke 23:34) at the moment of
Prometheus’s ultimate temptation to despair:
In each human heart terror survives
Many are strong and rich, - and would be just, But live among their suffering fellow men
As if none felt - they know not what they do.” (I, 618-631)
But where Christ’s request to pardon his torturers displays forgiveness, the Fury’s words
display despair about ever escaping Jupiter’s tyranny: Prometheus, however, resists this
despair in the end. During this torture, the Fury announces: “Behold, an emblem” (I,
594). This announcement confirms that Prometheus, much like Christ, is an emblem
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which is a type o f fixed traditional allegory. This allegory, linking the Titan to the mortal
son o f God, continues on with the parallel o f Prometheus’s release with Christ’s
resurrection when Asia first announces Prometheus’s re-birth to Demogorgon: ;
“Prometheus shall arise / Henceforth the Sun o f this rejoicing world” (II, ii, 126-127).
The word “sun” is a homonym for “son” and thus suggests the confluence between
Prometheus and Jesus Christ as the brilliant ushers and saviours of their worlds! “Sun” is
also capitalised, indicating that the sun is personified and stands in for both Prometheus
and Christ. Personification is a classical form o f allegory which follows the same vertical
line o f substitution as the metaphor, thereby linking this specific allegory more to the
hopeful symbol than to modem, despairing allegory. The figurative re-birth o f the
formerly violent Titan, therefore, turns the torture-laden allegory into something

;

redemptive. But what truly makes the comparison between Christ and Prometheus an

;.

allegory is the de Manian distance between the two: Prometheus, at the outset o f the play,
is a violent god who curses and steals from Jupiter, whereas Christ condoned good will
towards our enemies. Thus, while the connections that Shelley drawsvbetween
Prometheus’s and Christ’s rebirth and leadership highlight a redemptive allegory leading
to a Golden Age, they cannot bridge the chasm between Prometheus’s curse and Christ’s
benevolence.

,

;

-■

Potentiality and Process in the New World
Despite the disparity between Prometheus and Christ and the consequent utopian
abstraction o f a Golden Age, Shelley continues his project o f portraying a prospective
world through a language that, even as it portrays rains and harnesses negatives, displays
potentiality and process. When the cosmic orbs and their piercing rays destroy and grind
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away the remains o f the tyrant-ruled world, Panthea describes “the melancholy ruins / Of
cancelled cycles; anchors, beaks o f ships, / Planks turned to marble, quivers, helms and
spears” (IV; 288-290). These naval artefacts have been turned into their original
materials: “marble, quivers, helms and spears.” As D. J. Hughes argues in “Potentiality in
Prometheus Unbound,” the orbs grind the actual - the anchors, ships and planks - into
the new potential, into their elemental forms to be part o f a new process (114). Hughes
points to when “the, multitudinous orb / Grinds the bright brook into an azure mist / Of
elemental subtlety, like light” (IV, 253-255), but the argument stands for all o f the
imagery regarding the destructive force o f the orbs. These ruins, while they are ruined
I

i

objects left behind by older civilisations, are not as melancholy as Panthea describes, but
rather have become part o f a new world, thus also defying their appearance as ruins: they
are not ruins in the sense o f disconnected parts from which we can make no sense, but are
rather romantic fragments, incomplete and yet full o f potentiality.The Chorus proposes
this positive aspect o f the fragment in suggesting that “Ruin” may be “Love’s shadow” (I,
780). The idea o f a poetry which is always in process, but is forever incomplete, as we
have seen in with Athenaeum fragments 116 and 383 in the introduction to this thesis,
hints at Hegel’s system aiming for totality: however, where Hegel argues for an
obtainable Absolute, Athenaeum Fragmente acknowledge that the Absolute will always
be out o f reach, yet still something to be worked towards.
This poténtiality is also evident in the negative words which distinguish Jupiter
from Demogorgon. Timothy Webb suggests that Jupiter is associated with the
“shapelessness o f chaos”;while “Demogorgon is associated with the shapelessness that
can be ordered and organized by the human mind” (704). Under Jupiter’s rule, “shapeless

sight came wandering by, / The ghastly people o f the realm o f dream / Mocking
[Prometheus]” (I, 36-38). These mockers are probably Jupiter’s ministers, the Furies,
who are “shapeless as our mother Night” (1,472). While Demogorgon is “ungazed upon
and shapeless” and has “neither limb 7 Nor form nor outline, yet [still] is / A living spirit”
(II, iv, 5-6), he/she partakes o f “the matrix o f potentiality, the cradle of possibility, the
rich seedbed o f the future” instead o f Jupiter’s “darkness o f negation, o f winter, o f death”
\

(Webb 704). Demogorogon’s shapelessness, as Webb argues, therefore, correlates with
the chaos that the human mind orders to form language, “a perpetual Orphic song, /
Which rules with daedal harmony a throng / O f thoughts and forms, which else senseless
and shapeless were” (IV, 415-417 & Webb 704). Webb, thus argues- that “Demogorgon
inhabits the Tampless caves o f unimagined being’ (IV, 378), an address whose powerful
pair o f negatives suggests its unmeasured potentiality” (704). Webb does not address
Shelley’s earlier use o f “lampless,” when the orb is “peopled with unimaginable shapes, /
Such as ghosts dreams dwell in the lampless deep” (IV, 244-245). But once again the
idea o f “unimaginable shapes” now formed and living on the orb, which are also part of
dreams wherein they dwell in “the lampless deep,” suggests that these dreams come from
the potentiality o f the Demogorgon’s abyss.
Webb does however analyse negative words that are transformed from their
association with Jupiter’s rule to the freedom o f the Golden Age. The critic points to the
“black, wintry, dead, unmeasured” (I, 21) mountain to which Jupiter chooses to bind
Prometheus (“Unascended Heaven” 703). Under Jupiter’s tyranny, “the tongueless
caverns o f the craggy hills / [Cry], ‘Misery!’” (1 ,107-108), but once the Olympian has
been imprisoned by Demogorgon, “the caverns o f [the] hollow mountains, / . . . / Laugh
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with a vast and inextinguishable laughter” (IV, 331-333). The word “inextinguishable” is
a word with a negative prefix which Shelley uses here to denote a positive outcome.
More to the point, however, is the description o f one o f the celebrators o f Jupiter’s
downfall: “the Abysses / of the deep air’s unmeasured wildernesses” (IV, 335-336). As
Webb argues, “When unmeasured ceases to be a threat and becomes a potentiality, one of
Jupiter’s most formidable properties is taken from him and regenerated” (703). Webb
continues:
Wildernesses, too, are suggestive here o f infinite potentiality, that free range o f
possibility which is available to the human mind when it has liberated itself from
the shadow o f darker forces; the Fourth Spirit had hinted at such creative
possibilities in its picture o f the Poet feeding on the kisses of “shapes that haunt
through wilderness” (I, 741-742) but, so long as men fell under the distorting
influence o f Jupiter’s permitted tyranny, wildernesses would more obviously have
represented one o f the threatening aspects o f endless, bottomless, unwelcoming
space. (703)
...
\

However, Shelley’s prospective language and imagery and the utopia o f the new world
only display a hope o f achieving the Absolute, while other components o f the play, such
as man’s tyranny over nature, paradoxically,disclose Shelley’s acknowledgement that the
ideal is dissolving or in the process o f becoming.

\

Acknowledging a Dissolving Absolute: Antiquity and the Problem of Genre
Shelley’s attempt to re-animate antiquity through the myth o f Prometheus also underlines
the lost Absolute. As Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe argue in L ’àbsolu
littéraire (The Literary Absolute): romanticism aims to go beyond the past,

.

à la fois surpasser et completer l’Antiquité dans ce qu’elle a d’inachevé ou
d’inaccompli, dans ce qu’elle n’a pas réussi à effectuer de l’idéal classique qu’elle
entrevoyait. . . Il s’agit de construire, de produire, d’effectuer cela meme que, à
l’origine de l’histoire, on pensait déjà comme un « â g e d’o r » perdu et à jamais
inaccessible. (20-21 ).44
.
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“It involves doing better or more than Antiquity; at once surpassing and fulfilling the unfinished
or incomplete aspects o f Antiquity, wherever it failed to effectuate the classical idea it envisaged ... The
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Shelley, therefore, attempts to complete antiquity and proposes an ideal age which has
always already been “perdu et a jamais inaccessible [lost and forever inaccessible]” and
yet is accompanied by hope and the inability to give up the Absolute, demonstrated by
the projective imagery and language (Nancy & Lacoue-Labarthe 21 ;11). This tension, as
evidenced by Prometheus’s curse and the violence which forwards the revolution, is also
present in the genre o f the play.
The term “lyrical drama” also presents a paradox. A drama claims objectivity and
presents a dramatic action. However, neither criterion is fulfilled by Shelley’s
Prometheus Unbound. First, the play is full o f private moments: for example, the
narration o f Panthea and Asia’s dreams and the discussion between Asia and
Demogorgon, which seems like a monologue with the occasional interjection by
Demogorgon. Further, as Raj an argues, the play’s “diaphanous language” opposes the
objectivity required o f a drama {Supplement o f Reading 303). The play meets the second
criterion only partially: that is, the action o f the play only really occurs in Act III, Scene i
when Demogorgon pushes Jupiter into the abyss. The rest o f the play consists of
conversations and dreams: in Act I, Prometheus negotiates with the furies and spirits;
Asia and Panthea discuss their dreams and then meet Demogorgon in Act II; and the rest
o f Act III describes, through the conversations o f various characters, the new world free
o f Jovian tyranny. Act IV at least depicts some action, through the marriage o f the Earth
and the Moon and the accompanying celebration o f both the marriage and the
Promethean Age. Overall, however, the action is overshadowed by the lyrical
conversations in the play. This is similar to how the subjectivity o f Hegel’s romantic art
goal is to construct, to produce, to effectuate what even at the origin o f histoiy was already thought o f as a
lost and forever inaccessible ‘Golden A g e’” (11).
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eclipses the objectivity it needs to reach the Absolute. Further, the lyrical elements o f the
play are much like the overwhelming harmony o f the new world, which is disrupted by
the violence and drama o f Demogorgon and Prometheus. In addition, as a lyrical drama,
the play cannot be staged in the theatre o f the world, but rather can only be staged in the
theatre o f the mind. Prometheus Unbound, therefore, also fails one final test o f drama:
“Drama is, moreover, a communal mode: because it communicates to an audience, it
assumes a shared ideology and an affective link between words and the world outside
them” (Rajan, Supplement o f Reading 304). The play cannot communicate to an audience
because there is no audience, and in addition, Prometheus’s inability to recall his curse
and accompanying loss o f identity and authority problematize the link between words and
their meaning, thereby also calling into question the link between “words and the world
outside them.”

,
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v Labelling Prometheus Unbound a political allegory also has problems which
reveal underlying tensions in the play. “As a political work it assumes the legislative,
even the executive, authority o f words,” argues Rajan. “But as an allegory it concedes
that the world it represents exists at a certain distance from actuality and must be
rendered abstractly rather than realistically?’ (303). Once again, both the authority o f
Prometheus’s words and the staging o f the play are brought into relief. O f more
importance, however, is the paradox inherent in labelling the play both a political
allegory and a lyrical drama, though the former is Shelley’s label and the latter is a label
applied by critics: a lyrical drama is something private and transcendent, whereas
political allegory has a reference to the immediate, historical world. A lyrical drama, with
its necessary staging in the mind, acts as a symbol in the metaphysical sense o f Goethe
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and Coleridge’s definition, as something that is created with the immediacy and
organicism o f the mind. Because the play reaches for something h ig h e r- the Golden Age
—only to fall back into the tensions o f the splintering Promethean Age, the play is in fact
an allegory. Thus, we cannot fully come to the conclusion that the play is an allegory
without first labelling it as a dissolving symbol.
On the other hand, by labelling Prometheus Unbound as a lyrical drama, Shelley
invites us each individually to stage the play in the theatre o f our minds, making it “more
than a merely abstract potentiality, but less than a reality” (Rajan, Supplement o f Reading
317). In his preface to the play, Shelley implies that he recognises the function o f his
work as a drama, which allows for “a certain arbitrary discretion” as it recasts mythology
(206). Shelley also acknowledges that his reinterpretation o f the story is an effect o f the
historical age to which he belongs: “Poets, not otherwise than philosophers, painters,
sculptors, and musicians, are in one sense the creators and in another sense the creations
o f their age” (208). The implication, therefore, is that each reader’s production of
Prometheus Unbound in his or her mind is also an effect o f his or hercultural
conditioning. This means, as Rajan argues, that “in choosing the mode o f drama, Shelley
. . . [sets] his work in the space o f historical difference and forfeits for it the closure o f a
classic that can codify its message. To adapt a phrase from ‘Mont Blanc,’ the text
‘governs thought’ but does not originate it: it remains a presence in the world, but no '
longer one that can institutionalize meaning” (Supplement o f Reading 322). This absence
o f closure once again posits the play as a romantic fragment, in the light o f Athenaeum
Fragment 383: “bey aller Vollständigkeit muß dennoch etwas zu fehlen scheinen, wie
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abgerissen” (Athenaeum Fragmente 2:117).45 In a sense, the historical context that each
reader brings to the production o f the play offers a partial completeness: partial, because
the play remains forever open and incomplete since the next internal production o f the
play is always around the comer with the prospect o f a new reader. The play, as a
fragment, can also never be complete since it is the completeness o f the Work towards
which the fragment strives as its own Absolute.

Prometheus Unbound as a Hypothesis

-

Shelley is also conscious o f Prometheus Unbound as a play o f ideas and a hypothesis,
which must ultimately fall into allegory because o f its distance from reality. In the
Preface, the poet indicates his purposeful creation o f the play as a mental drama: “The
imagery which I have employed will be found in many instances to have been drawn
from the operations o f the human mind, or from those external actions by which they are
expressed” (207). Shelley cites Shakespeare, Dante, and the Greek poets as exemplars of
this same operation, which seems to be a nod towards their use o f a more traditional
sense o f allegory, which the romantics believe is a synthetic, forced operation o f the mind
V

as opposed to the immediate creation o f the symbol. Indeed, Shelley’s self-consciousness
about his work as a play o f aesthetic ideas bleeds through in his presentation o f abstract
J

'

:

'

forms without any precise content. We have seen that Shelley cannot particularize love,
but he also has trouble defining hope. Further, when Shelley attempts to define hope, he
can only do so in terms o f the failure o f hope, as an allegory which brings to light the
distance o f hope from its absence: “till Hope creates / From its own wreck the thing it
contemplates” (IV, 573-574). Shelley’s admission that his ideas are hypothetical, that he
45 “with all its completeness, something should still seem to be missing, as if tom away”
(Fragment 383, 78).
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presents no more than ideals which we should follow if we wish for the Promethean Age,
once again appears in the preface:1
Let this opportunity be conceded to me of acknowledging that I have . . . “a
passion for reforming the world” . . . My purpose has hitherto been simply to
familiarize the highly refined imagination o f the more select classes o f poetical
readers with beautiful idealisms o f moral excellence; aware that until the mind
can love, and admire; and trust, and hope, and endure, reasoned principles o f
moral conduct are seeds cast upon the highway o f life which the unconscious
passenger tramples into dust, although they would bear the harvest o f his
happiness. (208-209)
•
That the “beautiful idealisms o f moral excellence” are easily trampled on and difficult to
bear to fruition points to an ideal age which cannot exist in reality.

Dcmogorgon and the Inevitability of Dissolution
Demogorgon’s violence and purpose also presents an always already dissolving ideal.
First, his/her overthrow o f Jupiter allegorises the violence that is in history, such as in the
reference to the French Revolution and nailing Christ to the cross, and in allegorising
violence, he/she makes it abstract. This suggests that Shelley is using allegory to avoid
history and thus, he is also avoiding the reality that even if ideals could be represented or
brought to fruition, they cannot last. Second, in the entity’s final monologue, s/he
presents the spells by which to re-capture Jupiter, or “Conquest” as Demogorgon refers to
the overthrown Titan (IV, 556):

/

Gentleness, Virtue, Wisdom and Endurance, These are the seals o f that most firm assurance
Which bars the pit over Destruction’s strength;
And if, with infirm hand, Eternity,
Mother o f many acts and hours, should free
The serpent that would clasp her with his length, These are the spells by which to reassume
An empire o’er the disentangled Doom. (IV, 562-569)

‘
; ;

■
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However, the Doom which threatens to escape its pit has always already done so, as the
spirits that lead Asia and Panthea to Demogorgon’s lair reveal:
Resist not the weakness Such strength is in meekness That the Eternal, the Immortal,
Must unloose through life’s portal
The snake-like Doom coiled underneath his throne
By that alone! (II, iii, 93-98)

r.

Indeed, the inevitability of Demogorgon’s existence is that s/he “Must unloose . . . / The
snake-like Doom.” For not only do the spirits call Demogorgon the Eternal, but s/he
declares one o f his/her names before she drags Jupiter down to the abyss:
JUPITER
[The Car o f the Hour arrives. Demogorgon descends and moves towards
the Throne o f Jupiter]
Awful Shape, what art thou? Speak!
DEMOGORGON
Eternity - demand no direr name.
Descend, and follow me down to the abyss. (Ill, I, 51-53)
“‘Eternity’ here implies anything but a state o f permanence,” as Carol Jacobs argues in
Uncontainable Romanticism, “for it operates rather as the perpetual disruption of
temporal and spatial stasis . . . Eternity is the questioning o f the concept o f origin; it is the
pronounced incomprehensibility o f first cause, and it goes without saying, then, of telos”
(57). For Jacobs, it is because o f eternity that Prometheus Unbound is not about
Prometheus’s release and the accompanying “movement towards apocalypse or utopia..
. but rather the performance of perpetual if unpredictable revolution” (57). I would
specify that the play depicts a dissolution accompanied by a revolution. Interestingly,
Shelley depicts an explicit dissolution o f Jupiter’s reign, but only an implicit dissolution
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o f the Promethean Age, perhaps pointing to the minute hope that the Absolute is
obtainable.

- - -1

The Unobtainable Absolute: Humankind’s Mortality
The Absolute is not only unobtainable because it is always already in a state of
dissolution, but also because humankind’s own mortality prevents us from over-reaching
to a heavenly ideal. As the Spirit o f the Hour explains, humankind is
[Not] yet exempt, though ruling them like slaves,
From chance and death and mutability,
The clogs o f that which else might oversoar
The loftiest star o f unascended Heaven
Pinnacled dim in the intense inane. (Ill, iv, 200-204)
As Jacobs argues, “Only man’s mortality .. . prevents [man] from a fate far worse than
death, ah oversoaring that would rob him o f his reason and his definition. For if his death
unsettles him in another sense, it does not allow him to fa ll up into the delusions o f the
absolute” (52, emphasis mine). Jacobs’ reference to the Absolute as a delusion further
points to the dissolving and collapsing nature o f the ideal and to a certain naïveté in
believing in the perfection o f the ideal. Further, Shelley acknowledged that there are
consequences for trying to reach the Absolute: if man did oversoar, and try to reach “the
loftiest star o f unascended Heaven,” his punishment would be his capture in the infinite
void o f space, where he would be alone and unable to define himself in relation to others
or his ability to create.

The Literary Absolute in Prometheus Unbound
With thé always already dissolving nature o f the Promethean Age, Prometheus Unbound
is a play which contains its own criticism. The play thus is an example o f what the
authors o f Athenaeum Fragmente call transcendental poetry, as we have seen in Fragment
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238, which I presented in the introduction to this thesis. Shelley thus is, aware o f the
tensions and problems o f the play, weaving them into his creation and constructing a
highly self-reflexive text that provides both a theory regarding the ideal and criticism of
the play. Perhaps, Shelley gives us the apparatus by which to dismantle the play precisely
so that we will not do so: once we uncover the poet’s purposeful tensions, we accept the
problems in the play and give him his due as a memorable poet.
In addition, the Bodleian draft manuscript o f Prometheus Unbound is an example
o f the Literary Absolute:
(
' '■
ft begins with act IV and proceeds to alternate act I on the left-hand side o f the
page with the remainder o f act IV on the right-hand side. The manuscript
continues up to the middle Il.ii, then alternates part o f the third scene on the left
side with the remainder o f the second scene on the right, and finally places the
remainder o f the third scene (the song o f the spirits) on the left-hand side
alongside the crucial dialogue in the Cave o f Demogorgon (Il.iv). (Rajan,
Supplement o f Reading 319)46
;
:
This alternating arrangement o f the play allows for parts o f the text to be shuffled, and
still provide a different reading, presenting its own system o f literary deployment. As
Raj an argues:

.

;

\

The second and third scenes [of act II] are split at logical points, and from the
middle o f second scene onward the effect is antiphonal. Lyrical scenes are divided
from and juxtaposed with dramatic ones. The lyrical segments are separated and
transposed to the right-hand side, as if to stage a confrontation between the
imaginary world projected by desire and the greater complexities o f the linguistic
o rd er. . . [Shelley] places a model for the text’s deployment within a structure
that exposes it as problematic. Nevertheless, the mobile text that emerges from the
manuscript dissolves space and time, juxtaposing different temporal planes and
placing the cancellation of the Hours alongside the period o f Prometheus’
enchainm ent. . . That parts o f the play can be placed in different spatial positions
emphasizes that every event must be viewed in more than one way” (320).

46
For a more detailed description o f the three notebooks, see Rajan’s The Supplement o f Reading,
page 319, footnote 27.
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Shelley, therefore, once again forefeits the closure o f a singular meaning and with it the
closure o f obtaining the absolute Work, allowing for the openness o f the play to external
forces: the creator o f the play who re-arranges the play and the reader or critic who reads
new meaning into the play.
The Bodleian draft manuscript also highlights the question o f an adequate
materiality or arrangement o f a text to encapsulate its aims. The manuscript’s strategic
disarrangement, as Rajan presents it, recalls the problem of Hegel’s romantic mode in
finding an adequate form, or materiality, on its way to the Absolute. In light o f Plug’s
argument that the materiality o f the literary Absolute interrupts its quest for the ideal, it
seems that romantic art’s inwardness and hence, reduced materiality, may paradoxically
allow it to be slightly closer to achieving transcendence than the literary Absolute’s more
grounded materiality. Ultimately, though, Hegel’s romantic art does still possess a form,
which determines the interruption o f its search for the ideal.
In accordance with Plug’s variant o f the literary Absolute and its implication that
this version o f the Absolute is successful in its failure, the literary Absolute and ;
v

consequently Prometheus Unbound and romantic art seem to be successful instances of
the positive Absolute. That is, had the literary Absolute embodied the ideal, the ideal the
ideal would have become material and profane. Not Absolute at all. However, in failing
to fulfill its claims, the literary Absolute paradoxically dissolves in order to preserve the
Absolute as Absolute. The literary Absolute does admit that it cannot achieve the
reflection o f the Absolute in art, as evidenced by the Athenaeum Fragmented theories
that the work o f art is forever becoming, but there is a difference between constantly
becoming and having to interrupt or stop this embodiment all together.

. ■
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Further, the attempt to preserve the Absolute by, in essence, backing o ff from the
ideal, suggests that there is a certain anxiety in approaching the Absolute: that if someone
or something gets too close, the Absolute will shatter. This anxiety also suggests a
desperate attempt to preserve the faith in the Absolute, as if this preservation could save
the ideal and save oneself from the depression o f its loss. Further, this preservation is
problematic if it is shielding oneself from the acknowledgment o f an empty concept or if
it is a naive belief in something that is always already dissolving. The negative Absolute
reveals this attempt to shield oneself from the loss o f the ideal by trying to reach for
something higher with allegory; however, allegory cannot reach this higher meaning, as I
will further discuss in Chapter Two, and thus falls into melancholia. The concept o f a
literary Absolute cannot, therefore, recuperate Prometheus Unbound and Hegel’s
conception o f romantic art as instances o f the positive Absolute. Perhaps, then, even
Plug’s variant o f the literary Absolute will inevitably fall towards the negative.

Conclusion
Despite the shadow o f dissolution hanging over the ideals Hegel and'Shelley individually
V

hold out, they both still hope for the attainment o f the ideal, however unlikely it may be.
Hegel displays this hope with his system as an infinite becoming working towards the
ideal; yet, the philosopher’s corrective turn away from art and towards philosophy as a
path to the Absolute suggests the inklings o f a recognition that the ideal is unobtainable.
Hegel, however, still publicly persists in positing the viability o f the ideal. Shelley is a
little more realistic: the poet may posit the Promethean Age as a hypothesis that will only
come to fruition when humankind applies the appropriate morals and values, but he
begins to acknowledge that the ideal is unobtainable when he underlines that these seeds

62
o f happiness are unconsciously destroyed by us. He also acknowledges the inaccessible
nature o f the Absolute with the mismatch between Demogorgon’s and Prometheus’s
violence and the Golden Age, Demogorgon’s drive towards dissolution and revolution,
and humankind’s mutability. When there is no hope o f achieving the Absolute and the
naïveté ends, the external hints that the ideal is unachievable transform into an external
realisation o f its unobtainable nature. This in turn will match up with the internal
realisation that the ideal may never have existed in the first place. This realisation is
foreshadowed by Panthea’s description o f the “melancholy ruins” in Act IV (288). I
argued earlier that the “melancholy ruins” are not ruins, but rather are fragments full of
potential. While the materials left behind by the destructive power o f the orbs are also not
melancholic because o f their prospective casting into the future, the phrase does
foreshadow the aftermath o f the dissolution o f the Absolute. It is this complete loss o f the
ideal which leads to melancholy and the ruin o f ideals, whether in the form o f the end
goal o f a systematised whole, the Golden Age, or gods.
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Chapter Two: The Negative Absolute in Keats’s H yp erio n
Introduction
In opposition to Hegel, Keats fights the systematizing and totalizing drive to the extent
that he moves into allegory and melancholia, into thé negative-Absolute, to define a more
modem aesthetic that accepts non-productivity. In Hyperion, Keats begins his movement
into allegory and depression by subverting the epic, by moving away from metaphor into
metonymy and then into allegory, and also by focusing on the fallen Titans, who would
be the heroes o f a normal epic. Metaphor creates unity within the system o f substitution
and so, by choosing metonymy instead, Keats moves towards contiguity and
disfigurement. Keats then moves to allegory, which attempts to seek a higher meaning,
but this higher meaning does not exist, and so the poem falls into depression. This state
arises because allegory tries to find meaning and unity in the way that metaphor and the
symbol would do, but instead, it returns to something closer to the disconnection of
metonymy.

'

The negativity o f allegory is inherent in the Titans’ inability to act and their
V

constant ponderings regarding their fate! These repetitive ruminations lead to the Titans’
melancholia, which for Benjamin,’occurs when contemplation turns to absolute
knowledge and not truth. Contemplation then turns into melancholy and misses the
essence o f things, turning these things into ruin and allegory. Sigmund Freud argues that
melancholia is the absence o f the recognition o f the meaning o f one’s loss, which for the
Titans means that they do not accept their loss o f power as they consider how to
overthrow the Olympians. In Hyperion, therefore, allegory is the figurative way we
experience melancholia.

'
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This melancholia lends itself to the negative Absolute, which I will define with
the help o f Kierkegaard, as a depression and negativity, a constant wearing away, and a
lack o f productivity. Thus, while Keats may have wanted to move towards a literary
absolute similar to the one Plug poses - an ideal that is in the process o f decomposing
and yet striving towards the absolute, as it is successful in its lack o f success - Keats
instead ends up probing something similar to Krell’s ends o f the absolute: absolute
inhibition as the Titans slip into a forgotten past; absolute separation since the Titans are
separated from the world in their cave as eternal beings who become like rock and metal
as they are forced to enter into time; and absolute density with the similarity between
Novalis’s god made o f absolutely dense metal and the Titans’ metallic and almost
mechanic tendencies as they are “lock’d up like veins o f metal, crampt and screw’d (II,
25). Perhaps Keats understood that even a decomposing ideal that still strives for the
absolute will eventually fall to ruin.
Not only does the unexpected ending o f Hyperion display Jhis tendency towards
ruin, but it and the non-productivity evidenced in the poem suggest that the poem is a
failure o f narrative. On the other hand, the poem can be seen as a form o f art which
values negativity and non-productivity. Likewise, the Titans waver between being
failures and becoming subjects o f this aesthetic that values negativity. This wavering, like
the wavering between Hyperion’s clinging to the positive and demystifying it, constitutes
the structure o f the negative Absolute. Keats, however, is not fully comfortable with a
new art that values negativity and so he attempts to return to the positive with Apollo and
the pastoral. Keats then realizes that he is deluding himself, and as such leaves the poem
in ruin, thereby returning to an aesthetic o f the negative.

\

65

Metaphor and Metonymy
Keats first avoids the system by subverting the epic and moving away from metaphor into
metonymy. The epic represents, as Lukács argues, “die extensive Totalität des Lebens
[the extensive totality o f life],” containing its own history while depicting heroic
adventure or the creation o f consciousness or society (Die Theorie des Romans 53; The
Theory o f the Novel 46). Indeed, Hegel argues that the epic “sich aus ihrer
fragmentarischen Besonderung und selbständigen Vereinzelung drittens zu einem
größeren Ganzen aneinanderreihen und zu einer Totalität abrunden [kann], die
schlechthin epischer Art i s t . . . zum Bewußtsein gebracht werden soll, die
zusammenhaltende Einheit und den eigentlichen Mittelpunkt abgibt” (Ästhetik 3:238).47
Keats subverts both the structural and content criteria o f the epic. Rather than beginning
in medias res o f a heroic action, Hyperion starts at the end o f the action, when the Titans
have been overthrown. By beginning in this manner, Hyperion deviates from the
expected heroic progress of an epic and “acquires, by an ironic paradox, a premature
*S

sense ofending” (Aske 88). Further, the poem begins with Saturn, who sits “quiet as a
stone, / Still as the silence round about his lair” (1,4-5). The simile likening Saturn to a
stone implies that Saturn changes as slowly as a stone, which is practically imperceptible
to humans, as if he is out o f time, and only able to erode or regress with time. Indeed, as
Saturn grieves for his lost throne, he sits in a vale far away from the markers of time, “Far
. . . from the healthy breath o f mom, / Far from the fiery noon, and eve’s one star” (1,23). Saturn is not the expected hero o f an epic, but instead, he is an overthrown god
depicted in stasis: “Upon the sodden ground / His old right hand lay nerveless, listless,
dead, / Unsceptred; and his realmless eyes were closed; / While his bow’d head seem’d
47 “totality [in which] the unity holds the parts together” (Aesthetics 2:1041).
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list’ning to the Earth” (1 ,17-20). This description o f Saturn lying on the ground focuses
only on parts o f his body that before his overthrow would have depicted his power: a :
hand holding the sceptre and holding control over his kingdom, now nerveless and dead;
his eyes gazing over his realm seeing and knowing everything, now shut to the world and
shut to absolute knowledge; a head held high in recognition o f its power as head o f th e ,
state, now bowed down in pain. Indeed these dis-figured parts for the whole are synecdoches and metonymies o f a disfigured and grotesque body, which Keats has used
instead o f the normal epic similes and metaphors. Metaphors and similes, as Jakobson
would define them, work as part o f a system o f substitution, while metonymies and
synecdoches work within a field o f contiguity and chance, outside o f a system and
instead dependent on where things fall. Jakobson’s depiction o f metaphoric substitution
along the vertical axis bears a resemblance to Hegel’s dialectical system, which raises up
its individual parts (“Metaphor,” “Metonymy,” “Synecdoche”). Indeed, the system of the
metaphor often creates a sense o f unity in its substitution, whereas metonymy, as the dis
figured images o f Saturn depict, often involves a destructive force. Further, as metonymy
continues on its horizontal axis, it continues along in its depressive manner, depicting
Saturn as a lifeless, fallen king. For Keats, metonymy seems to unmake the epic and its
system. With this unmaking o f the system, aided by the message o f regression, stasis,
and dis-figurement, Keats begins to criticize the authority o f the epic and the authority of
a monumental history which the epic aims to create.
;

h
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The poet accomplishes this critique o f the system by depicting the stillness and

ruin o f the Titans through the annihilation o f time and renewal for the gods. Saturn sits in
his vale far from the markers o f time; however, the mention o f these markers indicates
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that the “mom,” “the fiery noon,” and “eve’s one star” do exist, but that the Titans cannot
experience them (1,2-3). Further, around Saturn, “no stir o f air was there, / Not so much
life as on a summer’s day / Robs not one light seed from the feather’d grass, / But where
the dead leaf fell there did it rest” (I, 7-10). The fall o f Saturn, the Roman god who
/

normally has the power o f renewal, “o f admonitions to the winds and seas, / O f peaceful
\

sway above man’s harvesting” (I, 109-110), stops the wind and the spread o f seeds and
their implantation in the ground, such that the dead leaf falls and rests without any
mention o f decomposition and the renewal o f life. His fall also hinders the restorative
properties o f water: “A stream went voiceless by, still deadened more / By reason of his
fallen divinity / Spreading a shade” (1 ,11-13). Though the stream moves, it is
“deadened,” unable to make noise and act as a renewing force, because it is affected by
the spreading shadow o f Saturn’s fall. Paradoxically, then, the beginnings o f the poem
depict the ends o f renewal and progress, breaking “Nature’s law,” which Oceanus later
recounts (II, 181), and stopping short o f the promise o f progress when the poem stops just
as Apollo dies into life.

\

The Titans as Statues
With the removal o f the system o f substitution demanded by metaphor, the Titans, who
should be the heroes o f the poem as per epic tradition; change from gods in eternity to
statues frozen in history, unable to enter into time. Similar to when Keats likens Saturn to
stone, the poet likehs the Titans to rock and metal, specifically to the immovable
Stonehenge, which also recalls Krell’s attention to Novalis’s god made o f an absolutely
dense metal: the Titans are “Lock’d up like veins o f metal, crampt and screw’d; / Without
a motion, save o f their big hearts heaving in pai n/ . . . like a dismal cirque/ O f Druid
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stones, upon a forlorn moor” (II, 25-35). These death-stricken gods, who possess “scarce
images o f life” (II, 33), depict the destruction o f the Titanic society and consciousness, ,
whereby Keats again fights against the epic impetus to create and depict creation. In fact,
Keats goes further than Hegel in his theory o f consciousness: Hegel believes that
consciousness ultimately finds unity through separation and the recognition o f its lack;
the Titans, however, recognize their lack o f power, and continue to lament this in the
cave, but have no way o f regaining their power and instead remain ruins o f a lost society.
The destruction o f the Titanic consciousness is further depicted when the Titans are
frozen in an eternal autumn, in their eternal twilight, where “no insulting light / Could
glimmer on their tears” (II, 5-6) and heaven cannot be reached. Indeed, the Titans are
modem mins o f their society, and not romantic fragments representing part o f the whole.
As rains, they encumber the earth, impede the narrative, and are unable to return to any
semblance o f order or power.

; ■'
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Symbol and Allegory
Traditional Allegory

^

Keats moves further away from metaphor and the epic as he delves into allegory. At first,
he begins with one o f the earliest and most systematic forms o f allegory: “hypnoicC' or
“under-sense” (“Allegory” 32). This literal sense of allegory, which was favoured in
antiquity, “divides the text into an apparent form and an underlying significance,” such
that the Titans or their primordial parents were associated with an element (“Allegory”
32). The classical form o f allegory, which is apparent in personification, follows the same
vertical system o f substitution as metaphor since Saturn is substituted for the winds and
the seas (Bloomfield 315-316). Keats then moves into a style o f allegory which follows
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the anagogic tradition o f Dante, specifically taking something to a higher level of
meaning (“Allegory” 33). As Angus Fletcher describes allegorical works in his Allegory:
the theory o f a symbolic m ode,“They are usually saying one thing in order to mean
something beyond that one thing” (4). We see the aim towards a higher meaning in
Oceanus’s interpretation o f the Titans’ fall. Indeed, Oceanus’s reading passes through the
four different levels o f allegory. First he develops the literal or historical level,

•

identifying the Titans as “passion-stung, / [Writhing] at defeat” and “[stooping]” at the
feet o f the victorious Olympian gods (II, 173-174 & 178). Next, the god o f the sea moves
to the allegorical level by providing his commentary: “as [Saturn] wast not the first o f
powers, / So [is Saturn] not the last” (II, 188-189). Then, he moves to the moral or
tropological level by declaring that the Titans “fall by course o f Nature’s law, not force /
O f thunder, or o f Jove” (II, 180-181). Finally, Oceanus, declares the anagogic
significance o f the replacement o f the Titans by the more beautiful and perfect
Olympians when he insists upon the eternal law “that first in beauty should be first in
might: / Yea, by that law, another race may drive / Our conquerors tcymourn as we do
now” (II, 229 - 231). Keats’s move to allegory allows for a multiplicity o f
interpretations, as exemplified by Oceanus’s, Clymene’s, and Enceladus’s differing
readings o f the Titans’ fall. This multiplicity opposes the unity and sole substitution
available with the system o f metaphor. Despite the diversity o f interpretations in allegory,
the fourfold schema o f traditional allegory - literal, allegorical, tropological, and
anagogic - grounds the positive Absolute in an organized system, as the anagogic holds
everything together, while it aims for a higher meaning. The anagogic performs a kind of
Aufhebung inHegelian terms and is part o f a positive Absolute.
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However, traditional allegory tends to be static and fixed. This lack o f freedom,
Fletcher argues, is apparent as the characters “remain bound to the Wheel o f Fortune,
though it turns, rising and falling to give them the illusion of a changed state” (64).
Further, Fletcher suggests that, traditional allegory reinforces the order o f things, where
each character is a willful personality asserting itself to produce a generalized system or a
hierarchy o f power (69). Thus, the Titans and the Olympians serve to exemplify the
hierarchy and rise and fall o f the gods as they are bound to fate. Indeed, the fixed agent
becomes emblematic since his or her hierarchic function only allows this status (Fletcher
66 & 69). That is, the hierarchic necessity in traditional allegory prevents characters from
growing or maturing, and thus, without any sense o f change, the static allegorical agent is
reduced to an emblem. Therefore, like Cupid with his bow, who, Fletcher argues
becomes an impresa (69), Saturn is an emblem for the fertile wind. Specifically within
Hyperion, Saturn’s emblematic status and inability to change makes him an emblem o f a
lost age and values.

'x ,

Indeed, the fixed state o f traditional allegory also leads to a depressive, fixed, and
negative state, which I will define as the negative Absolute. This state arises because
traditional allegory begins as an attempt to transform the horizontal, metonymic axis into
the vertical, metaphoric one, because allegory seeks for a higher meaning. But this
attempt fails, and allegory lapses back into something closer to metonymy. Thus, the
pairs o f metaphor and metonymy and symbol and allegory are closely related, despite the
fact that the former are tropes or techniques, and the latter are metaphysical terms that are
linked to certain world views: both metaphor and the symbol reach for something higher
along the vertical axis; while metonymy’s relations o f contiguity and allegory’s re
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organisation o f ruins into new constellations perform along the vertical axis. J. W. Goethe
distinguishes between symbol and allegory, arguing,
Es ist ein grosser Unterschied, ob der Dichter zum Allgemeinen das Besondere
sucht oder im Besondem das Allgemeine schaut. Aus jener Art entsteht Allegorie,
wo das Besondere nur als Beispiel, als Exempel des Allgemeinen gilt; die letztere
aber ist eigentlich die Natur der Poesie: sie spricht ein Besonderes aus, ohne an’s
Allgemeine zu denken oder darauf hinzuweisen. (Maximen No. 279,261 )4849
Goethe’s definition o f allegory implies that either the poet has a general plan and
searches the world o f particulars to match and confirm his plan, or the poet looks at the
world o f particulars and asks how to organize those particulars into a general plan. In the
latter movement, the poet attempts to find a higher meaning for the particulars by
organizing them. Goethe’s further distinction between allegory and symbol exemplifies
this reaching for a higher meaning:

,

Die Allegorie verwandelt die Erscheinung in einen Begriff, den Begriff in ein
Bild, doch so, dass der Begriff im Bilde immer noch begränzt und vollständig zu
halten und zu haben und an demselben auszusprechen ist, [während der]
Symbolik die Erscheinung in Idee [verwandelt], die Idee in ein Bild, und so, dass
die Idee im Bild immer unendlich wirksam und unerreichbar bleibt und, selbst in
allen Sprachen ausgesprochen, doch unaussprechlich bliebe. (Maximen Nos. 1112
; & 1113,360)49
?
\

By changing the phenomenon into a concept, allegory reaches for a higher meaning, even
if it is limited within the image. Indeed, the limiting nature o f the image can be aligned
with Fletcher’s argument about the fixity o f the allegorical agent-turned emblem. In Die

48 There is a great difference whether a poet is looking for the particular [from] the general, or sees
the general in the particular. The first gives rise to allegory where the particular only counts as an example
o f [the general]; but the latter in fact constitutes the [true] nature o f poetry, expressing something
something particular without any thought o f the general, and without indicating it. (33-34, my edits) From
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Maxims and Reflections, Trans. Elisabeth Stopp (London: Penguin Books,
1998). All further translations o f Maximen und Reflexionen will be from this translation.
49 Allegory changes an object o f perception into a concept, the concept into an image, but in such a
way that the concept continues to remain circumscribed and completely available and expressed within the
image, [while symbolism] transforms an object o f perception into an idea, the idea into an image, and does
it such a way that the idea always remains infinitely operative and unattainable so that evening if it is put )
into words in all languages, it still remains inexpressible. (Maxims and Reflections 141)
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Gegenwartsbedeutung des kritischen Realismus (The Meaning o f Contemporary
Realism), Georg Lukäcs takes Goethe’s distinction between allegory and symbol one step
further and argues that modem allegory does not seek a particular in the general, but
rather seeks only abstractions. These abstractions can never lead to a higher meaning, but
can only ever lead to disintegration. Lukäcs posits that the realist novel, or earlier the
Goethean symbol, depicts “die konkrete Möglichkeit [concrete potentiality]” (474;24)
concerned with “dessen Wechselwirkung mit den objektiven Tatsachen und Kräften des
Lebens zur Voraussetzung” (474);50 that it assumes “spontane Einheit [spontaneous and
natural unity]” (492;39); and that it achieves “die sinnvoll-sinnfällige Mitte zwischen
Einzelheit und Allgemeinheit” (498).51523By contrast, he argues that the naturalist novel, or
differently, allegory as Goethe defines it, depicts that “die abstrakte Möglichkeit sich
bloß im Subjekt ausleben kann” (474);

assumes a “bewußte [conscious, constructed]”

unity (492;39); disintegrates the world o f man into abstractions, angst, and melancholy
(492-493 ;39-40); and cannot achieve the fusion o f the particular and the general. Lukäcs
differentiates allegory from the naturalist novel by arguing that the forpier promotes the
general without the particular, while the latter promotes “das Partikulare in seiner:
momentanen Partikularität unmittelbar, reih formell (ohne Verallgemeinerung des
e i

Gehalts) zur höchsten Abstraktheit” (498)., The abstract character o f allegory does not
allow development because “Stimmung, auch die tiefste und aufrichtigst ergreifende,

50 “the dialectic between the individual’s subjectivity and objective reality” (24). From Georg
Lukács, The Meaning o f Contemporary Realism, Trans. John and Necke Mander (London: Merlin Press,
1963). All further translations o f Die Gegenwartsbedeutung des kritischen Realismus will be from this
edition.
51 “the fusion o f the particular and the general” (45).
52 “abstract potentiality belongs wholly to the realm o f subjectivity” (23-24).
53 “the individual detail in its immediate particularity (without generalizing its content) to the level
o f abstraction” (45). :
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ergibt nicht reale Determinanten des Lebens” (473).54 Thus, in allegory there is no
positive Absolute towards which we can strive or develop, and there is no totalizing
project for allegory as it is too far from the objective system o f the symbol and the
imified whole. Instead, in allegory only constant ruination and negation exist due to
, constant depression and wearing away. As Lukács argues, the concrete potentiality o f the
symbol allows for a particular character to “[tret] aus der schlechten Unendlichkeit seiner
abstrakten Möglichkeit [heraus]” (474).55 The theorist’s “schlechte Unendlichkeit [bad
infinity]” (474;24) likens itself to the potentialities that a victim o f depression, such as
Saturn, would constantly turn over in his or her mind. Thus in allegory, the poet, like the
Titans, looks for some sort o f higher meaning for the particulars around him, but instead
o f finding this higher meaning, he finds ruin. Indeed, despite Oceanus’s attempt to
interpret their fall and despite Enceladus’s call to arms, the Titans maintain their
a.
/
“despondence” (II, 379) and Saturn remains seated, unmoved by the call to action (II,
389).
Keats exposes this darker, desiccating side o f traditional allegory when the Titans’
bodies begin to form the stony walls o f the cave to which they have retreated. The fallen
gods are not only “like a dismal cirque / O f Druid stones,” (II, 25-35) but they are also
“Dungeon’d in opaque element, to keep / Their clenched teeth still clench’d, and all their
limbs / Lock’d up like veins o f metal, crampt and screw’d” (II, 34-35 and 23-25). Earlier,
Saturn’s unsceptred, dead right hand becomes part o f a metonymic chain, which could
function as a metaphor for power, but instead is actually a metonymy displaying the
disfigured body o f a fallen god. That this image could have been a metaphor displays the

54 “subjective mental states, however permanent or profound, cannot here be decisive” (22)
55 “be singled out from the ‘bad infinity’ o f purely abstract potentialities” (24).
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figure’s declaration that a god will have power in eternity. However, without the system
o f substitution and transformation characteristic o f metaphor, not only does Saturn’s body
become decrepit, but the Titans also become statues and part o f the cave that imprisons
them, caught in their frozen desert o f eternity and grief

:: :

To further emphasise this stasis, the Titans cannot affect the world, and as such
nature also pushes them away. Specifically, thè waterfall comers the Titans into the crags
o f rock, separating them from the world and preventing them from having any effect on
the world. Unlike the brook without a voice in Saturn’s valley o f grief, this waterfall is
“thunderous” and prevents the Titans, and the rest o f the world, from hearing their groans
(II, 6-9). Indeed, the imprisoned Titans can only groan and do not speak before Saturn
arrives. Further, the Titans’ place in eternity and their fixity as allegorical agents prevents
them from changing with nature: “no insulting light” can reach the Titans (II, 5-6), who
are frozen in their eternal twilight, and who have become isolated and outdated as nature
continues and changes.

,

^

^

The Titans are frozen in time because they look for a higher meaning regarding
their fall, while still seeing themselves as an emblem o f an age. As emblems, however,
they remain caught within a depressive mode and can only collapse into allegories or
projections o f themselves and their grief: the Titans are no longer aligned with power or
elements, but are mins o f an old culture caught in the desire for an epic world which can
no longer obtain. Thus, the Titans are projections and allegories o f lost values and a lost
system o f substitution. In Keats’s poem, the fallen gods are part o f an allegory to begin
with as the significance o f the values underpinning the outdated Titanic culture has
diminished. Keats’ use o f traditional allegory, therefore, begins in the unifying mode o f :
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the metaphor and the positive Absolute; however, his allegory leads to ruin and the
realization that the positive Absolute will be subverted when a higher meaning cannot be
obtained.
Though the Titans are ruins o f a fallen culture, Keats does include a background
history for them. This is unusual, for modem ruins are normally isolated in their ruined
state. However, it seems as if the background history, as well as Keats’s initial use o f the
classical form o f allegory or personification, which adheres to the system o f substitution
o f metaphor, is his attempt at an alternative to allegory steeped in ruin and exhaustion.
The background history cannot be a perfect alternative to ruin, however, as it is also
fragmentary. Regardless, this attempt to avoid allegory reflects the romantic anxiety
surrounding allegory and the more alluring plenitude o f the symbol, from the romantic
point o f view, as opposed to the mechanical and wasted mode of allegory. Goethe’s
argument against allegory demonstrates the romantic preference for the symbol as an act
o f immediately seeing as opposed to allegory as temporally seeking. Further, Goethe
prefers the symbol which expresses the idea such that it remains infinitely active, over
allegory which limits the concept in its analytic operation. It is this analytic and limiting
operation which the romantics, including Goethe and Samuel Taylor Coleridge, so decry.
Coleridge emphasizes the analytic nature o f allegory when he argues,
The Symbolical cannot perhaps be better defined in distinction from the
Allegorical,' than that it is always itself a part o f that, o f the whole which it is
representative. - “Here comes a sail,” - (that is a ship) is a symbolical expression.
“Behold our lion!” when we speak o f some gallant soldier, is allegorical. O f most
importance to our present subject is this point, that the latter (allegory) cannot be
/ other than spoken consciously- whereas in the former (the symbol) it is very
possible that the general truth may be unconsciously in the writer’s mind during
the construction o f the symbol; and it proves itself by being produced out o f his
own mind, - as the Don Quixote o f the perfectly sane mind o f Cervantes, and not
by outward observation or historically. The advantage o f symbolic writing over
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, allegory is, that it presumes no disjunction o f faculties, but simple dominance.
(29)
Though he identifies the symbolical with synecdoche and allegory with metaphor, this
alignment emphasizes that the symbolical is part o f a whole o f which it is representative.
Coleridge’s argument mirrors Goethe’s in that through the symbol, the writer has
immediate and unconscious access to the truth and the rational order o f things, whereas
allegory is produced through outward observation and the superficial disjunction o f the
faculties. Coleridge also aligns the symbol with the fusion o f imagination and reason and
the organic unity o f the world (“Allegory” 34, Fletcher 15). Allegory, on the other hand,
insists upon the splitting o f reason and imagination, such that its analytic operations result
in not only the disjunction o f faculties, but also the disjunction o f meaning. Coleridge’s
emphasis on the symbol’s totality also mirrors Hegel’s promotion of unity, while the
emphasis on allegory’s disjunction mirrors the ruin Keats depicts with the statuesque
Titans. The earlier romantics, therefore, define the symbol as synthetic, organic,
unifying, totalizing, and immediate, in opposition to allegory as analytic, mechanical,
disjoining, and temporal. Ironically, Fletcher argues that though anxiety is not a
necessary ingredient o f allegory, it is the most fertile ground from which allegorical
abstractions appear (37). Perhaps then, romantic anxiety about allegory produces allegory
anyway.
Regardless o f whether this is so or not, the romantic opposition between symbol
and allegory must be questioned. As Hans-Georg Gadamer historicizes the issue in
Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method), the nineteenth century devaluation of
rhetoric “ist somit die notwendige Folge der Anwendung der Lehre [von Kant] von der

/
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unbewußten Produktion des Genies” (77).56 Kant’s doctrine originally states that both
poetry and rhetoric are fine arts which exhibit the free play o f imagination. However, the
nineteenth-century critics, among whom Gadamer and Paul de Man include Coleridge
and Goethe, alter this tradition when they insist that the symbol is the unconscious and
S'

immediate expression o f the general truth in our experiences, thereby introducing “d[ie]
Befreiung der Kunst von den Fesseln des Rationalismus” (85).57 The nineteenth century
critics thereby designate the symbol as the creation o f genius, banishing rhetoric or
allegory from the realm o f “>freier< Kunst [‘free’ art]” and relegating it to the realm of
analysis (77;62). Thus, in the nineteenth century, “[tritt] Das Symbol als das
Unerschöpfliche, weil unbestimmt Deutbare dem in genauerem Bedeutungsbezug
Stehenden und sich darin Erschöpfenden der Allegorie ausschließend entgegen wie der
Gegensatz von Kunst und Unkunst” (80).58 Though the nineteenth century critics re
interpret the Kantian tradition, their desire for a unity o f meaning returns to Hegel’s
desire for totality and a system which is both inherent in the world and explains its
organization.

'

A

With this historical background in mind, Gadamer questions the opposition
between allegory and symbol: “Die Grundlage der Ästhetik des 19. Jahrhunderts war die
Freiheit der symbolisierenden Tätigkeit des Gemüts. Aber ist das eine tragende Basis? Ist
diese symbolisierende Tätigkeit in Wahrheit nicht auch heute noch durch das Fortleben

56 “follows necessarily from [the manipulation o f Kant’s] doctrine that genius creates
unconsciously” (62). From Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald
G. Marshall, 2nd ed (New York: Continuum, 2004). All further translations o f Wahrheit und Methode will
be from this edition.
57 “[the freedom o f art] from the fetters o f rationalism” (68).
58 “The symbol (which can be interpreted inexhaustibly because it is indeterminate) is opposed to
allegory (understood as standing in a more exact relation to meaning and exhausted by it) as art is opposed
to non-art” (65).
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einer mythisch-allegorischen Tradition begrenzt? Wenn man das erkennt, muß sich der
' (
Gegensatz von Symbol und Allegorie wieder relativieren” (86).59
In a similar vein, de Man, in “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” suggests that an
underlying commonality and tension exist between allegory and symbol. According to de
Man, Coleridge’s definitions o f symbol and allegory possess an inherent ambiguity:
Coleridge spiritualizes and characterizes the symbol as “the translucence o f the eternal
through and in the temporal” (Coleridge, The Statesman ’s Manual 437-438), while also
characterizing allegory as more devoid o f substance than its “phantom proxy” (437-438).
Thus, allegory “is an immaterial shape that represents a sheer phantom devoid o f shape
and substance” (de Man 192). When Coleridge defines symbol and allegory in this way,
[they] alike now have a common origin beyond the world o f matter. The
reference, in both cases, to a transcendental source, is now more important than
the kind o f relationship that exists between the reflection and its sources. It
becomes o f secondary importance whether this relationship is based, as in the case
o f the symbol, on the organic coherence o f the synecdoche, or whether, as in the
case o f allegory, it is a pure decision o f the mind. Both figures designate, in fact,
the transcendental source, albeit in an oblique and ambiguous w a y . . . We end up
with a description o f figurai language as translucence, a description in which the
distinction between allegory and symbol has become o f secondary importance.
(de Man 192-193)
The ambiguity which exists in Coleridge’s definitions o f allegory and symbol, therefore,
points to a common transcendental source,for both figures. This commonality suggests
that both can co-exist as expressions o f the transcendental, much as Gadamer suggests
that the opposition between, and the definitions of, allegory and symbol are relative. De
Man then suggests that literature possesses a tension between allegory and symbol when
he analyses Rousseau’s La Nouvelle Héloïse and compares the puritanical and allegorical
59
“Nineteenth-century aesthetics was founded on the freedom o f the symbol-making activity o f
the mind. But is that a sufficient foundation? Is not this symbol-making activity also in fact limited by the
continued existence o f a mythical, allegorical tradition? Once this is recognized, however, the contrast
between symbol and allegory becomes relative” (69-70).
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language o f the scene o f Julie’s Elysium and the symbolic and erotic language o f the
Meillerie episode:

^

2

The moral contrast between these two worlds epitomizes the dramatic conflict of
the novel. This conflict is ultimately resolved in the triumph o f a controlled and
lucid renunciation o f the values associated with a cult o f the moment, and this
renunciation establishes the priority o f an allegorical over a symbolic diction. The
novel could not exist without the simultaneous presence o f both metaphorical
modes, nor could it reach its conclusion without the implied choice in favor o f
allegory over the symbol. (204)
Superficially, it would be easy to assert that de Man claims that the romantics actually
preferred allegory over symbol; instead, I believe that de Man points to a tension between
allegory and symbol which must always exist. For, if Rousseau’s novel contains the
metaphorical modes o f both the erotic and the puritanical; then surely it must also contain
both the modes o f allegory and symbol in tension.

Contemporary Allegory: De Man and Benj amin;
De Man’s definition o f contemporary allegory also sheds light on why allegory cannot
attain a higher meaning:
The relationship between the allegorical sign and its meaning (signifie) is not
decreed by dogma . . . We have, instead, a relationship between signs in which
the reference to their respective meanings has become o f secondary
importance. But this relationship between signs necessarily contains a
constitutive temporal element; it remains necessary, if there is to be allegory,
that the allegorical sign refer to another sign that precedes it. The meaning
constituted by the allegorical sign can then only consist in the repetition (in the
Kierkegaardian sense o f the term) o f a previous sign with which it can never
coincide, since it is o f the essence o f this previous sign to be pure anteriority..
. Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility o f an identity or identification,
allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin, and,
renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it establishes its language
in the void o f this temporal difference. (207)
Since allegory evokes an origin with which it can never coincide, it cannot go forward
and find a higher meaning, as this higher meaning would also require a reference to the
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origin: without a set o f instructions, finding the purpose o f a complex piece o f machinery
and even putting it together would prove almost impossible^ Without an origin, allegory
remains only a ruin, indicating that the Titans as allegories o f their previous powerful
selves can only be projections and ruins o f themselves. In contemporary allegory, /
therefore, we can never create a whole or unity.

i

The temporality inherent in allegory not only acts as a reminder o f the distance
between allegory and its origin, but also as a reminder o f the subjective and temporal
nature which the symbol would deny. We see the atemporal nature o f the symbol when
Ccelus, the father o f the Titans, narrates the birth and fall o f his children to Hyperion. The
Titans are “fruits” o f the “powers” who created them (I, 315, 311),
Distinct, and visible; symbols divine,
Manifestations o f that beauteous life
Diffus’d unseen throughout eternal space:
O f these new-form’d art thou, oh brightest child!
O f these, thy bretheren and the Goddesses!
. . . Vague fear there is:
For I have seen my sons most unlike Gods.
Divine ye were created, and divine
In sad demeanour, solemn, undisturb’d
Unruffled, like high Gods, ye liv’d and ruled:
Now I behold in you fear, hope, and wrath;
Actions o f rage and passion; even as ■
I see them, on the mortal world beneath,
In men who die. - This is grief, O Son! (I, 316-335)

\

u.

While Ccelus attempts to project the Titans as symbols, he also narrates the life-cycle o f a
symbol: the figure begins life as a divine manifestation o f beauty, continuing undisturbed,
like fixed figures. When Ccelus states, “O f these new-form’d art thou, oh brightest child!”
(I, 319), depending upon the stress and pause in that sentence, he ironically declares that
being is art. The symbols, however, cannot maintain their immutability and so must yield

their eternal status to become temporal and emotional, entering the mortal world and
experiencing death. The symbols, therefore, transform into hollowed out allegory.
Further, as de Man argues, “the prevalence o f allegory always corresponds to the
unveiling o f an authentically temporal destiny. This unveiling takes place in a subject that
has sought refuge against the impact o f time in a natural world to which, in truth, it bears
no resemblance” (206). Despite the fact that the Titans have already fallen, Oceanus’s
interpretation o f their fall still attempts to find refuge in nature when he declares, “We
fall by course o f Nature’s law” (II, 181). Oceanus, however, does not attempt to protect
the Titans from time, but rather to absorb the Titans into the continuity and patterned
revolutionary change o f nature. Yet, this speech does not actually comfort the Titans, but
instead further exposes the fallen gods as subject to temporal change.
In temporalizing symbols, Keats’s use o f allegory also exposes the death of the
Titanic gods and decay in nature. Walter Benjamin concentrates on this link between
allegory and decay in Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiels (The Origin o f German
Tragic Drama):

\

Während im Symbol mit der Verklärung des Unterganges das transfigurierte
Antlitz der Natur im Lichte der Erlösung flüchtig sich offenbart, liegt in der
Allegorie die fa d e s hippocratica der Geschichte als erstarrte Urlandschaft dem
Betrachter vor Augen. Die Geschichte in allem was sie Unzeitiges, Leidvolles,
Verfehltes von Beginn an hat, prägt sich in einem Antlitz - nein in einem
Totenkopfe aus...Soviel Bedeutung, soviel Todverfallenheit, weil am tiefsten der
Tod die zackige Demarkationslinie zwischen Physis und Bedeutung eingräbt. Ist
aber die Natur von jeher todverfallen, so ist sie auch allegorisch von jeher. (182183)60
60Whereas in the symbol destruction is idealized and the transfigured face o f nature is fleetingly
revealed in the light o f redemption, in allegory the observer is confronted with the facies hippocratica o f
history as a petrified, primordial landscape. Everything about history that, from the very beginning, has
been untimely, sorrowful, unsuccessful, is expressed in a face - rather in a death’s head . . . The greater the
significance, the greater the subjection to death, because death digs most deeply the jagged line o f
demarcation between physical nature and significance. But i f nature has always been subject to the power
o f death, it is also true that it has always been allegorical. (166) From Walter Benjamin, 77*e Origin o f
German Tragic Drama, Trans. John Osborne (London: Verso, 1977).
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I f history is the telling o f past events in human culture, it must be bound up with death,
decay, and thus necessarily time, instead o f eternity and the ideal. Thus, in Benjamin’s
striking phrase; allegory confronts us with a death’s head. In Keats’s Hyperion, vie see
the mark o f this death upon the faces o f the Titans. For example, Cottus is described is
lying “prone . . . chin uppermost, / As though in pain; for still upon the flint/ He ground
severe his skull, with open mouth / And eyes at horrid working” (II, 49-52). This
grotesque image o f Cottus grinding his own head against the rocks is accompanied by the
dead serpent in Iapetus’s grasp, “its barbed tongue / Squeez’d from the gorge, and all its
uncurl’d length / Dead; and because the creature could not spit / Its poison in the eyes of
conquering Jove” (II, 44-48). Here the dead serpent is an allegory for Iapetus’s and the
Titan’s own despair and death in their inability to overtake Jove. Like the dead leaf and
the voiceless, deadened stream in Saturn’s vale (I, 7-13), the serpent displays the
subjection o f both nature and the Titans to death. Not only is this facies hippocratica
narrated to the reader, but the Titans also relay their confrontation with their own J
transitoriness and mortality: Hyperion bemoans that he “cannot see - but darkness, death
and darkness” (1,242).

• ’■■

•. ■■■1 .\
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The Melancholia of Allegory
In confronting their own mortality, the Titans enter into melancholy as they repetitively
consider their downfall. For Benjamin, “wird der Gegenstand unterm Blick der
Melancholie allegorisch, läßt sie das Leben von ihm abfließen, bleibt er als toter” (204).61

61 “the object becomes allegorical under the gaze o f m elancholy. . . melancholy causes life to
flow out o f[th e object] and it remains behind dead” (183).
■ ;
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The object becomes dead, Benjamin continues, because contemplation is directed
towards absolute knowledge and not truth:
Andererseits aber ist es gerade das Sinnen, dem, wenn es nicht sowohl geduldig
auf Wahrheit, denn unbedingt und zwangshaft mit unmittelbarem Tiefsinn aufs
absolute Wissen geht, Dinge nach ihrem schlichten Wesen sich entziehen, um als
rätselhafte allegorische Verweisungen und weiterhin als Staub vor ihm zu liegen.
Die Intention der Allegorie ist so sehr der auf Wahrheit widerstreitend, daß
deutlicher in ihr als irgend sonst die Einheit einer puren, auf das bloße Wissen
abgezweckten Neugier mit der hochmütigen Absonderung des Menschen zutage
tritt. (260)62
Thus, when contemplation concentrates on absolute knowledge and not truth, it turns into
melancholy, and misses the essence o f things, turning these things into dust and allegory.
In contemplating their downfall and how to overthrow the Olympians, instead o f coming
to and accepting the truth o f their downfall, the Titans, therefore, enter into melancholy
and turn themselves into dead objects. Not only does melancholy avoid the truth, but it
also attempts to deny the loss o f the object:
Das eben ist das Wesen melancholischer Versenkung, daß ihre letzten
Gegenstände, in denen des Verworfnen sie am völligsten sich zu versichern
glaubt, in Allegorien Umschlägen, daß sie das Nichts, in dem sie sich darstellen,
erfüllen und verleugnen, so'wie die Intention zuletzt im Anblick der Gebeine nicht
treu verharrt, sondern zur Auferstehung treulos überspringt. (Benjamin 264)63
Allegory, therefore, denies the void o f the object and attempts to fill the void with the
idea o f resurrection, or a desire to return to the origin. Thus, while allegory may begin
with the contemplation o f the object itself, it rests in the idèa o f resurrection, as the Titans

62

If contemplation is not so much patiently devoted to truth, as unconditionally and compulsively,
in direct meditation, bent on absolute knowledge, then it is eluded by things, in the simplicity o f their
essence and they lie before it as enigmatic allegorical references, they continue to be dust. The intention
which underlies allegory is so opposed to that which is concerned with the discovery o f truth that it reveals
more clearly than anything else the identity o f the pure curiosity which is aimed at mere knowledge with
the proud isolation o f man. (229)
63
And this is the essence o f melancholy immersion: that its ultimate objects, in which it believes it
can most fully secure for itself that which is vile, turn into allegories, and that these allegories fill out and
deny the void in which they are represented, just as, ultimately, the intention does not faithfully rest in the
contemplation o f bones, but faithlessly leaps forward to the idea o f resurrection. (232-233)

84
attempt to fill the void o f their death with the idea o f their resurrection through the
overthrow o f the Olympians. There can be no return to the origin, however, and “damit
[geht] freilich der Allegorie alles verloren, was ihr als Eigenstes zugehörte” (Benjamin
264),64 as it cannot preserve the object which is temporal and which has already turned to
dust due to contemplation. The Titans, likewise, can only contemplate a revolution, but
can never put it into action, and can never return to their position as symbols.
Allegorical melancholia can also be thought in terms o f Sigmund Freud’s analysis
o f the failure to work through grief. In his essay, “Trauer und Melancholie” (“Mourning
and Melancholia”), Freud differentiates the two titular mental states: with the exception
o f two characteristics, mourning and melancholia share the same traits as a person reacts
to “den Verlust einer geliebten Person oder einer an ihre Stelle gerückten Abstraktion wie
Vaterland, Freiheit, ein Ideal usw ...” (197).65 A person mourning her loss and a person
caught in melancholy over his loss will both feel “eine tief schmerzliche Verstimmung,
eine Aufhebung des Interesses für die Außenwelt, durch den Verlust der Liebesfähigkeit
[und] Hemmung jeder Leistung” (198);66 melancholiacs, however, alsp experience
“[eine] Herabsetzung des Selbstgefühls” (198)67 and “ kann nicht deutlich erkennen, was
verloren wurde” (199).68 As Freud elaborates,
der Kranke [kann] nicht bewußt erfassen, was er verloren hat. Ja, dieser Fall
könnte auch dann noch vorliegen, wenn der die Melancholie veranlassende

64 “Allegory goes away empty-handed” (233).
65 the loss o f a loved person, or to the loss o f some abstraction which has taken the place o f one,
such as one’s country, liberty, an ideal, and so o n . . . ” (243). From Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and
Melancholia,” The Standard Edition o f the Complete Psychological Works o f Sigmund Freud, Trans and
eds. James Strachey, Anna Freud, Alix Strachey, and Alan Tyson, Vol. 14 (London: Hogarth Press and the
Institute o f Psycho-analysis, 1957) 243-258. All further translations o f “Trauer und Mélancolie” will be
from this edition.
.
••
66 “a profoundly painful dejection, cessation o f interest in the outside world, loss o ff the capacity
to love, [and] inhibition o f all activity” (244)
; ;
r..
, ,
. ;
67 ”a lowering o f the self-regarding feelings” (244)
68 “an inability to recognize what has been lost” (245)
. ..
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Verlust dem Kranken bekannt ist, indem er zwar weiß wen, aber nicht, was er an
ihm verloren hat. So würde uns nahegelegt, die Melancholie irgendwie auf
einen dem Bewußtsein entzogen Objektverlust zu beziehen, zum Unterschied
von der Trauer, bei welcher nichts an dem Verluste unbewußt ist. (199)69
The Titans, thus, do not work through their grief and do not recognize what they have lost
within themselves: as melancholiacs, they consider their loss in numerous ways - as an
inability to influence the realms they once held, as Nature’s law, or as an opportunity to
overthrow Jove - but they do not consider what it is to no longer be an ideal or an
absolute. How does one mourn oneself? Perhaps it is impossible to do so, and so instead,
the Titans can only consider their loss from numerous angles without recognizing the loss
which is core to their identities: they were once gods, who were absolutes unto
themselves, and yet are not so any longer. Further, the Titans cannot cease their
melancholic contemplation until “nachdem die Wut sich ausgetobt hat [oder] sei es
nachdem das Objekt als wertlos aufgegeben wurde” (Freud 211),

meaning that they

would only be able to work through their grief once they have seen themselves as
valueless, which, given that they are former gods, seems unlikely to happen.
It seems, then, that allegory is the figurative way in which we experience
melancholia: allegory denies and attempts to fill the void left when contemplation
concentrates on absolute knowledge and not truth, thereby expressing melancholia, which
is the denial o f what has been lost within ourselves. Keats’s use o f allegory displays an
inevitability towards this figure: as we reach for a higher meaning, or as we attempt to fill
the void left by contemplation with allegory, we face the absence o f a higher meaning or
Jf________________________
: ;
69 The patient cannot consciously perceive what he has lo st. . . This, indeed, might be so even if
the patient is aware o f the loss which has given rise to his melancholia, but only in the sense that he knows
whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him. This would suggest that melancholia is in some way
related to an object-loss which is withdrawn from consciousness, in contradiction to mourning in which
there is nothing about the loss that is unconscious. (245)
70 “the fury has spent itself o r ... .the object has been abandoned as valueless” (2 5 7 ).

!
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the inability to fill this void. This contemplation is the nightmarish side o f modernity’s
tendency towards analysis, like the Titans’ over analysis o f their fall, and haunts both
romanticism and modernism.
: Further, a confluence exists between Keats’s use of the epic, a genre that may
have outlived itself and cannot be reanimated, and the Titans who have lost their
referentiality and significance. Indeed; the Titans have lost their significance to such an
extent that they refer to their future in the past tense, as Hyperion does when he foresees
his fall and declares his empire “left / deserted, void” before this is true (I, 239-240). This
confluence displays allegory as a priori to the poem. Try as he might, for instance in the
turn to Apollo at the end o f the poem, Keats cannot run from this epistemology.
Therefore, allegory in Hyperion is the epistemology o f melancholia and
exhaustion, as a way o f thinking and feeling ruin.71 This most clearly reveals itself in the
opening o f Book II with its repeated descriptions o f the Titans’ imprisoned bodies and the
ruins o f the cave in which they mourn. For example, the descriptions o f the rock crags
that form the caves repeat themselves with synonymous phrases; Keatsje-describes the
“crag[s] jutting forth to crag[s]” as “rocks that seem’d / Ever as if just rising from a
sleep” and then again, animating the rocks as he re-iterates, “Forehead to forehead held
their monstrous horns; / .. .7 Made a fit roofing to this nest o f woe” ( I I ,10-14). Each
new phrase about the ,cave adds another layer to the description, functioning like
overlapping snapshots or images glued together. This creates the effect o f jerky or
fragmented vision, like viewing the cave layer upon layer - as if it were a building
created by the poet - while a strobe light impedes any fluid vision or movement o f the
eye. This fragmented vision mirrors the broken, fragmented rock, and is re-created by
711 hesitate to use the word “as” here as it harks back to “allegory o f x.”

:

87
Keats when he describes the “couches o f rugged stone” upon which the Titans sit (II, 1517). Further, the disjointed snapshots serve to emphasize the containing nature o f the
cave: just as the narrow scope o f the fragmented images prevents any fluid motion
towards the roof or a possible sky, the rising rocks and the Titans are prevented from
continuing skyward by the roof o f the cave. The animation o f the rocks also suggests that
the Titans’ grief has become overwhelming and grotesque to the point o f mutating into
monsters, whose foreheads and horns form the roof o f the cave. In addition, this mutation
suggests that perhaps the Titans’ grief contains the Titans more than the cave itself. Thus,
the cave becomes the allegory through which the Titans experience grief.
Keats’s construction o f the cave layer upon layer directly opposes Hegel’s
reduction o f the externality, or the text, o f romantic art to a mere sign, which the
philosopher describes as “wert- und [inhaltslos] [worthless and meaningless]” (Äesthetik
l:124;l:88-89). Keats depicts the text, or sign, as full o f content, in Hyperion, despite the
ruined and exhausted allegory: in fact, the text becomes the object. Keats’s over
determined description o f the cave becomes the fragmented cave itself.
This is not to say that Hegel avoids all mention o f allegory. First, Hegel condemns
allegory: ^
Man sagt es daher mit Recht der Allegorie nach, daß sie frostig und kahl
und bei der Verstandesabstraktion ihrer Bedeutungen auch in Rücksicht
auf Erfindung mehr eine Sache des Verstandes als der konkreten
Anschauung und Gemütstiefe der Phantasie sei... In dieser Weise ist die
Allegorie nach beiden Seiten hin kahl. Ihre allgemeine Personifikation
; ist leer, die bestimmte Äußerlichkeit nur ein Zeichen, das für sich
genommen keine Bedeutung mehr hat... Unter den besonderen Künsten,
innerhalb welcher allegorische Darstellungen Vorkommen, tut die Poesie
unrecht, wenn sie zu solchen Mitteln ihre Zuflucht nimmt. {Ästhetik 1:
513-515)72 .
" :
72
It is therefore rightly said o f allegory that it is frosty and cold and that, owing to the intellectual
abstractness o f its meanings, it is even in its invention rather an affair o f the intellect than o f concrete

88

While he dismisses the form o f allegory as he knows it, as a trope, his understanding o f
romantic art valorizes something analogous to modem allegory: “aus dem Grande dieser
höheren Vollendung [der romantischen Kunst] sich der entsprechenden Vereinigung mit
dem Äußeren entzieht, indem sie ihre wahre Realität und Erscheinung nur in sich selber
suchen und vollbringen kann” {Ästhetik 1:115).73 Thus the inwardness o f romantic art
shares with allegory a mode o f thinking internalized into the form o f the text. For Hegel,
however, romantic art must be “unendlich Subjektive [infinitely subjective]” and allegory
is inadequate for romantic art because it is too objective {Ästhetik 2:111; 1:504 & 1:514515; 1:400). No form seems adequate for romantic art, though it must be expressed in
some sort o f medium, and it “must be judged defective if it resists this exteriority that
would, however, compromise its freedom” (Rajan, “Toward a Cultural Idealism” 65).
Indeed, Hegel resists sublating the subjective aspects o f romantic art into the objective on
its way to inwardness and the Absolute, and he can only get out o f this problem through
his deus ex machina o f the end o f art, which I will discuss at greater length in the next
chapter (Rajan, “Toward a Cultural Idealism” 65).
Interestingly, the trope o f allegory, as Hegel sees it, seems unsatisfactory for
Keats as well. Oceanus tries to make the narrative o f the poem into an allegory in the
conventional sense that Hegel condemns, but what the Titan does is too objective, since
he attempts to formulate a natural law, to express the inwardness o f the poem. Hence,
Oceanus fails to grasp the melancholia o f the Titans. Hyperion, therefore, is not an

intuition and the heartfelt depth o f the im agination. . . In this way allegory is in both aspects bleak; its
general personification is empty, the specific externality is only a sign, meaningless if taken by itself. . .
poetry is wrong in taking'refuge in [allegory]. {Aesthetics 1:399-401); 73
“Because o f [the] higher perfection [o f romantic art], it withdraws itself from an adequate union
with the external, since its true reality and manifestation it can seek and achieve only within itself ’

(Aesthetics 1:81).

- \
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allegory in the sense Hegel condemns, but one which contains the inwardness o f romantic
art and the vision o f contemporary allegory.

^

Despite Hegel’s dismissal o f formal allegory, he may have some sympathy for the
vision that Benjamin associates with allegory, since he does accept the negative' But
while Benjamin’s allegory forces us to face death and decay as parts o f life; Hegel fights
against himself and the negative in many instances and often resolves the negative into
the positive. First, the “negativ-vernünftige [negatively rational]” or antithesis must be
sublated into the “positiv-vernünftige [positively rational7” side or synthesis
{Enzyklopädie 1:169; 168). Next, Hegel writes, “[Geist] ist diese Macht nur, indem er dem
Negativen ins Angesicht schaut, bei ihm verweilt,“ such that “das Leben, das sich vor
dem Tode scheut und von der Verwüstung rein bewahrt, sondern das ihn erträgt und in
ihm sich erhält, ist das Leben des Geistes. Er gewinnt seine Wahrheit nur, indem er in der
absoluten Zerrissenheit sich selbst findet” (Phänomenologie 37).74 Thus, like
consciousness, Spirit finds itself in the negative and must face death,
but in its constant
’S
tarrying with death, comes away as a whole. This is not the case with the Titans, who
face death and stagnation and cannot come out o f it. Further, Hegel’s belief that reason,
which is associated with all things, will lead anything out o f the negative and into the
positive is evident in his letters to Windischmann, as we have seen in Chapter One. In
contrast, Keats goes further into the negative and ruin, into the exposed death o f allegory,
to open up a place for ruin, melancholy, and the negative in art.

74 “Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it,” . ..’’the life o f Spirit is
not the life that shrinks away from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation but rather the life that
endures [devastation] and maintains itself in [death]. [Spirit] wins its truth [and its whole] only when, in
utter dismemberment, it finds itself’ (Phenomenology o f Spirit 59).

90
Indeed, Keats’s use o f both contemporary allegory and select epic traditions leads
to his own brand o f allegory. Despite Keats’s use o f hollowed out allegory, he avoids the
aspect o f modem allegory which has lost the origin it renounced and for which it always
searches. The origin o f modem allegory may indeed be the symbol from which it
departed since both attempt to achieve a higher meaning. By continuing in the shadow o f
the epic, instead o f replacing it completely, Keats allows some o f the old epic traditions,
though with some alterations, to remain within Hyperion, such as beginning the poem in
medias res, including the background history o f the Titans, and using similes at the
beginning o f the poem. It seems, then, that Keats’s particular brand of allegory has not
renounced nostalgia for the symbol; instead, his brand o f allegory has subverted the
wholeness o f the symbol in a manner that allows for irony, meta-art, and
asystematization. Keats’s allegory results in romantic allegory, a negotiation between the
romantic symbol and the modem allegory, which acknowledges the effects o f time - a
characteristic o f modem allegory — on any,attempt to unify the eternal and ephemeral - a
characteristic o f the romantic symbol. Thus, the overthrown and statio^Titans demonstrate
the injection o f time and change into symbols who were once eternal and yet also aligned
with nature. Keats, therefore, is a later romantic and yet proto-modem poet who allows
for allegory, the nostalgia and m in it includes, and yet also the background history that
metaphor and symbol include.
As hollowed out statues, the Titans, therefore, are not romantic fragments
representative o f a larger whole, but rather stagnant mins o f a culture, as we attempt to
reach the positive Absolute. Since we can no longer, reach this higher meaning, Keats’s
poem, in effect, calls into question the existence o f this Absolute. As Giorgio Agamben
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argues, while recounting the history o f melancholy and analyzing Freud; melancholy is
“the imaginative capacity to make an unobtainable object appear as if lost” (20).
Agamben continues by explaining that melancholy “stages a simulation where what
cannot be lost because it has never been possessed appears as lost, arid what could never
be possessed because it had never perhaps existed may be appropriated insofar as it is
lost” (20). The positive Absolute perhaps never existed, even if earlier romantics such as
Hegel strive for it. Despite this recognition o f searching for something that may be
unreal, in Hyperion, the attempt to move towards the positive Absolute still exists, as
exemplified in the original attempt to reach for a higher meaning with allegory. When
Keats, the reader, and the Titans attempt to reach for this higher meaning but find only
ruin, they fall further into despair at their own naïveté in believing that the positive
Absolute exists. Thus, the paradoxical movement towards the positive Absolute still
persists, even if we recognize that it may be unobtainable. This movement is evident in
the way Keats wavers between clinging to the positive and demystifying it, and between
holding on to the epic and deconstructing it. While the poet recognizes^that the positive
Absolute is dissolving, he fights against this recognition, and thus wavers in his writing.
In effect, the wavering constitutes the structure o f the negative Absolute. Further, the
paradoxical attempt to reach the positive Absolute becomes a marker for an object that
may never have existed or a symptom o f recognizing the loss o f the positive Absolute but
not what the loss o f this ideal means.

:

The Negative Absolute
In avoiding this recognition, we come to rest in the negative Absolute, a constant despair
and wearing away, “deathwards progressing / To no death” (.Fall o f Hyperion 1,260-261).
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The negative Absolute can be thought through Soren Kierkegaard’s declaration that
romantic irony is “infinite absolute negativity,” and that “it is negativity because it only
negates; it is infinite because it negates not this or that phenomenon; and it is absolute
because it negates by a virtue o f a higher which is not” (278). Thus, infinite absolute
negativity negates everything from the position o f a higher meaning or idea which does
not exist.
Interestingly, Kierkegaard borrows the phrase “infinite absolute negativity” from
Hegel, who uses it to criticize romantic irony. Hegel claims that romantic irony is fixed at
the antithesis stage o f the dialectic which is negatively rational. Irony, therefore, does not
have a turn towards the positively rational side or the synthesis and so negates its infinite
and universal character, becoming finite and particular and only part o f the Idea (Asthetik
1: 93-100; Aesthetics 68-69). Thus, for Hegel infinite absolute negativity cannot progress
towards the positive Absolute. Though Kierkegaard redefines infinite absolute negativity
by adding the perspective o f a non-existent higher ideal, both philosophers disdain
romantic irony for its negativity: Hegel, for its lack o f synthesis or positively rational
side, and Kierkegaard for its indiscriminate negation without a higher purpose (as
opposed to Socratic irony which negates for the purpose o f pointing out internally
contradictory beliefs or institutions) (Kierkegaard 278-288). Hegel’s opposition to
negativity and Kierkegaard’s emphasis on a higher ideal demonstrate that both subscribe
to some version o f the positive Absolute, however differently, whereas Keats in Hyperion
settles in negativity, the loss o f the ideal, and a lack o f productivity within the negative
Absolute.
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Non-productivity o f Art
Saturn’s melancholic stillness and inability to do anything embodies this absence of
productivity, in a world that values “creating,” “forming,” and “fashioning forth /
Another world, another universe” (1 ,141-143) (Rajan, “Keats, Poetry and ‘The Absence
o f the W ork’” 344). The Titans’ inability to function in time also presents a non
productive art. In addition, though the Titans are presented first in the epic, they cannot
act as heroes; instead, the Titans are anti-heroes and parodies o f progress. The poem also
opens in the mode o f watchfulness, mirroring Saturn’s idleness as it lingers over the
Titans (Rajan, “Keats, Poetry and ‘The Absence o f the Work’” 346). All of this,
including the abrupt ending o f the poem, can be seen as a failure o f narrative and
productivity. On the other hand, the poem can be seen as a form o f art which values
negativity and non-productivity. For example, Keats fights against the notion o f idealized
eternity, or closed time, through his allegory, which argues for open and shifting time and
patterns. This is evident when the gods bemoan their loss and Keats references the
'

'
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seasons so that they seem to pass by at an alarming rate: the opening o f the poem
suggests that it takes place in autumn with “dead [leaves]” falling (1,10); then, the Titans
in the cave are likened to the dreary Stonehenge in “in dull November” (II, 37); and
suddenly, the sound o f Saturn’s voice preparing to speak is akin to “when Winter lifts his
voice” (II, 117). With this subversion o f standard conceptions o f time and the stagnation
o f the Titanic gods, Keats resists such aspects o f the positive as the idealisation of
antiquity, history, and the system.
Keats, therefore, denies us the work o f art which would normally obtain, have
meaning, use productive tropes, and be complete. The productive side o f poetry, as
Tilotttama Rajan argues in “Keats, Poetry and ‘The Absence o f the Work,” ’ “is
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associated with epic, not with sonnets or odes - forms that have lost their public and
ceremonial function, as Keats admits in the "Ode to Psyche" (1819). To write epic would
be to inscribe art as productive, unlike Saturn, who cannot engage in the work o f culture,
who has lost his ‘strong identity’ and ‘real se lf (Hyperion, I, 114)” (“Keats, Poetry and
‘The Absence o f the W ork’” 344).

,
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Apollo and the Pastoral: An Attempt to Return to the Positive
The wavering between the poem as a narrative failure and an aesthetic that values
negativity is also mirrored in Keats’s wavering between presenting the Titans as failures
and as subjects intimating this new modem aesthetic. Keats, however, attempts to return
to productive art with Apollo and the pastoral. As Rajan argues, with the passing of
authority from Hyperion, who is associated with the sun, to Apollo, who is associated
with art, Keats attempts to create an aesthetic epic, joining history and art and depicting,
as Oceanus declares, “That first in beauty should be first in might” (II, 229) (Keats,
Poetry and ‘The Absence o f the Work’” 342). Indeed, Keats denotes his attempt to move
back into the positive at the outset o f Book III, when the speaker o f the epic implores the
Muse to leave the Titans “to their woes” and instead to turn to Apollo, “the Father o f all
verse” (III, 3 and 13). Apollo’s difference from the Titans appears first in his
environment: he wanders away from his mother’s bower in “the morning tw ilight. . . /
Beside the osiers o f a rivulet, / Full ankle-deep in lilies o f the vale” (III, 33-35). This
blooming landscape is distinct from Saturn’s decaying vale and is free o f the stagnating
cave made from grief and its oppressive waterfall: “Throughout all the isle / There was
no covert, no retired cave / Unhaunted by the murmurous noise o f waves, / Though
scarcely heard in many a green recess” (III; 38-41). Apollo’s environment suggests that
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he will be able to grow and become like his landscape. Unlike Saturn, finds the Titans
and fails to have his questions answered by them, Apollo walks in search o f the goddess
o f his dreams and finds Mnemosyne, who answers his questions about her origins and
confirms his remembrance o f her (III, 50-79). Apollo, therefore, is able to carry out tasks,
an indication o f progress. In further opposition to the Titans who turn inward in their
grief, Apollo is curious about the world around him, even as he feels melancholic, and asks Mnemosyne about “the regions other than [his] isle,” the stars, and power (III, 96-97
and 103). Most importantly, Apollo notices the change from sun to moon, indicating that
he exists in time and not eternity; the Titans, however, do not notice the passage o f time
or the seasons around them, as Hyperion demonstrates when he shudders “Not at a dog’s
h o w l. . . / Or the familiar visiting o f the one / Upon the first toll o f his passing-bell, / . . .
/ But [at] horrors, portion’d to a giant nerve” (1 ,171-175).
Apollo’s participation in time also means that he is a god defined by knowledge,
not memory. Indeed, Apollo uses the knowledge of past “Names, deeds, gray legends,
dire events, rebellions, / Majesties, sovran voices, agonies,7 Creations ^nd destroyings”
to answer why he feels melancholic (III, 112-116). Further, Apollo is a god associated
with the lyric, a cultural object which changes in time, whereas the Titans are associated
with the elements, often seen as eternal even if capable o f affecting change. Apollo
thereby “brings the past into dialogue with the present moment, to take the legends and
events o f time and experience them as knowledge,” as Michael Sider argues (126).
In order to become a god, the pre-deified Apollo takes “leave / O f pale immortal
death,” which could also be the ruination o f eternal gods (III, 126-127). But if, as
Benjamin claims, “the greater the significance [of the object], the greater the subjection
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to death,” post-deified Apollo, would most likely have to undergo an even more difficult
second death (166). Apollo, as part o f history, would also have to face the petrified:
landscape o f eternity. Indeed, only pre-deified Apollo has the diachronic ability .which
allows him to progress and enter into time and though Keats attempts to contrast Apollo
with the Titans, unfortunately, there is no clear indication as to how post-deified Apollo
would survive being a god. Put differently: though the pre-deified Apollo seems to be on
a path towards the positive Absolute, how will the post-deified Apollo avoid the negative
Absolute which the ruined Titans embody? Apollo m aybe saved because he is a god of
culture; however, as the father o f the lyric, he is an origin which can never be regained

'

and not a cultural temporal object, like the lyric itself. Indeed, the speaker implores the
Muse to “meantime touch piously the Delphic harp,” as if Apollo will become “a fallen
old Divinity” like the Titans (II,TO & 8, emphasis mine).
Keats’s attempt to return to the positive through the genre o f the pastoral also
possesses problems, forcing him to leave the poem as an incomplete ruin when he
\

realizes that he is only deluding himself into attempting this move inter file positive. Keats
attempts to move into the pastoral with descriptions o f the clouds “floating in voluptuous
fleeces floating o’er the hills,” the “faint-lipp’d shells, / On sands, or in great deeps
vermillion turn / Through all their labyrinths,” and the breathing of the Zephyr through
the branches o f various trees (III, 17,19-21,24-27). Yet, Keats’s move to this sensuous
pastoral is exaggerated and forced, creating a parallel with his forced attempt to turn
towards a weak and juvenile Apollo, who is “tended by his mother and sister and capable
only o f ‘baby-words’ (Hyperion, 3:31-32; 2:314)” (Rajan, “Keats, Poetry and ‘The
Absence o f the Work’” 342). Perhaps Keats is uneasy with resting in the negative,.
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thereby displaying the romantic paranoia about the forms o f ruin and allegory, and thus,
hysterically attempts to return to the positive with Apollo and the pastoral, a genre that is
new to Hyperion and to which Apollo does not originally belong. Indeed, the Olympian is
an attempt at returning,to the symbolic mode, as “the Father o f all verse” carries his
“golden bow” and “lyre” (III, 13,43,101); within the framework of the negative in
Hyperion, Apollo, however, can only be a projection o f a symbol. Once this projection
fails, Apollo becomes an allegory o f the disrupted symbol.
Keats’s attempt at re-entering the positive, thus, displays a hysterically divided
voice that attempts an apocalyptic narrative but is compromised by the melancholic mood
o f the first two cantos. Keats, therefore, abandons the poem when he realizes that he is
trying to delude himself into believing in a ruined positive Absolute, “recognizing the
pretentiousness o f Apollo's birth into Absolute Knowledge” (Raj an “Keats, Poetry and
‘The Absence o f the Work’” 343). Perhaps Keats also aborts the poem because he is
\
uncomfortable with the relationship between history and art that he creates with
Oceanus’s theory of natural law. Not only is the poet uncomfortable \yith aligning beauty
with power and progress in history, but he also denies the work o f productive poetry by
leaving behind an incomplete poem as a ruin.

Conclusion
The poem as ruin is the ruin o f totalization, pattern, and symbol. Allegory plays its part as
it dissolves the unity o f the work o f art. Before, in the positive Absolute, a higher
meaning existed, or seemed to exist, even if it could not be attained; now, in the negative
Absolute, meaning cannot exist within a constant state o f depression and ruin. Keats,
therefore, de-idealizes the positive Absolute by pointing out the unbridgeability o f the
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gap between the text and meaning: The poet o f allegory, Gordon Teskey suggests, is
aware o f the contradictory structure o f assumptions on which it proceeds: on one hand,
the author appears to assume that everything he says emanates from and returns to an
ideal meaning that is beyond the figurative distortions o f language; on’other hand, the
author recognizes the assumptions to be false because in assuming one can return to any
original point, or meaning, and find it unchanged, the reality o f time is denied (22).
Keats’s use o f allegory displays these divided assumptions, much like the way his
wavering constitutes the negative Absolute, and favours the recognition that the
assumptions about allegory are false since he accepts the reality o f time instead of
denying it* as romantics such as Goethe and Coleridge attempted.
Further, the ending o f Hyperion, even if read as apocalyptic rather than hysterical,
frustrates our expectations and desire for a clear ending and revelation o f meaning. When
the poet recognizes and employs the contradictory nature o f allegory, instead o f offering
the key to what the signs mean, he offers the readers a new constellation o f clues,
indicating that truth to which the clues point is too sublime ever to be apprehended
directly. Thus the expected end and meaning o f the work remains elusive even if we see a
labyrinth o f correspondences leaning towards a presence o f meaning (Teskey 17-21).
With Keats, not only does his use o f hollowed out allegory show us the impossibility of
attaining this meaning, but the ruined end o f the poem and the divided voice o f the third
canto also prevent us from grasping the meaning o f the text and overturn our
expectations. If the reader or interpreter, in seeking to close up the gaps (between text and
meaning) perceived in the text, only opens up more gaps and questions (Teskey 21),
perhaps Keats plays with this seeking, exposing it and making the multiplying gaps more
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ruinous. Ironically, as the gaps multiply, the negative Absolute continues to wear away at
the poet and perhaps the reader. Indeed, the allegorical work is designed to sustain the
effect o f multiplying gaps as the goal o f complete interpretation always recedes beyond
the reader’s grasp (Teskey 21). The abrupt ending o f Hyperion takes this further and
displays the receding meaning in a physical and literal manner. Perhaps then, with the
ruins o f Hyperion, Keats exposes the fact that we can never come to the complete
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Chapter Three: The Dynamic Absolute in Keats’s T he F a ll o f
H y p erio n

Introduction
Like Hyperion, Keats’s The Fall o f Hyperion also departs from the system and totality as
expressed in the form o f the epic. But while the first poem falls into melancholia and the
negative Absolute, the second moves beyond this depression into despair and then tries to
recuperate this despair by making it the basis for a the dynamic Absolute, which attempts
to recognize the meaning o f the loss o f the positive Absolute. Keats aims for this
recognition through the use o f the dream and “emboîtement” o f visions, which buffers ;
the speaker o f the poem and the reader from the melancholy o f the Titans; by questioning
the position o f the hero and replacing him with an antihero; and by historicizing the
Titans and placing them within the memory o f Moneta, who acts as an archive.
The archiving o f the Titans shapes them into projections o f their former selves, or
allegories o f the allegory they were in Hyperion, as the poet attempts to distance us from
'S

the loss o f the Absolute by placing them behind the glass case o f a museum. This attempt,
however, is not completely successful because the dreamer-poet accesses the history o f
the Titans through Moneta, who is also a Titan plagued by the pain o f the fall. ;
However, The Fall o f Hyperion still attempts to recognise the meaning o f the loss
o f the positive Absolute even if it can never fully succeed. First, the dreamer-poet’s
desire for change saves him from becoming a statuesque Titan once he enters Moneta’s
memory. Though Moneta’s pain highlights the persistence o f a certain melancholia, her
distress fuels the preservation o f the memory o f the Titans, thereby developing a
productivity and positivity from her sorrow: What further saves her and the poem from a
sterile negativity is her acknowledgement o f history and historicity, and her calling
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history into question. The questioning o f history instigated by Moneta allows the
dreamer-poet to humbly cease from mining for historical goods and instead to observe
Moneta’s memories, transforming the pain o f the Titans’ fall into a source o f knowledge
which can be safely accessed through the frame device of Moneta’s memory.
Despite Keats’s use o f the frame device, modem allegory, and the form o f the
poem as ruin, he seems to struggle with meta-art, particularly because he is defining a
new art which neither soothes nor vexes the wounds o f the world. Instead, Keats creates a
bridge across this dichotomy, offering a purgatory o f sorts, embodied by the dreamerpoet who takes on the attributes o f the Titans but returns back to his humanity, which will
be immortalized in an incomplete poem. This acceptance o f meta-art differs from Hegel’s
condemnation o f self-reflexive art, which combined with the inability o f romantic art to
resolve its abstractness into an appropriate form, leads to the end o f art. Hegel does,
however, allow for art’s success in its lack o f success, as it constantly attempts to reach
its goal o f unifying subjectivity and objectivity, thereby continuing its search for the
positive Absolute, even if cannot achieve it.

V

Keats, on the other hand, eventually accepts art bom o f the negative, but
progressing towards something more positive. This is the dynamic Absolute, which
begins the process o f finding meaning in the loss o f the Absolute and by seeing a thing as
an object instead o f as a m in or a trace. This movement away from melancholia is
implicit in the buffer provided by the dream device and in Keats’s attempts to unify the
eternal and the temporal, in such singular and paradoxical forms as Moneta’s illness, the
unspoiled textiles in the sanctuary, and the dreamer-poet’s acquisition o f god-like
qualities. In particular, the dreamer-poet’s desire to die in order to escape the min of the
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Titans reveals his acceptance o f his mortality and his miniscule place in the universe,
which saves him from the melancholic ruin o f the Titans and therefore, provides the hope
that we can overcome the loss o f the ideal.

J i;

:

Departure from the System, Totality, and the Epic
The Emboîtements and the Dream
The Fall o f Hyperion continues Keats’s project o f questioning the system and totality
beginning with its form, the emboîtements, a French term for the encasing o f visions
within visions. This attempt at a narrative begins with the induction by the speaker (I, 117), continues with the speaker’s narration o f his meal and his swoon into a potion-
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induced sleep (1 ,18-56), after which he recounts his dream o f the sanctuary, his meeting
with Moneta, and the description o f her face (I, 57-290). Then, the dreamer-poet sees into
her brain, contemplating the fallen Saturn and Thea (1,291-463). Finally, Canto One ends
with the dreamer-poet’s narration of his exit from Moneta’s brain (1,464-468). Canto
Two then begins with Moneta’s explanation to the dreamer-poet that he cannot
understand the sorrow o f the Titans (II, 1-9), which is “Too huge for mqrtal tongue” (II,
9). The second canto continues with Moneta’s description o f Hyperion’s anxiety!
surrounding his imminent fall (II, 10-49), and finally the dreamer-poet enters into •
Moneta’s brain again to see her memory o f Hyperion pacing the halls o f his palace (II,
49-60). The poem ends just before Hyperion falls. This confusing narrative is an attempt
at a narrative, which fails not only because the poem ends abruptly but also because the
subjects under observation in the narrative are the statuesque and melancholic Titans.
Perhaps it is also a narrative about giving up on a narrative because o f the mortal poet’s
supposed inability to express the enormous sorrow o f the Titans. If mortal language

‘!
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cannot capture this melancholy, then the poem must fail and the narrative must be left as
another ruin. Indeed, the dreamer-poet begins to lose himself as he looks upon the scene
o f Saturn and Thea for a month (I, 392): everyday he watches this scene, he grows “more
gaunt and ghostly” (I, 395-396) and he prays that “death would take him” (1,396-398).
This fading o f the speaker’s sense o f self reflects the fading o f his narrative as it drowns
in melancholy and dream visions.
The second Hyperion poem continues to question the epic by framing the action
in a dream, which can escape the causalities o f plot, emphasizing the sterility and rigidity
o f the ideal epic mode which must adhere to plot-driven rules. Indeed, Keats’s use o f the
dream poem overcomes the romantic ambivalence regarding narrative which Andrew
Bennett describes: “on the one hand, the Romantics were critical o f narrative because of
its arbitrary imposition o f external o rd er. . . on the other hand, they were highly critical
o f [a] lack o f narrative logic” (22). In the first Hyperion poem, the Titans exist as dead
statues unable to enter time, yet Keats preserves the standard o f time; in The Fall o f
\

Hyperion, however, the poet manipulates time to question reality and the epic mode.
When the dreamer-poet must climb the stairs o f the temple, some force impedes his
progress and slows his pace, making it “heavy” and literally “deadly” since he will die if
he cannot mount the stairs (1 ,129); but then as his foot touches the bottom stair, he
climbs the stairs, “As once fair angels on a ladder flew / From the green turf to heaven”
(1 ,135-136). The speaker’s description first o f his struggle and then of his agility is
figurative and yet also invokes the experience o f time, o f moving slowly and then swiftly
up the stairs, changing time’s status from a standard to an experience. To question
causality in The Fall, the dreamer-poet observes Saturn and Thea for “a whole moon” (I,

104
392), without sustenance or any physical activity and without questioning how this is ;
possible. TheFall o f Hyperion’s flexibility with time and causality because o f its dream
structure, therefore, becomes a replacement for totality and epic: what was once complete
is now the ruined contents o f a dream.

,

The dream-vision structure o f The Fall not only provides an alternative to the
ideal epic, but also to literature bom o f the negative. As Rajan argues in her book, Dark
Interpreter, the form o f Keat’s second Hyperion poem tries to provide an alternative
between the poetic vision “that escapes from reality to the haven o f the ideal, and one that
is still haunted by the ideal but so aware o f the real that it can only frustrate its readers”
(200). While Hyperion is unable to move past melancholia, perhaps The Fall o f
Hyperion’s structure allows for a release from the ideal, in so far as the dream-vision
“suggests that art is a kind o f purgatory : neither godlike and foreseeing nor infernal and
poisoned, neither a medium o f pure knowledge nor one o f pure suffering” (Rajan 200).
Thus, The Fall o f Hyperion allows for a dynamic balance between the aesthetics of
distance and the aesthetics o f immersion; between subjective and objective poetry; and
between classical and romantic poetry (Rajan 200-201).

;

^

^

Rajan also argues that the dream permits the dreamer-poet to remain outside his
dream, while acting within it, doubling and dividing himself into both passive and active,
contemplator and sufferer (198). Moneta presents a similar doubling and dividing since
she acts as both the archive and part o f the Titanic history. However, in a dream, the
dreamer-poet cannot act in the world outside his mind. Despite the limiting nature o f the
dream, the dividing and doubling inherent in the poem allow the dreamer-poet to face his
failure as a poet and contemplate the mirrored historical failure o f the Titans (Rajan 198).
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This ability to self-reflect m aybe what saves the dreamer-poet from the melancholia o f
the fallen gods.

Re-assessing the Hero
The Fall o f Hyperion continues in its quest to critique both epic totality and the
despondency o f not attaining this closure by re-assessing the hero. In Hyperion, Keats
attempts to find a hero, but cannot do so, moving from the statuesque Saturn; to the
waning Hyperion, and then to the young Apollo, abandoning thè poem to ruin before
settling with one protagonist; in thesecond Hyperion poem, however, Keats attempts to
find his hero in the dreamer-poet, but cannot develop him into the normal epic hero. The
protagonist o f The Fall o f Hyperion enters the poem without any connection to the Titans
or other people, and yet because he is a “dreaming thing” (1 ,166), which Moneta
deplores, he has been chosen to be in the sanctuary by virtue o f his exceptional abjection
from others. In fact, the dreamer-poet seems to be a shell, who does not become a more
full-bodied character until he enters into Moneta’s memory to watch fallen Saturn in the
deadened vale and feels “A power within [him grow] o f enormous ken,'/ To see às a God
sees” (I, 303-304). Yet, this power begins to drain the dreamer-poet o f his sense o f self as
he becomes statuesque like the fallen gods. Luckily, the protagonist returns to his mortal
status once Moneta removes him from the ante-chamber containing Saturn and Thea,
informing him that the melancholy she contains is “Too huge for mortal tongue, or pen of
scribe” (II, 9). With that warning, the poem ends in the middle o f Moneta’s recollection
o f Hyperion’s downfall, maintaining the dreamer-poet as an antihero and the Titans, who
would be heroes in a normal epic, as projections in a dream. Thus, The Fall o f Hyperion
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reduces the ideality o f the epic hero to a marginal man or an antihero, who can only gain
power within a dream, and within a fragment o f an action.

Questioning Myth by Archiving the Titans
Whereas in Hyperion, Keats exposes the failing ideals o f myth and totality through the
static figures o f the Titans, in The Fall o f Hyperion, Keats agitates myth to see what
remains by historicizing the Titans in Moneta’s memory and by placing Moneta in a
dream. The preservation o f the Titans in Moneta’s memory treats Moneta as an archive
and the Titans as artifacts, thereby demythologizing the gods or stripping them o f their
absolute status and turning them into part o f a cultural chain. The death o f the gods also
begins to question the goals o f history, as Eugenio Donato claims: “the topos o f the Death
o f God . . . denies the very possibility o f an eschatological end, a privileged Telos to
history, and hence problematizes the very nature o f narrative” (134). In addition, Keats
questions the ideal status o f myth by harnessing the dream-vision’s inability to obtain or
impact the world. However, the sacred presence o f the Titans remains: Moneta and the
’S

remains o f the Titans still inspire awe, as we see with the dreamer-poet(s month long
contemplation of Saturn and Thea and his obsessive description of Moneta’s face.
Perhaps then, by placing the gods in Moneta’s memory, the poet attempts to place them
in a museum and to treat the lost Absolute, which the Titans represent; as a thing to be
observed. However, Keats’s attempt to distance us from the melancholia o f the fallen
gods falters not only because o f the paradoxical mix o f historicity and sacred presence,
but also because in accessing the Titans through Moneta’s memory, it invokes her
reminder o f the pain, and potentially her own melancholia. This attempt is also not
completely successful because when we place an artifact behind glass in a museum, we
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cannot see it objectively as a thing, but rather we study it as a ruined object giving us a
clue to a lost civilization. In addition, if in The Fall o f Hyperion the Titans’ experience
has become a source o f knowledge preserved in an archive, as Rajan suggests {Dark
Interpreter 169-170), then once again the Titans, as I argued in Ghapter Two, could be a
route to contemplating absolute knowledge, ruined allegory, melancholia, and the
negative Absolute. Yet, ambiguity is part o f the dynamism inherent in the The Fall o f
Hyperion and, thus, the attempt to recognize the meaning o f the loss o f the positive
Absolute is not fruitless: the interruptions in Keats’s path to distancing us from
melancholia reflect the rhythm o f repeating and working through depression.

Beginning to Accept the Loss o f the Positive Absolute
Allegory: The Titans as Projections
The paradoxical mixture of the Titans’ sacred presence and their historicized place in
culture continues the unraveling o f the Absolute as it is commonly understood. Through
the act o f archiving the Titans in another god-like Titan stationed in a sanctuary, Keats
once again tries to reach for something higher since archiving the Titan^ claims that they
are worth preserving as something hallowed. Whereas in Hyperion, the frozen Titans, as
part o f an allegory figuring an epistemology o f ruin and melancholia, were distanced
from the world as statues in a cave, in The Fall o f Hyperion, they are even more removed
from action and their former selves as ruins to be pondered in an archive within a dream.
Perhaps this double removal o f the Titans from their former god-like selves indicates that
they are in fact allegories o f another allegory, or projections o f their former selves. In
fact, the dreamer-poet describes the melancholy, “motionless” figures o f Saturn and Thea
“Like sculpture builded upon the grave / O f their own power” (I, 382-384). Perhaps the
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Titans in the first Hyperion poem were already alluding to their grave-marking condition,
as Donato argues: “Any attempt to sublate ‘the real,’ ‘the Natural Object,’ or ‘language’
always erects their texts as the allegories o f funerary monuments that hide the
decomposing corpses that lie within them” (149). If the Titans in Hyperion axe symbols
in which the mutability o f nature was joined with the eternal, but who could not maintain
their eternal status, becoming hollowed out allegory, as I argued in Chapter Two, then
they also had to eventually become allegories o f their former allegory. To further the
likeness between the Titans and artifacts, when the dreamer-poet first enters Moneta’s
memory, he “sees, what first [he] thinks an image huge, / Like to the image pedestal’d so
high / In Saturn’s temple” (1,298-300). In creating a simile between Saturn and an image
or artifact in the temple, Keats not only displays Saturn as an allegory o f himself, but also
paradoxically attempts to see the Titans as objects and not as ruins. To see something as
an object is to recognise its coherence in the present moment, which is often
accompanied by awe and some sort o f comprehension regarding the thing or the culture
to which it belongs. In opposition, to see something as a ruin is to be painfully reminded
o f something lost, which often results in seeking an obscured origin or past. Ruins also
often beget more ruins, as in T. S. Eliot’s The Wasteland: “These fragments I have shored
against my ruins” (430). The ability to see something as an object is related to the process
o f mourning as working through grief or to despair as something dynamic and beyond
depression, instead o f lingering on the past and ruins inherent in melancholia. Therefore,
Keats’s attempt to present the Titans as objects demonstrates his working through
melancholia: on one hand an artifact is still a remainder o f culture and a reminder o f ruin,
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and on the other hand, the poem describes the history o f the Titans and the image o f
Saturn provokes a certain awe.

^

O f importance is that both o f the two instances where the poet reveals Saturn as
an allegory o f an allegory are similes. As opposed to the tension between symbol and
allegory in Hyperion, perhaps this return to similes marks an acceptance o f the place of
both allegory, with its family o f metonymy and synecdoche, and the symbol, with its
family o f metaphor and metonymy. This parallels the acceptance o f both the organic and
the analytic and both the ideal and melancholia on the road to recuperation and renewed
productivity.
Saturn’s speech within the vale in Moneta’s memory also reveals that he is an
image o f a former god. There is something almost parodic and melodramatic in this
speech (I, 412-438) as Saturn repeats the phrase “Moan, brethren moan” (I, 412, 418, &
427), the sole word “moan” (1,417,425, & 430), and cries, “O, O, the pain, the pain, of
feebleness” (1,429). Perhaps as Rajan suggests, while the figures in Moneta’s memory
may be images preserved to “commemorate an event of immense and humbling
significance,” the figures may also remind the reader of the “use o f masks in ritual
enactments o f tragedy” {Dark Interpreter 193). This suggests that the figures act as a
barrier to comprehension and that they convey “the impossibility o f knowing ultimate
truths o f which we see only simulacra” {Dark Interpreter 193). Indeed, the parodic
elements o f Saturn’s speech hint at the dark side o f the figures whereby they seem “rigid
[and] nonorganic,” suggesting that the Titans are the simulacra or ruins that Rajan
describes {Dark Interpreter 193). As she summarizes, “The use o f representation instead
o f presentation makes us aware o f a mystery which cannot entirely be captured in the
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brazen vessels o f art” (Rajan 193). This representation also calls attention to Hegel’s '
definition o f romantic art, in which the spirit o f art cannot be unified or captured within
the physical form. As I will later explore in this chapter, it is this impasse o f unification
which leads to Hegel’s end o f art. The dreamer-poet seems to re-affirm the dissonance
inherent in Hegel’s romantic art as he describes the after-affects o f Saturn’s wailing and
moaning:
... Nor could my eyes
And ears act with that pleasant unison o f sense
Which marries sweet sound with the grace o f form,
And dolorous accent from a tragic harp
With large limb’d visions. ( 1,441-445)
The sound and music, or the spirit, cannot align themselves with the vision and form of
romantic art, pointing to Keats’s purposeful use o f parody and melodrama, or the masks
o f tragedy as Rajan refers to them, to underscore the Titans’ own disjunction from their
power, reminding us o f the difficulty o f moving through melancholia and o f seeing
beyond the ruin to the object.

The Dreamer-Poet’s Desire for Change

^

The Fall o f Hyperion’s endeavour to move out o f melancholia continues with the
dreamer-poet’s growing ability to avoid depression and climb out o f despair. Despair is a
more intense and dynamic emotion, whereas depression is flat and static. Indeed, the
dreamer-poet’s “gasping with despair/ O f change” (I, 398-399) allows him to move into
the next chamber o f Moneta’s mind, thereby preventing him from falling into the
repetitiveness o f melancholia, like that o f the Titans with their desire for their past glory,
and exemplifying the poem’s attempt to recuperate. To further demonstrate this healing,
the dreamer-poet marvels over the “refuse” and traces at the opening feast as objects
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instead o f ruins couched in pain or incoherence (I, 30): he describes the “empty shells”
and “grape stalks left bare” as the “sweet smelling” remains “o f a meal / By an angel
tasted, or our mother Eve” (I, 30-34). The dreamer-poet’s description of the amassed
objects in the sanctuary, however, suggests that his ability to see things as objects begins
to slip: “All in a mingled heap confus’d there lay / Robes, golden tongs, censer, and
chafing dish, / Girdles, and chains, and holy jewelries” (I, 78-80). Though the dreamerpoet sees each object individually and though the objects are connected by their possible
use in sanctuary ceremonies, this sanctity is undercut because they lie in a “heap
confus’d:” as Rajan argues, while the dreamer poet “broods over the statues and the bits
and pieces left in the sanctuary (robes, censers, and chafing dishes), he finds in this dead
culture a sublimity and perhaps a coherence that he can only half understand” (“Keats
and the Absence o f the Work” 350). This relapse into ruin as the poem works through
melancholia foreshadows Moneta’s biased and nostalgic memory.

Moneta as Archive: a Melancholic Allegory
Moneta is “blanch’d / By an immortal sickness which kills not” (I, 257^258), a stasis
similar to the Titans’, because she is working her way out of a depressed and static
melancholia. Thus, while the dreamer-poet recovers from despair, Moneta is recovering
from depression, perhaps caused in part by many things: the loss o f her fellow Titans, the
loss o f their power, her “immortal sickness,” the loss o f the absolute, and her preservation
o f the Titans’ history. If I may be allowed a bold statement, Moneta is both an archive
and archivist: she contains the memories o f the Titans within the ante-chambers o f her
mind, which are like rooms o f an archive, and at the same time she is the keeper who
chooses her subject o f focus. She also chooses what to remember and what to forget.
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Thus, her progression out o f depression is all the more difficult because, as an archive,
she is caught in the nostalgia o f the lost civilization she attempts to preserve and resurrect
with her memory. Moneta is an allegory, who attempts to access a higher meaning in the
Titans’ fall. However, her efforts falter and the allegory reveals itself to be hollowed out
because instead o f preserving the sacred presence o f the Titans, they are statues in her
memory. As an archive, Moneta also acts as the allegory o f a funerary monument, who
by trying to preserve and maintain the memory o f the Titans, also attempts to hide the
now ineffectual nature o f Titans. In the end, Moneta, like Benjamin’s image of the
death’s head, reminds us that death is fundamental to allegory.
To further make the poem’s progress out o f depression more difficult, the readers
and the dreamer-poet are in Moneta’s memory, which also evokes her nostalgia for the
lost age o f the Titans. Nostalgia implies that we seek a previous time, the origin, and even
attempt to deny the present, just as allegory denies the void and ruin o f the contemplation
o f absolute knowledge; however, we cannot ever reach the origin, regaining at best only a
ruin. Thus, in nostalgia, we see(k) ruin without acknowledging the true^meaning o f our
loss.
However, all is not lost to depression. As I argue in Chapter Two, allegory
reminds us o f what the symbol would repress in terms o f historicity. If history is the scar
left by the wound o f allegory, then Moneta’s pain and attempt to preserve history
harnesses the paradoxical combination o f the Titans’ sacred presence and their leveling
attendance in the archive to transform this combination into the acceptance that the
Titans’ fall is a regular part o f cultural change. This is a step towards the acceptance of
the Titans’ loss as something inevitable.
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Moneta’s Productive Melancholy
Móneta’s sorrow, thus, becomes productive and positive as it also drives her need to
preserve the memory o f the Titans, despite her “deathwards progressing / To no death” (I,
260-261). Her melancholy also becomes productive because of her narration o f the
Titans’ loss. As Julia Kristeva argues in Soleil noir (Black Sun),
Les signes sont arbitraires parce que le langage s'amorce par une
dénégation (Verneinung) de la perte, en même temps que de la dépression
occasionnée par le deuil. « J'ai perdu un objet indispensable qui se trouve être, en
dernière instance, ma mère », semble dire l'être parlant. « Mais non, je Tai
retrouvée dans les signes, ou plutôt parce que j'accepte de la perdre, je ne l'ai pas
perdue (voici la dénégation), je peux la récupérer dans le langage. »
Le déprimé, au contraire, dénie la dénégation: il l'annule, la suspend et se
replie, nostalgique, sur l'objet réel (la Chose) de sa perte qu'il n'arrive précisément
pas à perdre, auquel il reste douloureusement rivé. Le déni (Verleugnung) de la
dénégation serait ainsi le mécanisme d'un deuil impossible, l'installation d'une
tristesse fondamentale et d'un langage artificiel [et] incrédible. (55)7576
Productive melancholiacs, like Moneta who nostalgically falls back onto her
former reign, must create something like a new language “un incroyable effort à maîtriser
les signes de sorte à les faire correspondre à des vécus originaires, innommables,
traumatiques” because “le mélancolique est un étranger dans sa langue maternelle” (77 &
\
ne.
64). This new formulation o f language results in “l'élation esthétique, s'élevant par
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Signs are arbitrary because language starts with a negation (Verneinung) o f loss, along with the
depression occasioned by mourning. “I have lost an essential object that happens to be, in the final analysis,
my mother,” is what the speaking being seems to be saying. “But no, I have found her again in signs, or
rather since I consent to lose her I have not lost (that is the negation), I can recover her in language.”
Depressed persons, on the contrary, disavow the negation : they cancel it out, suspend it, and
nostalgically fall back on the real object. . . o f their loss, which is just what they do not manage to lose, to
which they remain painfully riveted. The denial o f negation (Verleugnung) would thus be an exercise o f
impossible mourning, the setting up o f a fundamental sadness and an artificial, unbelievable language. (4344) From Julia Kristeva, Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia, Trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York:Columbia UP, 1989). All further translations of Soleilnoir will be from this edition. .
76 “through an unbelievable effort to master signs in order to have them correspond to primal,
unnameable, traumatic experiences” (67); “melancholy persons are foreigners in their maternal tongue”
(53). :
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l'idéal et l'artifice au-dessus de la construction ordinaire propre aux normes de la langue
naturelle et du code social banalisé” (62).

The melancholiac’s work of art, therefore,

qui assure une renaissance de son auteur et de son destinataire èst celle qui réussit
à intégrer dans la langue artificielle qu'elle propose (nouveau style, nouvelle
composition, imagination surprenante) les émois innommés d'un moi omnipotent
que l'usage social et linguistique courant laisse toujours quelque peu endeuillé ou
orphelin. Aussi une telle fiction est-elle sinon un antidépresseur, du moins une
survie, une résurrection. (62)7778
Moneta’s narration o f the Titans’ fall, as a work o f art, therefore, helps make her
melancholy bearable even though she denies the negation o f her loss. It is Moneta’s new
language, therefore, which allows her melancholia to be productive as opposed to the
depressed melancholia o f the Titans which does not allow for any dynamism. This
requires a distinction between melancholia as Freud defines it and melancholia as
Kristeva articulates it: the former always involves depression and cannot move into
mourning until the subject accepts what is lost within himself; the latter, on the other
hand, allows the subject to always be “endeuillé [plugged into mourning]” (62;51). If
Moneta's work as an archive is productive melancholy, she is still in mourning for her
loss, and perhaps can never work her way completely out o f it. While Kristeva uses the
terms “depressed persons,” I would argue instead that productive melancholy moves
depressed persons into despair, as it does for Moneta. The art that results from this
despair is a product, displaying creativity and movement that opposes the hampering
stasis o f depression. Indeed, her poetry is a microcosm for The Fall o f Hyperion, which

77 “aesthetic exultance, rising by means o f ideal and artifice above ordinary constructions suitable
to the standards o f natural language and trivialized social code” (50).
78 that insures the rebirth o f its author and its reader or viewer is one that succeeds in integrating
the artificial language it puts forward (new style, new composition, surprising imagination) and the
unnamed agitations o f an omnipotent self that ordinary social and linguistic usage always leave somewhat
orphaned or plugged into mourning. Hence, such a fiction, if it isn’t an antidepressant, is at least a survival,
a resurrection. (51)
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puts forth a relatively new style o f the poem as rain and a new image o f Moneta as both
archive and archivist, as a way o f working through melancholia.
What further saves Moneta is her acknowledgement o f historicity, instead o f the
repression o f time and history forced by the symbol and the Titans, and her calling
history into question. Moneta, a Titan herself,

is a problematic curator because she is

also a figure in her own history. To make things more complicated, she is a figure in a
sanctuary in the dreamer-poet’s vision and thus in his mind; yet, this sanctuary and its
history are in the goddess’s mind, thus depicting her conflict o f interest. This conflict
calls the writing o f history into question by reminding us that we cannot objectively
record our own history. Raj an argues,
The image suggests how the ancient sanctuary which so completely surpasses the
Dreamer’s imagination in temporal and spatial extent is also reducible to the
theatre o f his mind, which has grown partly able to contain the initially crashing
force o f death.
The ability to contain and comprehend death is what distinguishes the living
Dreamer from the entropie sanctuary o f the past. But this is in no way the ability
to move beyond death to the total assumption o f power envisaged in the concept
o f a fore-seeing Apollo. The web o f history will always remain no more than
“half-unravelled” (I, 308), oppressing the mind with a core o f mutability that
cannot be absorbed into a pattern and therefore anesthetized. {Dark Interpreter
194)
.
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Since history in Keats’s The Fall o f Hyperion cannot be absorbed into a pattern or
totality, Moneta’s conflict o f interest and accompanying questioning o f history can be set
in contrast to Hegel’s desire to sublate events into a productive and evolutionary history.
This denial o f the positive Absolute saves Moneta from becoming lifeless like the Titans.
Further, if the emboîtement o f the poem attempt to make sense o f and “contain the79

79
While Keats does not explicitly state that Moneta is a Titan, the dreamer-poet refers to Moneta
as “the pale Omega o f a wither’d race” (1,290), Moneta calls Saturn “our fallen King” (1,334), and the
dreamer-poet refers to Apollo as Moneta’s “dear foster child” (1,286). Finally, Moneta includes herself
among the Titans when she describes Hyperion’s watchfulness: “one o f our whole eagle-brood still keeps /
His sov’reignty” (11,13-14).
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initially crushing force o f death,” perhaps the form o f the poem and Moneta’s questioning
o f history are also ways in which Keats tries to move out o f melancholia.

; ; ;;

Moneta’s Questioning of History
Moneta also represents Keats’s attempt to move out o f melancholia by calling the
dreamer’s attention to the remainders o f historyj to the war long forgotten and its ruins in
the form o f the Titans and the artifacts in the sanctuary. Thus, she once again shows
herself to be an atypical archive and archivist by raising the issue o f the economy of
history and what we can know through the lens o f history’s bias (Rajan, “Keats and the
Absence o f the Work” 349). At the outset o f the poem, the dreamer-poet sees Moneta’s
face and attempts to mine it for cultural riches: As I had found / A grain o f gold upon a
mountain’s side, / And twing’d with avarice strain’d out my eyes / To search its sullen
entrails rich with ore” (I, 271-274). This drive to economize history, to make it yield
something o f value and even map the past onto the future, follows the motives o f totality
and productivity. It also compels the dreamer-poet’s desire for entrance and vision into
Moneta’s mind: “So at the view o f sad Moneta’s brow, / 1 ached to see^vhat things the
v

hollow brain / Behind enwombed” (1,275-277). But, like the coherence o f the artifacts in
the sanctuary which he can only half understand and which probably add more fuel to the
speaker’s desire to mine Moneta’s mind, the melancholy of the Titan’s tales is “too huge
for mortal tongue, or pen o f scribe” (II, 9). Indeed, the dreamer-poet is too overwhelmed
by the past to do anything but describe what he sees once he enters into Moneta’s mind.
Further, he can no longer direct what sees, as he did earlier by asking Moneta for
entrance into her mind (1,289), and instead becomes caught in the ante-chambers of
Moneta’s mind both literally and figuratively. That is, he ponders the figures of Thea,
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Saturn, and Moneta for “a whole moon” (1,392) and he remains within Moneta’s vision
o f Hyperion’s waiting for his fall when the poem ends. As Rajan states, “By the end [of
the poem] the dreamer no longer strains to ‘do’ something with the past” (“Keats and the
Absence o f the Work” 350). Thus, the dreamer-poet’s human inability to completely
capture the history o f the Titans humbles him, while also deviating from the progressbound attempts to make something o f and from history.

.
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Further, by viewing the history o f the Titans’ fall through Moneta’s memory we
are also reminded o f history’s bias towards its writers, who are often conquerors and thus
benefit from the potential propaganda. In this case, however, Moneta is one o f the
conquered, displaying the lost story o f the fallen and revealing history as not allencompassing, but as limited and painful. Indeed, Moneta acknowledges the pain and
“curse” o f her memories, which is doubled by her position as an archive (I, 241-248). ,The
combination of Moneta’s pain and her productive melancholy, achieved because of her
questioning o f history and her preservation o f the Titans, suggests a certain balance or
i

dynamism in managing what can now be called Moneta’s despair, as opposed to her
former depression.
At odds with Moneta’s productive melancholy, the dreamer-poet’s watchfulness
and description o f what he sees in Moneta’s mind is “like archeology or philology and is
not idleness yet is strictly speaking unproductive” (Rajan, “Keats and the Absence o f the
Work” 351). This watchfulness, while it continues the effort to turn history away from
the enterprise o f domination, also transforms history into the pursuit o f knowledge
through the study o f culture. As opposed to the unbuffered idleness and pain in Hyperion,
the Titans’ fall, therefore, becomes a source o f knowledge in The Fall because Keats
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frames the downfall o f the gods within the ante-chambers o f Moneta’s memory. The
overthrow still yields melancholic, lifeless former deities, but it is the direct or indirect
access to this history which differentiates its affect. Perhaps those who directly
experience the loss o f the positive Absolute, cannot move out o f melancholia because
they are swamped by that pain, but those removed from the pain, as are the dreamer-poet
by race and Moneta by time, can have some success at moving past this melancholia. In
the case o f The Fall o f Hyperion, Keats’s use of meta-art, demonstrated by the dream and
the repeated frame device, provides a further distance from that loss.

Keats and Meta-Art: A Struggle with a New Kind of Art
While Keats embraces the negative in art by writing about the fallen, depressed Titans,
(deconstructing his poem around figures who are far from heroic, and leaving his poems
in ruin, he still struggles with the romantic impetus to conceive art in terms o f harmony
or totality. At the outset o f The Fall o f Hyperion, Keats identifies the poet as one who
“pours out a balm upon the world” (1,201), whereas the dreamer “vexes it” (1,202). This
opposition recalls the early romantic striving for harmony, which Rajanvdescribes in Dark
Interpreter.

■

That the identification o f poetry with the power to heal and harmonize was
pervasive in the nineteenth century is evident in the high status which both Arnold
and Mill accorded Wordsworth for his therapeutic pow er. . . The writer who sows
seeds o f misery in his readers is conceived as failure in relation to another kind of
creator who remains untarnished by the corruption o f life. (164-165).
Michael O ’Neill also argues, “For all its wish to believe in the usefulness o f poetry, the
poem also believes - and herein lies its modernity - that the utilitarian and the
imaginative are likely to be in tension with one other” (232). However, I believe that
Keats casts doubt on this dichotomy, or tension as O’Neill calls it, by leaving The Fall o f
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Hyperion in ruin and trapping the dreamer-poet in his dream. This doubt is figured, as
Rajan argues, by Saturn in The Fall o f Hyperion, who is a “revaluation o f a figure who
has been symbolic o f the Romantic failure [and now] becomes a way to transcend the
crippling antithesis between a classical art that quiets the will and a Romantic art which
sows seeds of misery” {Dark Interpreter 169). If as Rajan argues, the Titans and the
Olympians for Keats are the dreamers and the poets he defines at the outset o f The Fall o f
Hyperion {Dark Interpreter 169), then perhaps the dreamer-poet also represents a figure
who can transcend the dichotomy between a productive or positive art and a negative art.
This is evident when the dreamer-poet becomes statuesque like the Titans as he considers
Saturn and Thea in the vale, but is able to break free o f the negative because o f his human
and visiting status in Moneta’s memory. The speaker o f the poem also represents a
transcendence o f the dichotomy because he is distinct in his lack o f distinction; yet he
writes poetry, since he is the speaker o f the poem, even if it dissolves and does not
provide a balm.
^

N.

The dreamer-poet is not the only one able to move out o f the negative: the role of
the Titans also changes from Hyperion to The Fall o f Hyperion. In the former, the Titans
are evidence o f failure, as the poet implores the Muse to leave them (III, 3), but in the
latter, the Titans’ experience becomes a source o f “knowledge and vision” (Rajan, Dark
Interpreter 170). Perhaps Keats’s resistance to the negative is part o f his struggle to
define a new art since he still feels insecure about altering the old image o f a harmonious
art steeped in the positive Absolute (Rajan, Dark Interpreter 189). However, an implicit
theory o f a new kind o f art which is committed to knowledge rather than the fulfillment
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o f desire for the positive Absolute emerges from the form o f the poem (Rajan, Dark
Interpreter 189 & 196-198).
The quest for this new art begins for Keats with his use o f allegory, which is
rooted in the contemplation o f absolute knowledge in Hyperion, and continues in The
Fall o f Hyperion with M oneta’s position as an archive, which is committed to gaining
knowledge itself. This difference may prevent the latter poem from diving into the depths
o f a depression that the enthusiasm o f Hyperion's end hysterically tries to fend off. While
both Hyperion poems attempt to resist the negative at their outset - the first poem resists
temporality and the second displays a contradictory assessment o f poets and dreamers The Fall o f Hyperion, however, embraces the negative without drowning in darkness by
engaging with the depressing side o f history through a dream and the mind o f Moneta
{DarkInterpreter 198). Thus, Hegel’s ideology and Shelley’s ideal age relate more
towards a striving for harmony, while Keats’s Hyperion lends itself to art which sows
seeds o f misery even as it wavers between failure and an acceptance o f the negative. The
Fall o f Hyperion bridges the gap between these two groups and relates^towards a more
fleshed out proto-modem acceptance o f the negative.

v

Hegel’s Condemnation o f Meta-Art and his End ofArt
While Keats allows for meta-art in the form o f the emboîtements in The Fall o f Hyperion,
Hegel condemns both irony and meta-art. The philosopher disapproves o f irony,
including the brand o f irony harnessed by Friedrich Schlegel in Athenaeum Fragmente,
because it relativizes the Absolute, thereby destroying its purity {Àesthetik 1:95-100). He
declares irony as extreme subjectivity and argues that it is created by the artist’s ego,
“dem kein Inhalt das Bewußtsein als absolut und an und für sich, sondern als
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selbstgemachter zemichtbarer Schein erscheint” (Àesthetik 1:95).80 He goes on to argue
that irony, therefore, lacks objectivity and the earnestness o f “ein substantielles Interesse,
eine in sich selbst gehaltvolle Sache, Wahrheit, Sittlichkeit u s f’ {Àesthetik 1:96).81 Irony
for Hegel remains caught in “[dem] dialektische[n] Moment der Idee,” or the antithesis of
the dialectic, to the extreme o f “unendliche absolute Negativität” {Aesthetik 1:99).82
Because the Idea does not proceed into positive speculation, or synthesis, irony consists
o f only “ein Moment in der spekulativen Idee...auch nur ein Moment, nicht aber... die
ganze Idee," meaning that irony can never achieve truth (Àesthetik l:\00).83 Interestingly,
Hegel argues that the “unendliche absolute Negativität“ o f irony negates the Idea “das
Unendliche lind Allgemeine zu negieren zur Endlichkeit und Besonderheit und diese
Negation ebensosehr wieder aufzuheben und somit das Allgemeine und Unendliche im
Endlichen und Besonderen wiederherzustellen” (Àesthetik 1:99-100).84 This process of
framing the universal and infinite within the finite and particular sounds a bit like
Goethe’s definition o f allegory, which casts the finite and particularin infinite and
r

particular patterns. Hegel also presents the contradictory tensions df.ti^e ironic artist:
“das Subjekt [will] einerseits wohl in die Wahrheit hinein und [trägt ] nach Objektivität
Verlangen, aber [entschlägt] sich andererseits dieser Einsamkeit und Zurückgezogenheit
in sich n ic h t, [vermag] dieser unbefriedigten abstrakten Innigkeit nicht zu entwinden und

80 “to whom no content o f consciousness appears as absolute and independently real but only as a
self-made and destructible show” {Aesthetics 1:65)
81 “intrinsic worth, like truth, ethics life etc” (Aesthetics 1:65) ;
% -,
82 “the dialectical moment o f the Idea”; “infinite absolute negativity” (Aesthetics 1:68)
83 “one element o f the speculative Idea . . . and not the whole Idea” (Aesthetics 1:69)
84 “infinite absolute negativity” “as infinite and universal [so] as to become finitude and
particularity, and . . . cancels this negation in turn and so re-establishes the universal and the infinite in the
finite and particular” {Aesthetics 1:68).
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[wird] nun von der Sehnsüchtigkeit befallen” {Àesîhetik 1:97).85 Similarly, romantic art
cannot resolve the tension between the subjectivity and inwardness Hegel ascribes to it
and the objectivity it needs as it progresses towards the positive Absolute. Perhaps in
practice, Hegel cannot avoid something like irony and self-reflexive art.
But in theory, Hegel attempts to avoid irony and, thus, his condemnation o f irony
and allegory, contradicted as it is by romantic art’s inability to resolve its abstractness
with form, leads him towards the deus ex machina o f the end o f romantic art. Hegel
believes that all that can be expressed adequately in art has been expressed, especially
since romantic art struggles to express its inwardness in form. Further, he argues, that
since romantic art’s subjectivity cannot be reconciled with the objectivity of actual
objects and the real world, romantic art dissolves into its two extremes: “die Nachbildung
des äußerlich Objektiven in der Zufälligkeit seiner. Gestalt auf der einen Seite, auf der
anderen dagegen... das Freiwerden der Subjektivität ihrer inneren Zufälligkeit nach
heraus” (Àesthetik 2:240).86 In the first extreme, Hegel includes the epigram, which he
'
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considers similar to allegory, and in the latter extreme, he includes humour and irony.
Since Hegel condemns these extremes o f art and cannot resolve the problem o f romantic
art’s internal division, he declares the end o f art. Hegel’s elevation o f philosophy above
art suggests that philosophy will take over the work o f the inwardness o f romantic art as
it progresses towards the Absolute. He also allows philosophy to be self-reflexive in

85 “on the one hand, the subject does want to penetrate into truth and longs for objectivity, but, on
the other hand, cannot renounce his isolation and withdrawal into him self or tear him self free from this
unsatisfied abstract inwardness” {Aesthetics 1:66)
86 “on the one hand, into the imitation o f external objectivity in all its contingent shapes; on the
other hand, however, into the liberation o f subjectivity, in accordance with its inner contingency”
{Aesthetics 1:608).
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thinking about itself while exhibiting art’s “dies Gehaltvolle und seine schöne
Erscheinungsweise ist, denkend zu begreifen” (Äesthetik 2:245)

.
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Despite his pronouncement o f the death o f art, Hegel does allow for art to be
successful in its lack o f success, as it continues to attempt to unify its abstract content
with form. He argues,
Wenn wir also hier zunächst im Vergleich mit dem wahren Ideal noch
unangemessenen Kunstformen begegnen, so ist dies nicht in der Weise
der Fall, in welcher man gewöhnlich von mißlungenen Kunstwerken zu
sprechen gewohnt ist, die entweder nichts ausdrücken oder das, was sie
darstellen sollten, zu erreichen nicht die Fähigkeit haben; sondern für
den jedesmaligen Gehalt der Idee ist die bestimmte Gestalt. (Äesthetik
■,/!■■ 1:391)*88
.■
Hegel, therefore, legitimizes art as something revolutionary, constantly turning over and
over, as it attempts to reach its goal o f unifying subjectivity and objectivity. This
restlessness, however, even i f it m aybe bom o f the negative, still strives for the positive
Absolute and the unity o f form and content, even if it can never achieve either.

The Dynamic Absolute
Keats, on the other hand, eventually accepts art bom o f the negative, without the allconsuming drive for the positive Absolute and the resulting melancholia over its loss,
i

thereby also transcending the dichotomy between an art that soothes and an art that
vexes. I call this more realistic vision an example o f the dynamic absolute, which does
possess some o f the sobriety o f Gasche’s sober absolute since both the sober absolute and
the dynamic absolute highlight the profane and secular, as embodied by the dreamer-poet,
gy

'
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“fullness o f content and its beautiful mode o f appearance” (Aesthetics 1:611).

88 Thus i f . . . we encounter art-forms at first which are still inadequate in comparison with the true
Ideal, this is not the sort o f case in which people ordinarily speak o f unsuccessful works o f art whi ch. . .
lack the capacity to achieve what they are supposed to represent; on the contrary, the specific shape which
every content o f the Idea gives to itself in the particular forms o f art is always adequate to that content.
(Aesthetics 1:300)
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as opposed to the sacred and transcendent absolute, as represented by the Titans. The
dynamic absolute, however, moves beyond the sober absolute as it moves away from an
analytic response to the absolute and back into an emotional response. Within the
dynamic Absolute, we begin to move through depressed melancholia into despair,5
thereby beginning to process the meaning o f the loss o f the positive Absolute and
beginning to see the thing as an object instead o f as a ruin or a trace. This dynamism is
evident in the dreamer-poet’s vaulting up the steps o f the sanctuary and the
accompanying dilation and contraction o f time; in Moneta’s productive melancholy; and
in the buffer provided by the frame and dream device. The dynamic Absolute is also
evident in Keats’s attempts to unify the eternal and the temporal, such as with Moneta’s
illness and the unspoiled cloth in the sanctuary.
A certain dynamic balance is evident in Moneta’s sickness as Keats attempts to
infuse some temporality into an immortal god. Moneta is “blanch’d / By an immortal
sickness which kills not” (I, 257-258), like the “pale immortal death” {Hyperion III, 127)
which pre-deified Apollo escapes. The phrase “immortal sickness” is ail oxymoron, since
sickness is a human experience. Perhaps this illness assigns some humanity and time to
Moneta or perhaps it refers to the melancholia experienced by gods who have been
overthrown: likely, both apply to her to a certain extent, but the former holds more power
over Moneta since her sickness “works a constant change” (1,259). The oxymoronic
quality o f Moneta’s illness intensifies when we read that it sends her “deathwards
progressing / To no death” (1,260-261). This touch o f mortality allows Moneta to be
stuck in a stasis only slightly better than that o f the Titans, since it prevents her from
becoming completely ruined and statuesque, allowing her to interact with the dreamer-
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poet, but forcing her to be the memory bearer o f the Titans. But while the mortality o f the
Titans in Hyperion revealed them as ineffective gods, as mere allegories o f themselves,
Moneta’s illness may in fact be her way o f working through her grief about the overthrow
o f the Titans - an example o f how to move out o f the negative Absolute and into the
dynamic Absolute.

Tension between the Eternal and the Temporal
However, an uneasy tension exists in Keats’s attempts to unify the eternal and the
temporal. Moneta’s immortal sickness is one instance o f this uneasy tension, but more
poignantly there are also the artifacts, particularly the textiles that cannot be corrupted by
the moth (I, 75) and have been unspoiled by time (I, 72-80). Their preservation inspires a
feeling o f “awe” (I, 81) in the middle o f the sanctuary, which the dreamer-poet describes
as “old” (I, 62 & 65) and a “fallen house” (1,284). The textiles should be tattered rags
and the “gold tongs” (I, 79) and “holy jewelries” (I, 80) should be tarnished after their
prolonged stay in the sanctuary, which should in turn feel more sacred than destitute, but
instead they have been preserved. Keats’s transformation of temporal objects into eternal
offerings beside a shrine attempts to save what would be human-related artifacts from
ruin. This awkward metamorphosis, however, parallels the romantic symbol’s attempt to
force the eternal upon temporal objects and recalls the path towards hollowed out
allegory and melancholia, highlighting once again that the poem is trying to move beyond
depression.

The Dreamer-Poet’s Experiences as a God and as a Human
Similar to the unspoiled textiles, the dreamer-poet is saved from organic ruin and death
when he runs up the stairs o f the sanctuary and feels “what ‘tis to die and live again
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before / [His] fated hour” (1 ,142-143). The dreamer-poet does not question his new god
like ability to come back to life, perhaps because it does occur in a dream, but his new
symbolic status does present a tension similar to that o f the preserved textiles. Perhaps in
the dreamer-poet’s case, he must attain this quasi-immortal status before he can enter into
the mind o f the goddess Moncta.
Once the dreamer-poet enters the memory o f Moneta, he begins to assume the
eagle-sight and stasis o f the gods. When the dreamer-poet first enters Moneta’s mind to
watch Saturn, he feels “a power [grow] within [him] o f enormous ken, / To see as a God
sees” (I, 303-304). He then “sets [himself] / Upon an eagle’s watch, that [he] might see /
And seeing ne’er forget” (I, 308-310). The gaze o f the eagle references the vision o f the
loftiest bird, thereby symbolizing the vision o f the gods and the dreamer-poet’s
assumption o f the knowledge and memory o f the Titans. Yet, with the view afforded by
an eagle’s gaze, the dreamer-poet can remain outside the action as an objective observer
who is higher than Saturn. Despite the higher status attributed to him by his vision, by
entering into Moneta’s mind to learn about her past, his view is not onl^ mediated by her
memory, but he also becomes a repository for memory, like the goddess. The dreamerpoet, thus, paradoxically possesses both a more objective eagle-sight than that o f the
Titans and the same painful view o f the fallen gods. In addition, “The new ability to see
and ‘seeing ne’er forget’ (I. 310),” as Rajan argues, “marks the crossing o f some kind of
threshold in the process o f self-cognition, by which a knowledge buried in the racial
memory is made fully conscious and recovered for the future” {Dark Interpreter 194).
Perhaps it is this uncovered knowledge which lends itself to the dreamer-poet’s
paradoxical blend o f both objective and melancholic sight. This paradox seems much like
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the dynamic Absolute, which bom o f the negative Absolute, is constantly reminded o f its
melancholic roots and yet tries to move towards something more hopeful.
The combination o f the Titan-esque pain and despair the dreamer-poet feels while
he watches the fallen gods and his temporal status also reminds us o f his dynamism.
Though Moneta assures the dreamer-poet that he will experience as a “wonder” (1,244)
and without pain the memories she constantly replays in her mind as a “curse” (1,243),
the dreamer-poet does slip into the misery o f the Titans. The seemingly contradictory
association o f immortality with suffering, and o f mortality with wonder, may be
explained by the constant replay o f the pain which Moneta and the other Titans
experience. In opposition, the dreamer-poet, in his returned human state, can objectively
and for a limited time view memories o f a forgotten past and glean some sort of
cognizance about a lost ideal and a lost history. Before the dreamer-poet does gain this
insight, he watches Saturn, Thea, and Moneta:
Without stay or prop
But my own weak mortality, I bore
The load o f this eternal quietude,
The unchanging gloom, and the three fixed shapes
Ponderous upon my senses for a whole moon. (I, 388-392).

:
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Though he attributes his ability to maintain his position and to survey the Titans to his
mortality, I believe that the dreamer-poet enters a month-long vigil, similar to yet
different from the continuing stasis o f the Titans, because he also loses himself as he
begins to feel the burden, “load,” and “gloom” o f the Titans’ loss o f power. It is
inevitable that with the eagle-sight o f the gods the dreamer-poet must also experience the
degradation o f the gods. Thus, the dreamer-poet, begins to undergo the melancholy o f the
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Titans and calls attention to the dynamic Absolute’s strain against, and yet movement
beyond, its melancholic roots.

!
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The dreamer-poet returns to his humanity when Moneta removes him from her
memory to tell him about Hyperion and also when he wishes for death (I, 396-398). His
wish to die lifts him and the poem back into temporality because it reminds him o f his
transience and underlines that his life could be without value; the Titans, on the other
hand, would never wish to die, could never see themselves as finite and mutable, which
asTargued in Chapter Two would allow them to recognize the meaning o f their loss and
help them move past their melancholia. The speaker’s desire for death thus follows the
trail o f the dynamic Absolute in working through melancholia, into grief, and hopefully
into something more positive. He may also be saved from his own ruin because he is
caught in the ruin o f poem: that is, while poem is appropriately a ruin because it is
incomplete and does not provide answers, it also freezes the dreamer in his mortality,
creating another paradox - human immortality. We assume that the speaker o f the poem
would die a normal death, but we cannot know for sure because he is caught in a dream
and in time.

Conclusion

:v.:

In The Fall o f Hyperion, Keats begins to present the dynamic Aboslute as the beginnings
o f recognizing the meaning o f the loss o f the ideal. In each o f the above cases - Moneta’s
immortal sickness, the unspoiled textiles, and the dreamer-poet’s changing mortality Keats has prevented ruin or death from completely taking over, thus highlighting the
movement out o f this negativity. It is as ifK eats is negotiating some growth or change
back into stasis, which is the opposite direction from Hegel who attempts to sublate the
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negative into the positive. Keats thus intimates a depression from which we and the
Romantics can move on, instead o f being confined to infinitely negating possibility, as
we begin to move from static melancholia into productive melancholia, from depression
into despair and hopefully beyond. The Titans will be confined to impotence, while the '
human dreamer-poet and the mortally-touched Moneta affect the world. This suggests,
along with the dreamer-poet’s desire to die, that the recognition o f our frail mortality
moves us out o f stasis into self-presence, allowing us to recognize the meaning o f the loss
o f the ideal. As Friedrich Schlegel writes,
Hat man nun einmal die Liebhaberen fürs Absolute und kann nicht davon lassen:
so bleibt einem kein Ausweg, als sich selbst immer zu widersprechen, und
entgegengesetzte Extreme zu verbinden. Um den Satz des Widerspruchs ist es
doch unvermeidlich geschehen, und man hat nur die Wahl, ob man sich dabei
leidend verhalten will, oder ob man die Nothwendigkeit durch Anerkennung zur
ffeyen Handlung adeln will. (Blütenstaub 77-78)89
So, either we “[verhalten uns] dabei leidend [assume an attitude o f suffering]” that will
inevitably turn into depression or we accept the possibility o f “[die] ffeyen Handlung
[free action]” and move into the world.
The absolute persists in The Fall o f Hyperion, despite the presence o f the profane,
V

in the form o f the dreamer-poet, and despite the implied movement into the world. Why,
then, is there still an absolute in this poem and not an abandonment thereof for an
analytic o f finitude? Perhaps it is because the fact that the poem is still about gods, even
if they’re in the background and the dreamer-poet is in the foreground, and even if the
gods have been demythologized, a sort o f aura o f sacred presence still surrounds the

89 “If one becomes infatuated with the absolute and simply can’t escape it, then the only way out is
to contradict oneself continually and join opposite extremes together. The principle o f contradiction is
inevitably doomed, and the only remaining choice is to assume an attitude o f suffering or else ennoble
necessity by acknowledging the possibility o f free action” (Blutenstaub 17). From Friedrich Schlegel,
“From Blutenstaub," Philosophical Fragments, Trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: U o f Minnesota Press,
1991) 17.

o
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fallen divinities and the items in the sanctuary. Maybe in rendering the gods finite, Keats
does also confer a kind o f immortality on the mortal. And in using allegory, Keats still
attempts to reach for something higher. Perhaps in setting the poem in an ancient
sanctuary, rather than the waste land o f modem London, Keats further preserves a sacred
presence. As such, The Fall o f Hyperion has not lost its transcendence and must be
something beyond the sober absolute.
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Coda
Instead, Eliot’s The Waste Land is a better example o f the sober Absolute, though it too
differs from the sobriety described in Gasche’s article. The word absolute is still
appropriate because the Absolute still haunts modernism, but in a completely dissolved
and ruined form. The modernist deconstruction o f the Absolute is a kind o f hyper
dissolution in the sense that the ruins o f the past and present cultures and even everyday
life seem almost incomprehensible and overbearing, and it is also "hyper" in the sense
that it is an over-reaction to the former faith in the Absolute, as an attempt to completely
shake modernism from the reminders o f its past and foundations, to be completely other.
Modernism, therefore, regards the Absolute atheistically, but not with the tools of
analysis like the sober absolute, but from a position o f avoidance. This avoidance means
that modernism does not want to acknowledge its ties to the Absolute and tries to avoid
acknowledging the Absolute's transcendence. Modernism, in its pride, attempts to avoid
what it does not know about itself, thereby trying to forestall acknowledging that it
::'v
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cannot know the Absolute by evading and trying to deconstruct the ideal. This repression
o f higher meaning is evident in the confessional poignancy o f the following passage:
‘Trams and dusty trees.
Highbury bore me. Richmond and Kew
Undid me. By Richmond I raised m y knees
Supine on the floor o f a narrow canoe.'
'My feet are at Moorgate, and my heart
Under my feet. After the event
He wept. He promised "a new start".
I made no comment. What should I resent?'
'On Margate Sands.
I can connect
Nothing with nothing.
The broken fingernails o f dirty hands.
My people humble people who expect
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The possibility that these snippets relate three different rapes o f poverty stricken women
furthers the sense o f not understanding, especially regarding the incomprehensibility of
violent sexual acts. “What should I resent?” also presents a variety o f different meanings:
perhaps she does not resent a man who rapes her and then repents; perhaps she does not
know what it is that she should resent: is she beginning to repress the trauma? Or is rape
something so common to the “humble people,” the poverty stricken who cannot do
anything against such a violation and indeed, who accept it as part o f their lives? The
third woman may not fully remember her rape: she remembers the trauma in fragments,
as evidenced by “the broken fingernails o f dirty hands”. O f particular note is that she
“can connect / nothing with nothing:” she and the rest of poem create metonymies or
continguities from “nothing,” which refers to everything being leveled to the mundane or
profane, like Lukacs’s naturalism which depicts particulars without the general, but
modernism levels everything to such an extreme that there is no allegory in this poem,
*

'

'S

just incoherence and ruin. The absence o f allegory, the sheer naturalisin o f the poem,
suggests that modernism does not reach for something higher as it shuns the Absolute.
But modernism cannot completely free itself from the ideal: it is still haunted by
the phantasm o f the Absolute. Modernism's insistence on continually splitting itself to be
something new points to this haunting or even paranoia - that it will fall back into a naïve
belief in the ideal and that it will not be able to be new - surrounding the Absolute. The
phantasm o f the ideal is present in the conclusion o f The Waste Land, particularly as Eliot
reinterprets the fable o f the meaning o f thunder (399-422). Eliot’s rethinking of
dayadhvam, or to have compassion, is especially telling:
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Dayadhvam: I have heard the key
Turn in the door once and turn once only
We think o f the key, each in his prison
Thinking o f the key, each confirms a prison
Only at nightfall, aetherial rumours
Revive for a moment a broken Coriolanus. (410-416)
There is no compassion in this reference to the imprisonment o f Ugolino and his sons,
who were left to die o f starvation. And only hints o f compassion persist in regards to
Coriolanus who was murdered after he negotiated a peace treaty between the Volscians
and the Romans. If compassion is one o f the values o f an ideal age, then there is no
possibility for this ideal age in the face o f human nature. More importantly, however, is
this idea that if we think o f the key, we confirm our prison; this could be interpreted to
mean that if modernism thinks o f the Absolute, even if to try to escape it, modernism still
confirms the (phantasm o f the) Absolute. Thus, as Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe remark
about romanticism,
nous appartenions encore à l’époque qu’il a ouverte et que cette appartenance, qui
nous définit (moyennant l’inévitable décalage de la repetition), soit précisément
ce que nous cesse de dénier notre temps. Il y a aujourd’hui, décelable dans la
plupart des grands motifs de notre « m o d e r n ité » , un veritable inconscient
romantique. (26)90
If modernism cannot escape romanticism, cannot escape the phantasm o f the Absolute,
despite its attempts to repress its romantic roots, the question remains whether this flight
can ever be possible. But that is a question for another thesis.

90 “we still belong to the era it opened up. The present period continues to deny precisely this
belonging, which defines us (despite the inevitable divergence introduced by the repetition). A veritable
romantic unconscious is discernable today, in most o f the central motifs o f our ‘modernity.’” (15)
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